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ABSTRACT
URBAN TERRORISM: STRATEGIES FOR MITIGATING TERRORIST ATTACKS
AGAINST THE DOMESTIC URBAN ENVIRONMENT
John J. Kiefer
Old Dominion University, 2001
Chair: Dr. Wolfgang Pindur

This study identifies strategies to mitigate the impact o f terrorist attacks against the
domestic urban environment. It uses multiple qualitative research methods to identify
patterns of attack used by terrorists against urban targets in the United States and suggest
ways for policymakers to mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack through not only physical,
but also organizational, political, legal, and social strategies. It uses case analysis, literature
review, and interviews with experts in domestic terrorism preparedness to develop and
suggest solutions.
Terrorism, as with other criminal acts, can have can best me met by implementing
strategies to mitigate the impact o f this form o f crime. Governments are simultaneously
confronted with a rapidly growing number o f potential terrorist targets that must be
secured, and constrained by democratic principles from utilizing many technological
devices to secure those targets. Creating an effective security system that protects against
a wide range o f terrorist attacks while it continues to afford a maximum exercise of
democratic freedoms and privileges is a formidable task.
Several broad, theory-based categories o f defending urban spaces are considered.
This study builds on past research and extends defensible space theory with careful
consideration o f the special challenges in dealing with terrorist attacks. The potential for
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terrorist attack is reviewed, and an understanding o f who the domestic urban terrorists
are, why they may attack the urban built environment, what might they attack, and what
can be done about is developed. Recommendations for public policy and future research
are presented.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

©2001, by John J. Kiefer, All Rights Reserved.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

V

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
As with any worthwhile endeavor, the successful accomplishment o f a doctoral
program, and in particular the dissertation, requires a strong supporting cast o f relatives,
friends and associates. Each and every one o f these people contributed in some very
meaningful way to my ability to devote the past six years o f my life to academic study. I
would like to express my thanks to those who have made this possible.
First, I owe a debt o f gratitude to the faculty o f the Graduate Center for Urban
Studies and Public Administration at Old Dominion University. These fine professors
provided the foundation for my academic career. Second, I am grateful to my
dissertation committee for their time and commitment to the project. Dr. Bill Whitehurst
was invaluable in bringing his considerable background in public service to the process,
as well as for his willingness to facilitate my contacts with government officials. Dr. Len
Ruchelman was always accessible and willing to discuss theory, and his extensive
experience with how cities function was a tremendous resource. I am deeply indebted to
Dr. Wolfgang Pindur, Chair, for coordinating the entire process, reviewing myriad
revisions, suggesting alternative paradigms for approaching each roadblock, and for
professional guidance. The privilege o f being mentored by Dr. Pindur has increased my
educational experience immeasurably.
Next, it is important to recognize the special contributions o f m y family. I owe a
debt o f gratitude to my dog, Rekkie, for ensuring regular ergonomic breaks from the
writing process, usually in the form o f a walk or game o f catch. Certainly I am grateful
for the support o f my father and mother, John and Martha Kiefer, who were always there
when needed —not only during this recent doctoral program, but for all important events

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

throughout my life. And last, but certainly not least, the most important partner in the
process, my wife, Aleta. She deserves special thanks for her reviews o f countless
revisions to this work and others. Without Aleta’s support o f my goals, none o f this
would have been possible.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................ix
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................... 1
BACKGROUND................................................................................1
THE PROBLEM ................................................................................. 3
RESEARCH QUESTIONS.............................................................. 7
THE LIMITATIONS.......................................................................... 8
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RESEARCH.....................................9
METHODOLOGY............................................................................ 9
OUTLINE OF THIS REPORT......................................................... 11
DEFINITIONS.................................................................................... 12
SCOPE, KEY ASSUMPTIONS
AND LIMITS OF THE STUDY...................................................... 13
CONCLUSION...................................................................................14
EL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE....................................................... 15
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR A
TERRITORIAL DEFENSE AGAINST TERRORISM............... 20
THEORIES ON DESIGNING TO DETER CRIME.................... 23
THEORIES ON “DESIGNING-IN” CRIME PREVENTION.... 27
THEORIES ON BLOCKING TERRORIST
OPPORTUNITIES............................................................................ 30
THEORIES ON TARGET HARDENING.....................................32
THE THEORY OF THE RATIONAL TERRORIST.................. 34
LINKING THEORIES OF DEFENSIBLE SPACE TO
THEORIES OF THE RATIONAL TERRORIST.........................36
THEORIES OF CRIMES IN SUPPORT OF TERRORISM.......37
THEORIES OF TERRORIST BEHAVIOR
AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSE.............................................. 37
THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS
AS VARIABLES............................................................................. 39
THEORIES ABOUT TERRORIST IDENTITY:
EXTREMISTS RIGHT AND L E F T ............................................. 40
THEORETICAL TYPOLOGIES OF
AMERICAN TERRORISTS.......................................................... 42
THEORIES REGARDING THE CHARACTERISTICS
OF LEFT-WING AND RIGHT-WING AMERICAN
TERRO RISTS................................................................................. 43
THEORIES REGARDING TERRORIST IDEOLOGY............. 43

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

viii

THEORIES OF HUMAN NATURE AND
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE............................................................45
THEORIES ABOUT WHY CITIES ARE IDEAL
TARGETS: THE URBAN CONNECTION.............................. 47
THEORIES ABOUT HOW THE TERRORISTS
MAY ATTACK: THE TACTICAL APPROACH....................49
THEORIES ABOUT WHAT THE TERRORISTS
MAY ATTACK: TA RGETS........................................................51
m . M ETHODOLOGY................................................................................56
RESEARCH Q U ESTIO N S...........................................................56
STUDY DESIGN.............................................................................58
THE INVENTORY OF RECENT TERRORIST ATTACKS
AGAINST THE URBAN BUILT ENVIRONMENT................58
SPECIFIC CASE SELECTION CRITERIA...............................59
THE INVENTORY OF CURRENT REPORTS ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST THE URBAN
BUILT ENVIRONM ENT............................................................. 60
INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS................................................... 60
INTERVIEW FORMAT AND QUESTIONS G U IDE............. 62
DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES..................................... 64
DATA ANALYSIS PROCEDURES............................................70
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVIEW S..........................................71
RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY................................................ 71
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION...........................................................................76
FINDINGS........................................................................................77
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOM M ENDATIONS.............................135
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...................... 136
IMPLICATIONS FO R TH EO R Y ................................................. 157
REFEREN CES.............................................................................................. 167
APPENDICES
A. INVENTORY OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS
MEETING THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
FOR THIS STUDY, PREVIOUS 20 YEARS..................... 175
B. INTERVIEW FORMAT AND QUESTIONS GUIDE
188

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ix

LIST OF TABLES
Table
1. The Evolution and Shifting M ajor Focus o f Major Theories
Regarding Defending Physical Territory Against Crime........................... 18
2. Incidents o f Terrorist Attacks Against the Domestic Urban
Built Environment During the Past Twenty Years.................................... 81
3. Demographic Characteristics o f the Study Population o f
Terrorists by Political Orientation/Ideology............................................... 98

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The genesis o f modem terrorism in the United States was the bombing o f New
York's World Trade Center in 1993. This bombing incident was the largest
international terrorist attack ever conducted in the continental United States. In 1994,
the FBI successfully thwarted an attempt by terrorists to detonate a bomb in the
Lincoln Tunnel. The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing was one o f the largest explosions
ever investigated by the FBI. That single bombing killed more Americans in the
United States than any terrorist attack in the modem era (Terrorist Research and
Analytical Center (U.S.), 1996). It demonstrated, for the first time, the real and
deadly threat o f terrorism to urban America.

BACKGROUND
To date, most o f the American planning effort has been directed at response
capabilities and security procedures. Very little attention has yet been paid to
designing projects from the start in a manner that will mitigate the effects o f a
terrorist attack. The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici amendment to the FY97 National Defense
Authorization Act, in response to concern about domestic terrorism, provided
authority for the Defense Department to address domestic vulnerabilities (National
defense panel, 1997). Yet the over $40 million allocated was used, according to H.

The format for this dissertation follows current style requirements o f the Publication Manual o f the
American Psychological Association, 4 th edition, Washington, D.C.
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Allen Holmes, assistant secretary o f defense for special operations and low-intensity
conflict, only for training, access to federal assistance (after an incident, and)
exercises (National defense panel, 1997).
There has been recent statistical data that suggest that buildings and
institutions, not people, have been the targets chosen by terrorists. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in an information pamphlet, states that
terrorists look for visible targets where they can avoid detection before or after an
attack such as large cities, major international events and high-profile landmarks.
FEMA goes on to list likely targets for terrorist attacks as buildings, auditoriums,
sports complexes, tunnels, bridges, transportation facilities, utilities, or other public
services. Such facilities in urban areas are especially vulnerable.
Yet despite more effective physical security and technological
countermeasures, it is extremely difficult to harden potential targets in urban areas.
Even if the range o f weapons is relatively short, it will be a considerable challenge to
expand an anti-terrorist security zone beyond the immediate periphery o f potential
urban targets like sports facilities, government buildings, corporate headquarters, or
power plants. Appropriate defense for urban public facilities requires planning for
terrorist attack well before development o f projects.
According to the FBI, most recent terrorist incidents in the United States have
involved conventional explosives in the forms of car, pipe, or letter bombs (Terrorist
Research and Analytical Center (U.S.), 1996). Future threats, however, may employ
more exotic weapons, such as nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) agents. The
increasing accessibility o f these weapons of mass destruction has elevated
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significantly the concern over terrorism. In 1996, Georgia Senator Sam Nunn said that
the United States had a remarkable lack o f domestic preparedness to deal with NBC
terrorist attacks. He went on to say that, "an attack o f this kind is not a question o f ‘ifi
b u t ‘when’” (Starr, 1996). Given the tremendous destructive threat in terms o f both
loss o f life and damage to the built environment, urban planners and policymakers
must consider the potential for terrorist acts against urban targets, particularly those
involving Weapons o f Mass Destruction (WMD) —the use o f nuclear, biological, or
chemical agents —as well as conventional munitions (bombs).

THE PROBLEM
Terrorist acts aimed at cities in the United States pose a significant problem.
According to the final report o f the National Defense Panel, created by Congress in
1996, the "defense o f the homeland" will become a critical problem as more nations
hostile to U.S. interests acquire weapons o f mass destruction and the means to deliver
them (National defense panel, 1997).
Richard Clarke, director of Counter terrorism with the National Security
Council, agrees. "In the future, enemies are going to attack us. They're going to look
for our Achilles' heel, and our Achilles' heel is here —here in the homeland," Clarke
said. He said the World Trade Center bombing by Islamic fundamentalists shows
foreign terrorists' willingness to attack the United States directly (DiefFenbach, 1999).
Leaders also are worried about the increasing availability o f weapons o f mass
destruction and the willingness o f terrorists to use them. For example, the chemicals
used to make both the Oklahoma City bomb and the toxic Sarin gas released in Tokyo

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

4

in 1995 were purchased on the open market- Officials also are concerned that nuclear
technology may fall into the wrong hands.
Besides becoming easier to get, these weapons are lethal. One expert
described a 1979 incident in which a fraction o f an ounce o f anthrax was accidentally
released in the Soviet Union, killing 69 people within a three mile radius. The release
o f a large amount of anthrax or other biological or chemical weapon in a major
metropolitan area could result in thousands o f casualties (Dieffenbach, 1999).
The FBI has investigated more than 160 cases involving the use or threatened
use o f weapons of mass destruction over the past two years. While most are hoaxes,
they still spread panic. More importantly, only one event would be a catastrophe. In
its series o f reports, "Terrorism in the United States," the FBI says that supporters of
formalized terrorist groups continue to view the United States as an attractive refuge
and staging area. In addition, it said that extremists with loose affiliations to terrorist
organizations continue to view the United States as both a staging area and target. The
report notes that terrorists studying the attack against the World Trade Center and the
Oklahoma City bombing "could prompt future terrorists to plan their attacks with
greater care” (FBI Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, 1991). The recent
terrorist bombings of the American Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam,
Tanzania and the resulting U.S. retaliatory strikes against known terrorist strongholds
in Afghanistan and Sudan have given a renewed sense of urgency to preparing for
domestic terrorist attacks.
On the other side o f the political spectrum, right wing extremist groups -which generally adhere to an anti-government or racist ideology —continued to gain
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supporters (Terrorist Research and Analytical Center (U.S.), 1996). Many o f these
recruits feel displaced by rapid changes in the U.S. culture and economy, or are
seeking some form o f personal affirmation (DeHennis, 1997). As American society
continues to change, the potential for hate crimes by extremist right wing groups is an
increasing concern.
During the 1995 seditious conspiracy trial in New York o f Egyptian Shaykh
Omar Abdel Rahman and several followers, one Sudanese national testified that
Sudanese diplomats were aware o f the conspiracy to bomb major landmarks in New
York City. One Sudanese diplomat allegedly offered to help the conspirators place a
bomb at the United Nations by providing diplomatic license plates. The U.S.
Department of State, in coordination with the FBI, declared the diplomat at the
Sudanese Mission to the United Nations persona non-grata in 1996 (Terrorist
Research and Analytical Center (U.S.), 1996).
Some supporters in the United States are believed to be conducting criminal
activity —to include military-style training —in support o f terrorist groups' objectives
(FBI). With the conviction o f Shaykh Rahman, the detention o f HAMAS leader Musa
Abu Marzook, and the American retaliatory strikes against known terrorist
strongholds in Kenya and Tanzania, it is possible that members o f formal terrorist
groups will be considering some form o f retaliation.
Terrorists in the United States continued a general trend in which fewer
attacks are occurring in the United States, but individual attacks are becoming more
deadly (Driscol, 1996). Recipes for large explosives are available for any extremist
willing to research them. It is likely that the United States will continue to face the
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threat o f "spectacular terrorism" for the foreseeable future (Terrorist Research and
Analytical Center (U.S.), 1996).
In recent years, numerous foreign and domestic terrorists were either
apprehended or sentenced to prison. Several known terrorist groups and even some
pariah nations have publicly threatened to retaliate. Other groups may be considering
revenge, but have not broadcast their intent.
At first glance, the threat of domestic terrorism and the scope o f potential
methods and targets may appear overwhelming. Activity by right-wing extremist
groups has remained difficult to assess because o f the cell-type structure and other
clandestine tactics many groups have adopted and the fact that most groups operate in
rural areas. Problems have appeared to increase since the Oklahoma City bombing.
Klanwatch —a project o f the nonprofit Southern Poverty Law Center that attempts to
curb Klan and racist violence through litigation, education, and monitoring —reported
that "[tjhere were 858 groups operating in the United States in 1996, a 6 percent
increase over the 809 groups noted in 1994 and 1995” (Officials Bolster Action Vs.
Far Right, 1997). Although others who track extremist activity acknowledge the
difficulty when determining the level o f threat, a concern for future activity remains.
The same report, along with numerous others, warns o f increased violence, including
the possibility o f biological and chemical attacks (Officials Bolster Action Vs. Far
Right, 1997). Disagreement exists concerning the level o f threat, but the need to
prepare and plan for the possibility o f an incident occurring in any jurisdiction,
regardless o f location or size, remains strong.
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research questions are:
1. What strategies can be implemented to mitigate the impact o f terrorist
attacks on the urban built environment -- attacks using either conventional or weapons
o f mass destruction?
2. What are the unintended effects o f these strategies?
3. Where are the gaps in existing terrorist/crime mitigation theories —
especially in light o f emerging threats from “weapons of mass destruction” i.e.
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
To best answer these questions, four sub-questions will be answered
("attack” for the purposes o f the research is generally synonymous with "attempted
attack."):
1.

What types o f terrorist attacks against the domestic urban built

environment have taken place over the previous twenty years?
a.

Who were the terrorists?

b.

What did the terrorists attack?

c.

When did the terrorists attack?

d.

Where did the terrorists attack?

e.

Why did the terrorists attack?

f.

How did the terrorists attack?

2.

What are the weaknesses/vulnerabilities in the preparedness for attack

against the built environment o f American urban areas?
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3.

How can the involved agencies play a more effective role in ensuring the

readiness o f the urban built environment for terrorist attack?

THE LIMITATIONS
This study will be limited to terrorist (as defined by the FBI) attacks, both
actual (attack actually caused damage to property and/or loss o f life) and attempted
(attack was preempted by law enforcement personnel). Because o f the significant
differences in politico-legal environments, it will examine only domestic (vice
international) attacks. The subject o f this study will be narrowed to attacks against
the urban built environment. By this it is meant capital facilities and land assets
commonly associated with and supportive o f urban densities (generally over 1,000
persons per square mile), and, generally including regional or community-based water
distribution, wastewater collection and treatment, storm drainage, transportation
(including public transportation), and parks. It will specifically exclude
people/assassinations, attacks against hardened military targets even if in an urban
area (for example, a military base), or city-unique targets such as national
monuments, embassies, or the White House. Finally, the study will also examine
those attacks estimated by the FBI to be credible and serious. It will eliminate what
the FBI or other law enforcement agencies have viewed and classified as frivolous
threats, and will exclude attacks conducted by perpetrators later found to be mentally
unbalanced.
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JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RESEARCH
This dissertation will contribute to practice and theory. Theory related to
urban development and safety will be explored and extended to incorporate the recent
phenomenon o f urban terrorism. The case study approach, plus interviews with a
purposeful sample of subject m atter experts, will lead to a more complete
understanding o f the causes and consequences o f terrorist acts in the United States.
Clear, practical relevance beyond the research setting w ill be evident in that urban
practice will be improved through refining urban design to prevent or mitigate the
effects o f terrorist attacks. It will give a priori consideration to the effects o f a
conventional, chemical, biological, or nuclear attack against urban targets.

METHODOLOGY
The dissertation will use multiple qualitative research methods to identify
patterns o f attack used by terrorists against urban targets in the United States and
suggest ways for policymakers to design public facilities in urban areas to mitigate the
effects o f a terrorist attack. The methodology will proceed in six parts as follows:
1)

It will begin by creating an inventory o f domestic terrorist attacks

against the urban built environment over the past twenty years.
2)

Through careful analysis o f each o f the domestic terrorist attacks

against the urban built environment, both successful and unsuccessful, shared patterns
o f attack will be analyzed and vulnerabilities identified. A matrix, showing what these
attacks had in common and w hat was uncommon with regard to types of built
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environment, method o f attack, and vulnerability, will be constructed. This will form
a foundation for further analysis. The matrix is provided as Appendix A.
3)

Next, trends will be identified and definitions operationalized. A

conscious effort will be made to ensure that this study meets the criteria for a quality
research design. Multiple sources o f evidence will be analyzed using triangulation
(Yin, 1984) and will provide the basis for the development o f interview questions.
4)

A comprehensive literature review will be undertaken to suggest and

develop ideas for mitigating the effects o f urban terrorism on the built environment
and to further refine interview questions.
5)

Expert testimony will be gathered through interviews with experts in

terrorism, urban design, and emergency management. An explanatory letter will be
mailed to the participants to describe the purpose and extent o f involvement in the
interview process, the method o f selection, and secure participant's agreement to
participate. Follow-up telephone contact will be made. These interviews will aid in
refining the initial suggestions for reducing the severity o f terrorist attack developed
previously through the inventory o f incidents and literature review, and will assist in
further qualitative development o f those ideas.
6)

Given the ideas developed in the steps outlined above, several

strategies for mitigating the impact o f terrorist attack on the urban built environment
will be identified. They will provide the basis for the conclusions and
recommendations for mitigating the effects o f terrorism on the urban built
environment.
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One instrument will be used in this study: an interview format and questions
guide (Appendix B). The interview format and questions guide will provide the
structure and framework for conducting the interviews with a purposeful sample of
experts, selected from the agencies that have major responsibility for domestic
terrorism incidents. The guide will list the introductory comments by the interviewer,
a review o f agreement to participate and tape the interview, a list o f questions (from
general to specific, with a conclusion back to the broad question), and the debrief
comments.
The purpose o f the interviews is to aid in refining the initial suggestions for
reducing the severity of terrorist attack developed in the inventory case study analysis
and literature review. They will assist in further qualitative development o f those
ideas. One or two broad questions will be asked to prompt the initial response in the
expert, and several more focused questions will be used if the interviewee has not
provided depth in explanation o f the initial response. The goal will be to elicit specific
vulnerabilities, causes, and ideas for mitigating terrorist attacks against urban areas.

OUTLINE OF THIS REPORT
Chapter I will describe the research problem by giving a statement of the
problem, the background and significance o f the problem, state the research
questions, and provide operational definitions. Chapter II will review the literature
related to urban design for safety and terrorism. Chapter III will detail the
methodology for the study, and Chapter IV will present the study results and analysis.
Chapter V will offer conclusions and recommendations for further research.
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DEFINITIONS
Definitions adopted by researchers are often not uniform, so key and
controversial terms are defined to establish positions taken in the research.
Conventional weapons —utilize missiles or (non-nuclear) explosions and, as a
function o f their design, inflict physical injury by imparting kinetic energy but not
foreseeably to a specified part o f the body (Coupland, 1996).
Terrorism - this study will use a current and detailed definition o f terrorism
given by the Federal Bureau o f Investigation. Terrorism is officially defined by the
Bureau as: “the unlawful use o f force or violence against persons or property to
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
furtherance of political or social goals” (FBI Terrorist Research and Analytical
Center, 1991).
Urban — is defined for purposes of this study as “an inhabited place; a place
larger than a village or town: a large, prominent or important center o f population: a
relatively permanent and highly organized center having a population with varied
skills, lacking self-sufficiency in the production o f food, and usually depending on
manufacture and commerce to satisfy the wants o f its inhabitants” (Merriam Webster
Dictionary).
Weapons o f Mass Destruction - Weapons that cause indiscriminate,
widespread destruction. Such weapons include nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons in any form, and associated delivery systems. These three types of weapons
are also referred to as NBC weapons (United States Air Force Counterproliferation
Master Plan).
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SCOPE, KEY ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITS OF THE STUDY
The dissertation is limited in scope due to both resources and time constraints.
It will examine and suggest strategies to mitigate the impact o f urban terrorist attack
against the urban built environment. The cases used in the inventory o f terrorist
incidents over the past twenty years will meet the criteria and limitations outlined
below. Specifically, it will be limited to:
1.

Terrorist (as defined by the FBI) attacks, both actual (attack actually

caused damage to property and/or loss o f life) and attempted (attack was preempted
by law enforcement personnel);
2.

Domestic (vice international) attacks;

3.

Attacks against the urban built environment means capital facilities

and land assets commonly associated with and supportive o f urban densities
(generally over 1,000 persons per square mile); and, generally including regional or
community-based water distribution, wastewater collection and treatment, storm
drainage, transportation (including public transportation), and parks (The New Jersey
State Planning Commission, 1992). It will exclude such attacks that involve specific
people/assassinations, attacks against hardened military targets even if in an urban
area such as a military base, or city-unique targets such as national monuments,
embassies, or the White House;
4.

Attacks estimated by the FBI to be credible and serious (i.e. will

eliminate frivolous threats) -- but the study will specifically exclude attacks conducted
by perpetrators later found to be mentally unbalanced.
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A purposeful sample o f experts, selected by the researcher both for their
expertise and for availability, will be used in the interviews.

CONCLUSION
This chapter has laid the foundations for the report. It has introduced the
research problem and research questions. Then the research was explained and
justified, definitions were presented, the methodology was briefly described, the
report was outlined, and the limitations were given. On these foundations, the report
can proceed with a detailed description o f the research.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

INTRODUCTION
This study will suggest strategies to mitigate the impact o f terrorist attack on
the urban built environment. In this chapter, several broad, theory-based categories of
strategies are considered. It builds on past research and extends defensible space
theory with careful consideration o f the special challenges in dealing with terrorist
attacks. The potential for terrorist attack is reviewed, and an understanding o f who
the domestic urban terrorists are, why they may attack the urban built environment,
what might they attack, and what can be done about it will be developed. These
questions will be the focus of the research in subsequent chapters.
Several broad theories regarding defending physical territory against criminal
acts have been developed, and will be described in detail later in this chapter. The
concept of defensible space originated along with the earliest cities, where there was a
need to provide physical separation from outside the community to ensure physical
safety. The has been described in myriad histories, but by none more articulately than
the noted urban critique Lewis Mumford in his classical work History o f the City.
During the Second World War, Harold Lasswell linked physical defensibility
to political and military readiness as a matter o f public policy, coining the now
famous concept of “The Garrison State.” The idea that physical spaces could
somehow be influenced to enhance safety as a matter of public policy was expanded
upon by the work of Jane Jacobs in The Death and Life o f Great American Cities.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

16

Jacobs, writing in the early sixties and in the wake o f large scale urban renewal in
American cities, argued that a priori design o f urban spaces could be employed to
enhance the safety o f citizens. Jacobs stressed passive measures that would promote
common ownership and surveillance o f urban spaces.
In the early 1970’s, Oscar Newman published his work, Defensible Space.
Newman built on the earlier ideas o f Jacobs and Lasswell, and argued for designing
urban spaces to maximize defensibility and safety. In the late 1970’s, the concept of
defending territory to enhance safety was taken one step further by advocates of
proactive designs for security. Where Jacobs and Newman had argued for passive
measures, the newer theorists, generally lead by Jeffery and his concept of CPTED
(Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design), argued for proactive measures
that encompassed active surveillance devices, hardened entry points, and adequate
lighting to deter crime.
As the concept o f CPTED was developed and embraced by its proponents, it
soon became apparent that the proactive approaches inherent in a CPTED philosophy
were expensive, especially when compared to the essentially non-existent
defensibility provided by the passive measures advocated by Jacobs and Newman. In
order to best utilize limited proactive defensive measures, new theories on where
crime occurs were developed. The premise was that, if one could determine the most
likely targets for criminal acts, one could best employ limited defensive resources at
those locations. This work was pioneered by the Brantinghams with their theory on
the Geometry o f Crime and Pattern Theory, and continued with the works o f Mawbry
with his theory on the Diffusion o f Benefits, Allatt with Displacement Theory, Felson
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& Cohen with Routine Activity Theory, Sherman and Spelman with Crime-clustering
Theory, Plaster & Carter with their Theories o f Territorial Reinforcement, Combs &
Crowe with their theory o f Target Hardening, and LaVigne with Theories on
Designing-in Crime Prevention.
The work o f the above theorists in determining which areas were likely targets
for criminal acts was largely dependent on yet other theorists, particularly Cornish &
Clark with their Rational Choice Theory that took yet another step by attempting to
understand how criminals made the decision to attack a target. The evolution and
shifting major focus o f the major theories regarding defending physical territory
against crime is shown below in Table 1. Figure 1, following, provides an overview
o f the development o f the major theories related to defending territory against
criminal acts.
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Table 1. The Evolution and Shifting Major Focus o f M ajor Theories
Regarding Defending Physical Territory Against Crime_________
The Historical City; Lewis Mumford
Physical Separation from Outside the
and others
Community
Beginning to 1950s
The Garrison State; Harold Lasswell
Societal Influences: '‘The Huns at the
G ate”
Jane Jacobs
Passive Social Barriers Within the
Community
1950s-1970s
Societal Influences: Civil Rights, Great
Society
Defensible Space; Oscar Newman
Passive Physical Barriers Within the
CPTED; Jeffery
Community
Routine Activity Theory; Felson &
1970s
Societal Influences: Rising Crime Rates
Cohen
Theories
on
Geometry
of Crime;
Targeting Specific Locations Within the
Brantinghams
Community
Theory
on
Diffusion o f Benefits;
1970s-1980s
Societal Influences: Social Stratification,
Mawby
Gated Communities
Displacement Theory; Allat
Situational Crime Prevention Theory;
Clarke
Pattern Theory; Brantinghams
Rational Choice Theory; Cornish &
Clarke
Theories of Territorial
Physical Separation Within the
Reinforcement; Plaster & Carter
Community
Theories on Designing-in Crime
1990s
Societal Influences: Continuing Social
Prevention; LaVigne
Theory of Target Hardening; Combs,
Stratification, Domestic Terrorism
Crowe
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Figure 1. T he Relationship o f M ajor Theories Regarding Defending
Physical Territory Against Crime
T he Historical City o f Great Walls. Towers. Gates
Described by Lewis Mumford and other historians

The Death and Life o f Great American Cities
Jane Jacobs, 1961

The Garrison State
Harold Lasswell. 1941

Theories on Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design
Jeffery, 1971-1977

Theories on the Geometry o f Crime
Brantinghams. 1977

T

Defensible Space
(Theories on Crime Prevention Through Urban Design)
Oscar Newman. 1972. 1980

Theory o f Diffusion o f
Benefits
Mawbv. 1977

Routine Activity Theory
Felson & Cohen. 1979

Displacement
Theory
Allatt. 1984

Situational Crime Prevention Theory
Clarke. 1980

• -------------

Rational Choice Theory
Cornish & Clarke. 1986

Pattern Theory
Brantinghams. 1993

/

Crime-clustering Theory
Sherman. 1989
Spelman, 1995

Theories ofTerritorial Reinforcement
Plaster & Carter. 1993

Theories on Designing-in Crime Prevention
LaVigne, 1997

Theory o f Target Hardening
Combs. 1997
Crowe. 1991

This chart is adapted from a chart provided a t the College of Architecture and Urban Studies at Virginia T ech at http://ww.arch.vt.edu/crinieprev/pages/
hdevbody.html

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

I
|

20

Terrorism is a criminal act, and, as with other criminal acts, strategies can be
undertaken to mitigate the impact o f this form o f crime. Former FBI Director
William Webster told a congressional subcommittee in 1987 that the most important
characteristic o f the FBI’s definition o f terrorism “is emphasizing the criminal aspect
o f it” (U.S. House o f Representatives, 1987).
Governments are simultaneously confronted with a rapidly growing number of
potential terrorist targets that must be secured, and constrained by democratic
principles from utilizing many technological devices to secure those targets. Creating
an effective security system that protects against a wide range o f terrorist attacks
while it continues to afford a maximum exercise o f democratic freedoms and
privileges is a formidable task indeed. As this study is limited to examining strategies
to mitigate terrorist attacks on the urban built environment, this chapter will begin by
examining the basis for mitigating and preventing criminal acts in urban areas.

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR A TERRITORIAL DEFENSE
AGAINST TERRORISM

Defending Space: The Walled City
Lewis Mumford theorized that the paranoid physical structure o f the city
manifested itself in the walled city. The great cities o f antiquity, he noted in his
classic work, “The City in History,” controlled access to their space by designing and
building great walls, with massive gates to control and limit those who entered. In
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Mumford’s words, “The protected economy o f the medieval corporation was, in
origin, based on the corporate superiority o f the walled town over the barbarous,
insecure life o f the open country” (Mumford, 1961).

Harold Lasswell’s Garrison State Construct
The formulation o f the garrison state construct represents Harold Lasswell’s
most provocative and challenging scenario for the future. In the development o f the
garrison state construct, Lasswell was stimulated by the work o f Auguste Comte, who
had suggested a social evolution moving through feudal to industrial (Comte, 1970)
and Herbert Spencer, for whom societies were either military or industrial (Spencer,
1940). Lasswell theorized that the garrison state would develop from the industrial
state in response to technical advancement (Lasswell, 1941).
Lasswell offered the garrison state construct in 1937 in response to the SinoJapanese War. He reasoned that technological changes within the military would alter
the relationship between the military institutions and the civilian societies of which
they were a part. This projection was consistent with his general perspective that
technological change is always accompanied by social dislocations and that these
dislocations were responsible for psychological tensions that threaten the rationality
o f political processes (Lasswell, 1941).
The crucial technological development that prompted Lasswell’s reflections
and resulted in the garrison state construct was the introduction o f air power to
military efforts. He perceived that military air power would make civilians as
vulnerable to attack as were military installations and personnel. In essence, he argued
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that the development o f military air power generated a democratization o f risk. The
garrison state construct became a widely embraced theory o f civil-military
relationships. Many intellectuals subscribed to it, as did representatives o f the mass
media. The construct o f the garrison state has been expanded to describe any broadly
applied exclusionary physical barriers among society or segments o f society
(Lasswell, 1941).

Defense From Within
The concept that physical form could affect the level o f security in an urban
community was perhaps first proposed by Jane Jacobs (1961) in her now seminal
work, The Death and Life o f the Great American City. This work was first and
foremost an attack on the urban planning practices o f the 1950's, such as slum
clearance and urban renewal, which Jacobs saw as unnecessarily destroying a number
o f the older urban neighborhoods. Jacobs argued that several factors within such
neighborhoods provided a natural security blanket for the entire community: the
structures were close to the street, with stoops, porches and street-level windows;
members o f the community used such structures and the street itself for social
interaction; and through the closeness o f the communities, strangers could easily be
identified. Thus, the physical nature o f the neighborhoods encouraged social
interaction, which then increased overall security. When these communities were
"renewed," the much different physical environment (larger housing and commercial
complexes, wider and more-traveled streets, etc.) weakened the social community and
greatly reduced the effectiveness o f this natural method of law enforcement.
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Jacobs countered the accepted wisdom o f the time that demanded wide streets,
tall buildings well set back from the street and each other, and turned toward
courtyards rather than out to the sidewalk. She found that the new homogeneity was
dull, that dullness was a blight that drained vitality from the streets, and that streets
that did not attract people soon deteriorated. Jacobs theorized that people are
attracted by people, not by open spaces, and she pointed to the old, richly textured
neighborhoods that were a mix o f housing, businesses and industry as the models to
be emulated (Jacobs, 1961).
Today, Jacobs’ observations have become so much a part o f the theory o f
urban life that it is hard to imagine how controversial they were at the time —
principles such as the importance o f neighborhoods, mixed-use developments that
contain housing shops, and offices, the need for density and the recognition that
people, more than anything else, ensure the safety o f public areas (Jacobs, 1961).

THEORIES ON DESIGNING TO DETER CRIME
As noted by Mumford, Lasswell and Jacobs, the oldest forms o f crime
prevention were undertaken with the knowledge that making changes to places might
prevent undesirable compromises to personal safety. Oscar Newman's (1972) work
built on Jacob's argument that physical structure was an important aspect o f creating a
secure environment. Newman argued that the degree that a space is considered private
influences whether that place will be secure. Very public places, in which no one can
claim ownership, are dangerous, in that no one community has a stake enforcing
security. The key, according to Newman, is to "privatize" many public places around
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where people live. For Instance, Newman argues that multi-family housing complexes
could be designed in which only a small number o f units share a common entrance,
and door and windows all face this common area. Through this physical modification,
the lobby, stoop and sidewalk area, usually very public, becomes much more private,
as residents know who should be there, and are aware when "intruders" are present.
Conversely, potential criminals will see the area as less accessible, and less an
opportune environment for criminal activity (Newman, 1972).
Newman stimulated interest in the link between the built environment and
crime. Newman’s theory was based on a comparison o f two urban areas and asserted
that the differences in design were the principal reasons for the differences in crime.
However, the limited number o f places observed and the failure to take into account
other differences suggested to some that his conclusions may have been overstated
(Mahew, 1979; Mawby, 1977; Merry, 1981; Taylor etal., 1980).
To address these concerns, Newman expanded on his theories in a later book
(Newman, 1980). Other studies o f the influence o f design have compared more sites
(Coleman, 1985; Poyner, 1983; Poyner & Webb, 1991). All pointed to the association
o f design features and crime, particularly features that allow unfettered movement
through urban areas.
These theories all generally argue that physical features that offer better
surveillance and proximity o f sites to well-used locations enable control o f spaces
(Newman, 1972) (Jacobs, 1961). Newman theorized that four elements of physical
design, both individually and in concert, contribute to the creation o f secure
environments. The first element o f this theory is the territorial definition o f the
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physical environment, which is the area o f influence. This definition works by
subdividing the environment into zones toward which the users o f the space easily
adopt proprietary attitudes. These users o f space become responsible for the
cleanliness and safety o f the space as if it were their own (Newman, 1972).
The second element o f the theory is the positioning of windows to allow the
users o f the space to survey the exterior and interior public areas o f their environment
naturally. The goal of surveillance is to avoid designing blind spots and allow
supervision o f open areas that legitimate users use in a safe manner. The third
element o f the theory is adaptation o f the building form to avoid the stigma o f
peculiarity that allows others to perceive the vulnerability and isolation o f the
occupants (Newman, 1996).
The fourth element o f the theory involves enhancing safety by locating
buildings in functionally sympathetic urban areas adjacent to non-threatening
activities. Placing compatible-use building types together is a key concept in zoning
and building codes and land use plans (Newman, 1995).
Newman based his theory on the assumption that territorial behavior involves
personalizing or marking a place or object and communicating that it is owned by a
person or group. Defensive responses may sometimes occur when territorial
boundaries are violated (Newman, 1976). Newman theorized that a range o f
territories make up a person’s territorial network. These include public, secondary,
and private territories. The longer a person occupies a territory, the more
psychologically comfortable and familiar he or she becomes with it. For example,
public territories, such as bus seats or city sidewalks, are the least personalized.
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Secondary territories, such as neighborhoods, which are also characterized by shared
ownership among members o f a group or culture, are more familiar and personalized.
Primary territories, such as homes and apartments, are most personalized (Newman &
Franck, 1980).
Newman’s fundamental assumption is that most criminals behave with some
rationality, selecting for their crimes locations they believe will offer high rewards but
very low risk o f being caught. To deter crime, then, spaces should convey to would
be intruders a strong sense that, if they enter, they are very likely to be observed, to be
identified as intruders, and to have difficulty escaping.
Defensible space theory has received strong supporting evidence from studies
in Britain and the United States (Newman & Franck, 1980) (Newman & Franck,
1982) (Perkins et al., 1992) (Taylor e ta l., 1984) (Taylor, 1988). Studies o f varying
quality began testing these ideas in the early 1970's and continued at a rapid pace for
the next dozen years. In 1980, a theory was formulated that made a distinction
between "first generation" and "second generation" defensible space (Taylor et al.,
1980). In the latter version, researchers considered more carefully how the impact of
physical features on crime mitigation might depend upon other social and cultural
features in the setting.
Yet many disagreed with defensible space theory. Some have argued that the
principles are too mechanistic and narrow to account for the complex issues o f fear
and crime (Brennan, 1997). Other critics object to the concept o f territoriality that
forms the basis o f the theory, while still others believe that Newman and his
colleagues did a poor job o f picking matched sites for comparison and analyzing their
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data (Krupat & Kubzansky, 1987). One o f the major limitations to expanding the
number o f defensible space designs has been the lack o f research about how potential
terrorists view or use the physical features in question.
What these arguments clearly suggest, is that natural police power is
significantly superior to the more artificial, state-imposed police power. In other
words, the existence o f a social community which "looks out for its own," and o f a
physical structure which encourages such community and allows for widespread
community surveillance, is better able to deter criminals and respond to crime when it
does happen. While Newman readily admits that in contemporary urban America a
situation can not be envisioned in which no state police presence was required
(Newman, 1972), the effectiveness o f this artificial police power depends greatly on
how equipped the communities are to prevent crime.

THEORIES ON “DESIGNING-IN” CRIME PREVENTION
C. Ray Jeffery, a criminologist from Florida State University, coined the term
"CPTED" and studied the relationship between the physical environment and
incidence of crime (Cisneros, 1995). Studies were undertaken where criminals were
interviewed as to why they chose a certain location for the crime that was committed,
and what the influencing factors, if any, were to that environment. Based on these
studies, several theories about "designing-in” crime prevention emerged. Crime
Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a theory that links the design,
planning and structure o f cities, communities, buildings and neighborhoods (National
Crime Prevention Council, 1997).
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The CPTED approach is a set o f widely used techniques based on the
defensible space argument. It first and foremost emphasizes the need to create a
natural environment o f limited access, surveillance and territoriality. The most widely
used CPTED design modifications have become extremely popular among designers
because they are seen as more incremental and less costly to install: for instance, the
process o f target hardening uses barriers to entry (such as alarms, locks, bars, street
layout, unbreakable glass, etc.), surveillance tools (better lighting, cameras, etc.) and
other deterrents (property identification programs) to create a more secure
environment. In these ways, the CPTED approach is a more practical corollary to the
defensible space theory. Also, in contrast to the theories o f Newman and Jacobs,
many o f its features would undoubtedly be considered artificial or mechanical.
CPTED theorizes that the physical environment has an important impact on
the types and location o f crime both on small and large scale projects. The concept is
that the physical environment can be manipulated to produce behavioral effects that
will reduce the incidence and fear o f crime, and thus improve the quality o f life.
The theory of CPTED was bom in the 1960s after several studies were
conducted on the effect of the physical environment on crime. Early CPTED
concepts are associated with the work o f not only Jeffery but also the already cited
and ground-breaking theories of Oscar Newman and that o f Jane Jacobs.
CPTED differs from traditional target hardening by emphasizing the
development o f three strategies; natural surveillance, natural access control and
territorial reinforcement. Natural surveillance is a design concept that is directed at
facilitating or keeping intruders under observation by natural means. Natural access
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control is directed at decreasing criminal activity and opportunity. Proponents o f
CPTED theorized that one can deny access: to a target and create a perception o f risk
to offenders. This is commonly accomplisfcied by designing access to one central
location.
Theories o f territorial reinforcem ent expand upon this by advocating the
establishment o f boundaries by using physical design to differentiate public, semi
public and private space. Curbs, landscaping, sidewalks and grade changes are
commonly used tools (Plaster & Carter, 19*93). Clearly, this information is only the
tip o f the CPTED iceberg and many o f th ese strategies overlap.
Theories o f “designing in” crime prevention may be effective, but it is
extremely difficult to determine if a design is effective. LaVigne (La Vigne, 1997)
theorized that physical design and crime levels were correlated. She compared the
Washington, D.C. Metro to three other urt>an rail transit systems and found that the
Metro had less crime than the other system s. She also compared subway station crime
to crime in the areas above-ground. If the system had no influence on crime then the
above-ground crime levels and station crim e levels should be correlated. I f the system
design prevented crime, then there should fce no relationship between station and
above ground crime. LaVigne (La Vigne, 1997) found that, except for assaults,
ground level and station crime were not co-rrelated. Although this is not a strong
research design, it is the best evidence available to date that system design influences
crime patterns.
Several other scholars have continued to advance theories o f defensible space.
Concentration o f crime at places is predicted by routine activity theory (Cohen, 1998;
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Felson, 1998) and offender search theory (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981).
Sherman theorized that crime was clustered, in his studies o f Boston and
Minneapolis (Sherman et al., 1989).
Additional evidence supporting crime concentration theory at places has been
found for specific types o f crime. In studies o f Kansas City and Indianapolis, crimes
were found to be highly concentrated at a few places (Sherman & Rogan, 1995).
Combining the results from several studies, Spelman theorized that 10 percent of the
victims in the United States are involved in about 40 percent o f the victimizations,
that 10 percent o f the offenders are involved in over 50 percent o f the crimes, and that
10 percent o f the places are sites for about 60 percent o f the crimes (Spelman & Eck,
1989). Further, Spelman theorized that the concentration o f crimes at a few places is
relatively stable overtim e (Spelman, 1995a; Spelman, 1995b). These theories suggest
that something about a few places facilitates crimes and something about most places
prevents crimes.

THEORIES ON BLOCKING TERRORIST OPPORTUNITIES
Clarke argues that changes to places should involve making crime more
difficult, risky, less rewarding, or less excusable. This theory is known as opportunity
blocking (Clarke, 1992; Clarke, 1995). Opportunity blocking does not have to be done
at places. It can also be built into potential terrorist targets.
A theory that one can design methods for blocking crime opportunities is
called Situational Crime Prevention (Clarke, 1992; Clarke, 1995). Rather than look
for a generic solution to a specific crime problem at a place, Situational Crime
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Prevention involves a thorough examination o f the problem and then development o f
a unique set o f interventions to address this problem. Such an approach is advocated
by not only situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1992), but also by problem-oriented
policing theory (Goldstein, 1990).
Situational crime prevention theorizes that environmental approaches are an
important dimension to any crime prevention strategy. The fundamental thrust is that
it is possible to avoid “designing crime in(to)” urban areas. Planning developments to
take advantage o f routine activity theory results in an area less conducive for crime
(Clarke, 1983).
Critics o f a situational theories o f crime prevention say that it costs too much
money, therefore it is more likely to redistribute victimization away from the wealthy
to the poor. It also discounts the fact that not all offenders are determined to offend,
but are rather opportunistic. Critics o f a situational approach argue that it ignores the
“diffusion o f benefits,” i.e. a theory that says if there is a reduced concentration o f
targets, the whole area may benefit (Mawby, 1977).
Proponents o f opportunity blocking theory argue that it may have a greater
direct effect on offenders than other crime prevention strategies. This is because
place-focused tactics might influence terrorists when they are deciding to commit a
specific terrorist act. Most offender based strategies try to sway offenders weeks,
months, or years before they confront a tempting criminal opportunity (Clarke, 1983).
Clarke theorizes that, if offenders pay closer attention to the situation immediately
before them than to the uncertain long-term risks o f their behavior, it is quite possible
that prevention at places may have a greater impact on offending than increases in
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penalties or less tangible increases in risks (e.g., decreases in police response time,
increased police presence, or greater numbers o f arrests and convictions).

THEORIES OF TARGET HARDENING
Physical security has, as its objective, “the hardening o f the target against
which an attack may be made” (Combs, 1997). According to Combs, no blueprint
for physical security measures against terrorist attack has been adopted. Still, there are
certain considerations and countermeasures that have begun to achieve acceptance in
both the government and the business community. The question, can good planning
and design make potential terrorist targets in urban areas less vulnerable? has not
yet been answered.
Traditional crime prevention theories typically argue for making a target
harder to get to by means o f psychological and physical barriers (signage/closed
circuit television/fences/locks), and response methods (security staff adequate
laws/procedures/education). This is also known as target hardening, and is an
effective and widely used strategy to reduce crime (Crowe, 1991).
The theory that place-focused interventions may cause the displacement of
criminals to less protected locations is commonly raised as a threat to their
effectiveness. Patricia Allatt (Allatt, 1984) has been one o f the few researchers to
explicitly test this theory for displacement effects. In addition to identifying the target
areas which received improved security, she examined other locations in the area
immediately adjacent to the target area. And she used a control area that was far
enough from the treatment area that it would not be contaminated by displacement.
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She found that crime in the target area increased by 9 percent one year after
implementation, but in the control area crime had increased 77 percent. This suggests
the program may have reduced potential crime, compared to what would have been in
the absence o f the program. Crime increased 86 percent in the displacement area, but
relative to the control area this was only a 9 percent increase over what could have
been expected without the program. Thus, she was able to determine that
displacement may have occurred, but was small relative to the overall program effect
on the target area (Allatt, 1984).
Target hardening appears to reduce crime without major displacement effects.
However, with only two studies, more rigorous research would make valuable
contributions to our knowledge o f what works in place-focused crime prevention.

Assessing Physical Vulnerabilities
It is slowly being recognized by the government and business communities
that security measures against terrorism must go beyond the level o f normal crime
prevention. Combs theorizes that, although indeed criminals, terrorists are not
“normal” criminals: their goals, their willingness to sacrifice innocent lives, and their
willingness to die in their attacks make them extraordinary criminals, against whom
extraordinary measures must be taken if security is to be achieved and maintained
(Combs, 1997). The nature and extent o f these measures remain undetermined.
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THE THEORY OF THE RATIONAL TERRORIST
Research indicates that terrorists operate in a rational fashion; that is, they
prefer to commit acts that require the least effort, provide the highest benefits, and
pose the lowest risks. Researchers have applied this rational offender theory to a range
o f crimes (Clarke, 1992) (Clarke, 1983) (Clarke & Cornish, 1985). Some types of
terrorists follow a multistage planning process that begins with the selection o f an
area where they feel they can operate comfortably, with low costs in terms o f time and
effort, and where they stand a good chance o f obtaining a reward for their efforts
(Rengert, 1989). Subsequently, they select targets within that area (Taylor &
Gottfredson, 1986). This view theorizes that terrorist acts are most likely to occur
when potential terrorists encounter a suitable target where the chances o f detection by
others are thought to be low or the terrorist, if detected, will be able to exit without
being identified or apprehended. The features o f the physical environment can
influence the chances of a terrorist act occurring. They affect potential terrorists'
perceptions about a possible attack site.
Rational offender theory would also suggest that crime prevention measures
may produce diffusion o f benefits rather than displacement o f crime. This would
occur if offenders experience increased fear o f detection (that is, they perceive that the
risk o f committing a crime has increased) and/or decreased likelihood o f gain (that is,
they perceive that the reward o f crime is reduced) beyond the actual scope o f the
intervention. Diffusion o f benefits is defined by Clarke (Clarke, 1992) as "the spread
o f the beneficial influence o f an intervention beyond the places which are directly
targeted, the individuals who are the subject o f control, the crimes which are the focus
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o f intervention, or the time periods in which an intervention is brought." When
potential offenders are deterred (by increased fear o f detection and greater actual or
perceived risk o f arrest) or discouraged (by reduced actual or perceived rewards of
crime) beyond the degree merited by the preventive measures taken, diffusion of
benefits will occur. Clearly, practitioners should seek to design interventions that
reduce the total amount o f crime and/or that displace activity to less serious crime or
to less victimized populations. Better still would be the design o f interventions whose
effects reach beyond their target and thus produce diffusion o f benefits (Clarke,
1992).
Terrorists may decide whether or not to commit a terrorist act in a location
after they determine the following:
o How easy will it be to enter the area?
o How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
o What are the chances o f being seen?
o If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
o Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is
committed (Clarke, 1983)?
In order to assess the impact o f the physical environment on domestic terrorist
attacks, and in order to suggest strategies to mitigate the impact o f those attacks, the
questions What types o f terrorist attacks against the domestic urban built
environment have taken place already? Who were the attackers? What did they
attack? Why did they attack it? What are the most likely urban targets fo r terrorist
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attack? How will they attack the target? What options fo r reducing the severity o f
the attack (zoning, codes, etc.)? must be addressed.

LINKING THEORIES OF DEFENSIBLE SPACE TO THEORIES OF THE
RATIONAL TERRORIST

Beyond Traditional Concepts o f Defensible Space
Physical design changes are but one first step. Merry studied the criminal’s
views on areas conducive to committing crimes. She theorized that there are
differences between areas that criminals and the general public feel are prime
locations for crimes. Her m ain conclusion was that design can provide preconditions
for effective control, but it cannot create such control if the social fabric o f the
community is fragmented. For example, in older urban locations in many cities,
residents and entrepreneurs are often o f different ethnic backgrounds (e.g., AfricanAmerican residents vs. Korean or Arab-American entrepreneurs) and therefore have
different cultures. Merry theorized that it is difficult for each group to interpret the
behavior o f the other (Merry, 1981), which in turn may impede entrepreneurs'
contributions to informal control over events on the street. An important role for
police community-relations councils and local business organizations then, may be to
develop strategies so these entrepreneurs can contribute meaningfully to residentbased control over street life.
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THEORIES OF CRIMES IN SUPPORT OF TERRORISM
Richard Quinney presents an interesting theory on the way government should
respond to crimes in support o f terrorism. H e divides crimes into two basic types
depending upon the motive o f the perpetrator: crimes that are intended for purely
personal profit are referred to as lumpen crimes, while crimes that reflect increased
social consciousness are referred to as "crimes o f resistance." Although the crimes
committed may be identical (i.e., robbery m ay be either a lumpen crime or a crime o f
resistance), Quinney suggests that governmental responses vary depending on the
motive and intended victim. Consequently, i f the victim of the robbery is simply
another member o f the working class and the motive is personal profit, the
governmental response would be substantially different than if the victim were a
member o f the corporate community and the stolen money was to be used to fund a
worker's revolution. The latter offense w ould, o f course, be defined as terrorism and
subject to more intense law enforcement and prosecutorial efforts (Quinney, 1980).

THEORIES OF TERRORIST BEHAVIOR AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
Durkheim theorized that a certain level o f crime as well as other forms o f
deviant conduct (including terrorism) was viewed as "normal” in any society
(Durkheim, 1966). Only when levels o f deviance reached disruptive proportions were
they perceived as indicative o f social pathology. Crime and deviance came to be seen
as functional ~ performing some useful purpose for the maintenance o f social order.
Using this line of reasoning, Kai Erikson wrote: “Deviant forms o f behavior, by
marking the outer edges o f group life, give the inner structure its special character and
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thus supply the framework within which the people o f the group develop an orderly
sense o f their own cultural identity” (Erikson, 1966). If deviant behavior is to some
extent tolerated because o f its "utility," Erikson asks under what conditions does
society say enough is enough, and in what manner does society say it? Erikson goes
on to maintain "we invoke emergency measures when the volume o f deviance
threatens to grow beyond some level we have learned to consider ‘normal’" (Erikson,
1966). His analysis o f crime waves in seventeenth century Puritan society resulted in
a theory suggesting two things: first, that "emergency" social responses to deviance
occur when society is threatened if the behavior is allowed to continue; and second,
that the response is apt to be highly publicized and punitively more severe than that
toward other deviants (Erikson, 1966).
The application o f this approach to governmental responses to terrorism is
identical to that provided by Erikson's deviating Puritans: certain types of terror may
be "condoned," as long as it is not too violent, too destructive, or too organized. The
FBI routinely addresses this issue in officially labeling some acts as terroristic while
ignoring other acts that appear equally harmful. However, once the bounds of
"acceptability" are crossed, the government will muster all possible resources to
publicly condemn the offenders. The prosecutor will give the terrorism case the
highest priority as investigative and law enforcement assets are called in to assist in
bringing the offenders to justice. At trial, the terms “terrorism” and “terrorist” would
be emphasized in the courtroom, and demands for maximum sentencing become
common. According to the Erikson’s theory, the theme o f any governmental response
to terrorism is to restore the "symmetry and orderliness o f nature itself," (Erikson,
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1966) to bring society back into a state o f equilibrium and thwart social change that

might accelerate into anarchy.

THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS; AS VARIABLES
Some theorists see evidence o f continuing; conflict even in a society
supposedly characterized by overwhelming stab ility and consensus (Turk, 1979). As
Murray Edelman noted: “We have compelling evridence from a variety o f kinds o f
observation that political beliefs, demands, and attitudes, far from being fixed and
stable, are frequently sporadic in appearance, fluc-tuating in intensity, ambivalent in
composition, and therefore logically inconsistent rin pattern and structure" (Edelman,
1971). Although non-partisan conflict theory (or cultural deviance theory, as older
versions in criminology are known) has a long traidition in the criminological
literature, that perspective has assumed a more prom inent place in sociological theory
within the past two decades (Blalock, 1989) (B oulding, 1989).
O f the few non-partisan conflict discussioms o f the response to terrorism that
are available, Austin Turk's model o f political crim inality provides the most
comprehensive examination of the types o f b ehavior one might expect the judicial
system to exhibit in responding to terrorism (Turkt, 1982b). In particular, he describes
three distinguishing features o f political crimes: 1 ) explicit politically; 2) exceptional
vagueness; and 3) greater permissiveness regarding law enforcement. Regarding the
criminalization o f terrorism, Turk’s theory is straightforward: "Politicality, vagueness,
and permissiveness in the legal definitions o f p olitical criminality are especially
apparent in the growing preoccupation with terrorism " (Turk, 1982a).
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On some issues, Turk's hypotheses are similar to the suggestions o f Erikson's
consensus approach. For example, both perspectives agree that when political
authority is threatened, governmental agents are apt to focus upon the "consensual
rather than the coercive foundations o f law," (Turk, 1982b) maintaining that the
prosecution o f terrorists is for the common good. Consequently, the terrorist who
commits murder is defined as an "assassin," the arsonist is guilty o f "sabotage," and
some minor offenses may be transformed into "conspiracy to overthrow the
government," "sedition," or "treason." In other places, Turk seems to contradict this
.basic argument by suggesting that political offenders (such as terrorists) are frequently
charged with non-political crimes to avoid giving the public the impression that a
serious social problem exists. The consistency with which government officials have
persuaded the federal courts that persons charged with assassination or attempted
assassination o f the president should be committed to mental institutions is cited as
evidence o f this approach to governmental intervention (Turk, 1982a).

THEORIES ABOUT TERRORIST IDENTITY: EXTREMISTS RIGHT AND LEFT
Profiles and typological theories o f terrorist groups have become common
place. Since Charles Russell and Bowman Miller first published their theories in
"Profile o f a Terrorist" in 1977 (Russell, 1977), attention has been focused repeatedly
upon the demographic and psychological characteristics o f the men and women who
turn to terroristic violence (Clutterbuck, 1980). Researchers describe terrorists as
young, generally between eighteen and thirty-five years old; primarily male, although
a larger percentage o f women are involved than in traditional criminality; and better
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educated than others in their age group (Rubenstein, 1987). Researchers also say
that, contrary to Marxist theory, these men and women generally were from middle or
upper income families whose parents were predominantly professional or white-collar
workers (Russell, 1977) (Becker, 1977).
Virtually all o f these findings are based upon studies o f international
terrorism. With terroristic activity occurring infrequently within the United States and
with international terrorism dominating the news, the domestic American terrorist has
been an ignored and frequently forgotten source of violence. Most people assume that
the extremists in America who are willing to use terrorism as a political or social
lever are closely related to their European cousins -- politically leftist with anarchist
overtones (Wilkinson, 1987).
This view of the terrorist as universally leftist and Marxist permeates not only
the news media but has left its mark upon academic studies o f terrorism. The
typological theories developed to create some order from the numerous terrorist
groups reveal researchers' fascination and preoccupation with leftist violence
(Flemming, 1988). Ever since Russell and M iller theories on the three major
varieties o f the 'urban guerilla' as 'anarchist,' 'Marxist-Leninist,' and 'nationalist,'
research in terrorism has focused upon leftist political violence. We have accepted,
with few reservations, that "it is the combination of these three in specific contexts
which produces the variant left extremist philosophies espoused by most terrorists
today" (Russell, 1977).
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THEORETICAL TYPOLOGIES OF AMERICAN TERRORISTS
Typologies o f terrorists and terrorist groups abound. Peter Flemming, Michael
Stohl, and Alex Schmid have theorized that there are nearly fifty different typologies
that attempt to categorize the varieties of terrorism (Flemming, 1988). They further
reduce these typologies to four major types: (1) those based on terrorist group
behavior; (2) those based on the motivation o f the terrorist; (3) those that discriminate
on the basis o f the method o f operation or types o f targets selected by the terrorist
group; and (4) those that use the historical origins o f a terrorist group to distinguish it
from other groups (Flemming, 1988).
According to the theories o f Flemming and his colleagues, the best typologies
are mutually exclusive, are valid and reliable, and have a high degree of functional
utility. In other words, one should be able to assign a terrorist group to one, and only
one, category in any typology; different persons should be able to correctly label the
category in which the terrorist group fits within the typology; and finally, the
categories within the typology should be able to help us predict different behaviors or
actions by terrorist groups assigned to those categories (Flemming, 1988).
Due to the relatively small number o f persons identified as having been
involved in terrorism in America, typological theories with large numbers of
categories limit any efforts to make meaningful statistical comparisons. The FBI has
categorically divided terrorists’ activities into 'domestic' and 'international' terrorism.
For the purpose o f this study, 'domestic terrorism' will be divided further into: (1) leftwing, (2) right-wing, and (3) single-issue terrorism. Single-issue terrorists in the
United States have focused primarily upon environmental issues. However, due to the
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small number o f persons who have been indicted for these acts, no statistical
comparisons can be made. These distinctions are very similar to one o f Paul
Wilkinson's theoretical typologies, which identified four categories o f extremism:
Left, Right, ethno-religious, and single-issue extremist movements (Wilkinson, 1987).

THEORIES REGARDING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF LEFT-WING AND
RIGHT-WING AMERICAN TERRORISTS
Wilkinson theorized that the 'extreme Left' is characterized by extreme
egalitarianism, an extreme hatred o f racism and capitalism, and an overt opposition to
militarism. He described those within the 'extreme Right' as having "a belief in the
intrinsic superiority o f their own race or national group and the need to make their
own race or national group supreme over other groups ... and a belief in the necessity
and desirability o f w ar as a means of realizing national or racial destiny" (Flemming,
1988).

THEORIES REGARDING TERRORIST IDEOLOGY
While left-wing terrorist groups in America have adopted primarily a political
focus, most right-wing terrorists are ideologically bound by religious beliefs. The
Christian Identity M ovement provides the link that has tied rightist groups in America
together. Frequently referred to as the "British Theory," the Christian Identity
Movement is based on the belief that Aryans, not Jews, are God's chosen people-a
conviction widely held by many fundamentalist churches in America. Sheldon Emry,
pastor of the Lord's Covenant Church in Phoenix, Arizona, is one o f the movement's

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

44

chief spokesmen. His radio program "America's Promise" was broadcast widely
throughout the United States during the 1970s and 1980s. Members and leaders o f
SPC, the Aryan Nations, and CSA have come from among those sharing that belief.
The movement, which is anti-Semitic and anti-black, argues that America is the
Promised Land, reserved for the Aryan people o f God. Similar to Shiite terrorism in
its justification o f violence, right-wing religious extremists in America advocate the
use o f terrorism as a prelude to war - the Armageddon, which will establish Christ's
kingdom (Hoffinan, 1988).
Left-wing extremists traditionally have been sympathetic to, if not ardent
advocates of, Marxism and, unlike religious rightwing groups in the United States, are
apt to view religion, as Marx did, as 'the opiate o f the masses.' Advocating the
overthrow o f capitalism as an economic and political system, Marx maintained the
necessity o f a 'worker' revolution before a classless society could be installed (Marx,
1970). Religion, according to Marxist theory, has prevented the development o f a
proletariat collective consciousness necessary for revolutionary action, slows that
process. While some left-wing extremist groups in America may not explicitly
espouse Marxism, they share one major ideological similarity —a disdain for U.S.
capitalism and its 'imperialism' and 'colonialism.' That commonality has led leftist
groups to seek funding from similar sources. For example, while the El Rukns were
seeking Libyan funds to bomb buildings in Chicago, Moammar Kaddafi was
simultaneously funding the travels o f such diverse extremists as Vernon Bellecourt,
Bill Means, and Kwame Ture (a.k.a. Stokely Carmichael).
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THEORIES ON HUMAN NATURE AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
Underlying both left- and right-wing terrorist group ideologies are their views
on human nature and human motivation. The basic beliefs on these issues provide the
framework by which extremists o f either type view the world, American government,
and social programs funded by tax money. The groups categorized as right-wing
repeatedly write o f their belief that people should be rewarded based on the value of
their labor. Described by George Homans as'distributive justice/ (Homans, 1974)
the theory suggests the commonly held belief that humans are motivated by rewards
and punishments. When combined with the religious influence o f the Christian
Identity Movement, most right-wing terrorists express a strong belief in the 'protestant
ethic’ (Weber, 1976). Logically expanded, these basic views are central to the rightwing terrorists' opposition to affirmative action, welfare, and educational programs
for the economically disadvantaged that exclude non-minorities.
With their strong belief in the righteousness o f capitalism and a disdain for
communism, terrorists o f the right have little sympathy for the wayward and
dispossessed. While many Americans harbor the same attitudes, the violent extremists
o f the Right see as futile any attempts to rectify the perceived injustices of affirmative
action or welfare fraud through legislative change (Beam, 1987). Common to many
Americans who retain a strong belief in state's rights, right-wing extremists desire to
maintain control over public funds at the local level. Consequently, the anti-tax
beliefs o f SPC permeate most o f the groups of the extreme Right. With the Zionist
Occupation Government (ZOG) firmly in control, the seemingly disparate extremists
o f the Christian Identity Movement turned to militant action under the guise of
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preparing for Christ's Second Coining (Anti-Defamation League o f B'nai B'rith,
1982).
Leftist ideology holds to Marx's maxim "From each according to his abilities,
to each according to his need” (Marx, 1956). Believing that capitalist societies
unleash and encourage a manipulative greed in humans, leftist terrorist groups in
America today typically aspire to create a social system devoid o f the greed they
maintain characterizes American society. Consequently, such disparate groups as the
FAUN and the Macheteros, the UFF, and the NAPF held similar views regarding the
United States (Cullen, 1984). All o f these groups were allied ideologically by their
opposition to capitalism's presumed exploitation o f blacks, Hispanics, and the
working class (Fernandez, 1987). They perceived welfare and affirmative action
programs as inadequate efforts to reform postindustrial capitalist society while
maintaining the corrupt status quo. Such efforts were viewed as attempts to pacify the
dissatisfied masses and prevent the development o f the collective consciousness
necessary for revolutionary action. Having given up on their ability to change the
system without violent action, these left-wing extremists turned to Leon Trotsky's
views on 'heroic terrorism' out o f frustration and despair (Trotsky, 1974). The
effectiveness o f the Puerto Rican nationalist groups was greatly diminished in 1987
with the imprisonment o f most o f its key leadership. M ost o f these leaders, however,
were released by President Clinton in September o f 1999.
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THEORIES ABOUT WHY CITIES ARE IDEAL TARGETS: THE URBAN
CONNECTION
Leftist groups found urban areas more to their liking, while right-wing
extremists have preferred the countryside. Many members o f leftist groups are blacks
or Hispanics, and large concentrations o f Puerto Ricans live in Chicago and Hartford.
Blacks also disproportionately live in urban areas. Much o f the explanation has to do
with the ideological and tactical differences between the two (Janke, 1983).
The Christian Identity Movement spawned its radical terrorists during the past
decade only. In contrast, violent left-wing extremists in America have been in the
business o f terrorism at least since the 1960s. During that time, leftist radicals learned
to focus their attention on urban areas in America and, to some extent, developed a
fear o f basing their operations in the countryside. According to Janke, part o f that
fear grew because o f revolutionary failures in the 1960s (Janke, 1983).
When Fidel Castro defeated the Batista regime in Cuba in 1959, he became
the darling o f the oppressed masses. By mounting a campaign o f extortion, terror, and
conventional guerilla warfare, Castro first concentrated on taking the rural
countryside o f Cuba. Since the export o f sugar was the economic base o f the island,
Castro gradually strangled Havana by capturing and controlling the plantations o f
rural Cuba (Janke, 1983).
With Che Guevara at his side, Castro became the leading spokesperson for
revolution in the Americas. At the Tricontinental Conference in 1966, Guevara
presented the idea o f exporting Castro's revolution to Bolivia. By mounting a rural
revolutionary campaign, he believed the Bolivian government could be overthrown

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

48

and the base created there could be used to further export revolution to neighboring
countries, particularly to his homeland o f Argentina. (Janke, 1983) However,
Guevara's capture and death in October o f 1967 had a chilling effect on the advocates
o f rural revolution. The failure o f the National Liberation Army (ELN) to wage a
successful rural campaign in Bolivia was carefully scrutinized by leftist strategists in
Latin and North America. They turned to a more radical approach, one brought
forward by despair and frustration at being unable to mount a successful conventional
guerilla campaign or to develop the collective consciousness o f the masses. The urban
strategies o f Carlos Marighella and Abraham Guillen became the logical alternative to
rural revolution (Marighella, 1971) (Guillen, 1973).
The urban setting was described by Marighella in the Mini-manual o f the
Urban Guerilla as the ideal location for terrorist operations. Originally published in
1967, the Mini-manual has been found among the possessions of almost every leftist
terrorist group in America, perhaps due to Castro's distribution o f it to the
Venceremos Brigades, the leftist students who came to Cuba in the late 1960s to help
with sugar cane harvests. The manual advocated an urban location for two reasons.
Theoretically, it provided the opportunity to strike at the very seat o f capitalism;
tactically, it offered the anonymity o f the crowd as a safe haven for its revolutionary
members (Marighella, 1971).
But even though Leftist have targeted urban areas in their doctrinal
publications, the literature shows that terrorist attacks from the right on the urban
built environment cannot be dismissed (Beam, 1987). Almost exclusively based in
rural America, violent extremists o f the right have met with much the same fate as
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Guevara's army. With their fixed bunker-style camps, they have been identified with
ease, and were arrested and prosecuted in large numbers during the 1980s and 1990s.
Despite these weaknesses, they had specific reasons for choosing to locate in the
hinterlands of America. With the purported imminence o f Armageddon, these groups
viewed their survivalist camps as necessary and required by God. They interpret
biblical passages that speak o f end-time events as being addressed directly to and for
them. Numerous scriptures are interpreted by the militant Right as commands by God
to prepare for Armageddon (Beam, 1987) .
However, the camps o f the Christian Identity extremists were more than just a
tactical choice; they represented an effort to escape the pollutants o f urban life —large
concentrations of ethnic minorities, a tolerance for homosexual rights, and a liberal
press. (Beam, 1987) These camps frequently housed entire families, with a church as
the center o f social life. CS A, for example, at one time housed upwards o f one
hundred persons. Most o f the camp's inhabitants never became involved in terrorist
activity (Beam, 1987).

THEORIES ABOUT HOW THE TERRORISTS MAY ATTACK: THE TACTICAL
APPROACH
Extremist groups that engage in violent action to overthrow established
governments are faced with a paradox. On the one hand, the criminal nature o f much
o f their activities requires that they maintain a clandestine existence. On the other
hand, the organization must engage in political and propagandists activity to elicit
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public support for the movement. All violent extremists, whether leftist or rightist,
are faced with the dilemma o f needing both secrecy and publicity (Laqueur, 1977).
Inspired by the writings o f noted South American revolutionary theorists
Abraham Guillen and Carlos Marighela, leftist revolutionaries in the United States
adopted the use of cellular structures: safe houses, "mail drops" as a means o f
communication, and a variety o f other clandestine tactics that have been successful in
maintaining the anonymity o f group members. The best example is provided by
members o f the UFF, the leftist revolutionary band headed by Levasseur. Members o f
the group successfully evaded capture for nearly a decade before their arrests in 1984.
The leader o f the UFF, Raymond Levasseur, had been on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted
list since 1977. As James Greenleaf, an FBI special agent involved in the manhunt,
explained, "UFF members have an ability to blend in with the community as average
citizens.... If you are willing to cut your ties with the past, it's pretty easy to disappear
in this country" (Cullen, 1984). In adopting a clandestine cellular approach, however,
their ability to recruit and to engage in legitimate political propagandizing is severely
restricted (Laqueur, 1977).
According to Laqueur, Christian Identity extremists chose to build popular
support by creating 'survivalist' camps. Such camps also allowed male members to
bring their families to live on the compound. Unfortunately, from the terrorist's point
o f view, such permanent sites are easily located and observed by law enforcement
personnel (Laqueur, 1977). Abraham Guillen made the same observations regarding
the failures o f the Tupamaros in Uruguay: the establishment of'fixed fronts' for
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supplies, support, and propaganda were easy targets for governmental responses
(Guillen, 1973).
In addition, the right-wing terrorist groups chose to link their organizations
nationally rather than develop distinct clandestine cells. Apparently, this issue was
debated extensively by the members o f various Identity groups. Within two years the
major leaders o f right-wing terrorist groups from around the country were on trial for
conspiring to overthrow the U.S. government. Major pieces o f evidence introduced
during their trials included verbal and written communications to almost every known
leader in the movement, newsletters, and evidence o f a computerized national
telephone network (United States v. Miles et. al.).

THEORIES ABOUT WHAT THE TERRORISTS MAY ATTACK: TARGETS
Almost all violent extremist movements select two basic types o f targets:
those that help to fund their operations and those that help to further the political or
social causes advocated by the organization. Marighela referred to the first o f these
targets as "the appropriation o f government resources" (Marighella, 1971). Both leftand right-wing extremists in America have found robbery necessary for funding the
revolution. Few have found sufficient external support to make ends meet otherwise.
Others, like the El Rukns, have solicited funds from outside sources (Laqueur, 1977).
Consequently, most violent extremist groups, Left and Right, are forced to
stoop to "ordinary" criminality to support their causes. In fact, some o f the biggest
armored car robberies in American history have involved American terrorists. It is
one o f the few similarities between the two polar types (Laqueur, 1977).
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Beyond the issue o f funding, however, leftist and rightist groups bear marked
differences in target selection. Since terrorism is, in many ways, a staged media event,
the symbolic nature o f the target frequently is as important to the terrorist as the
extent o f damage the incident causes. For both, the targets ultimately selected bear the
mark o f their respective ideologies (Bowman, 1994).
Bowman theorizes that targets generally follow broad categories based on the
motives o f the group or on the individual planning the attack. Domestic groups,
including right-wing, issue-oriented, radical organizations and separatists, often
choose targets for a specific purpose. Targets normally fall into five broad categories,
some that overlap, depending on the motives o f those planning the attack (Bowman,
1994).
According to Bowman’s theory, symbolic or public message targets represent
the first, the most common, and by far the largest, category. These may include
prominent landmarks, electrical utilities, pipelines, state and local government
buildings, universities, certain federal government buildings, and businesses and
industries involved in such areas as chemical production, animal research, forest or
wood products, and refineries (Bowman, 1994).
The second category includes government-owned or -operated facilities. These
consist of tunnels, computer facilities, airports, state capitols, bridges and overpasses,
maritime facilities (e.g., locks and harbors), and law enforcement buildings and
support structures (Bowman, 1994).
The third category involves military targets (e.g., military bases, museums,
and testing facilities). While generally more secure than other potential targets, these
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offer an immense opportunity to embarrass the military and the U.S. government
(Bowman, 1994).
Cyber targets comprise the fourth category o f potential targets. An enormous
psychological impact could result from targeting utilities, hacking into their networks
and control systems, and shutting them down. Other potential cyber targets include air
traffic control centers, financial networks, utility distribution networks, emergency 91-1 centers, and other vital services that rely on computer-operated control systems
and networks (Bowman, 1994).
Individual victims represent the fifth and last major target category.
Kidnapping, extortion, assassination, and other human target attacks accomplish
terrorist objectives. While intimidation remains the most common tactic used against
individuals to gain compliance, domestic terrorists continue to employ violence.
Individuals most likely targeted include elected government officials, law
enforcement personnel, tax collectors, court clerks, members o f the judiciary and
prosecution systems, and families in each o f these categories (Bowman, 1994).
Threat assessment in this area requires not only evaluation o f the individual or
group making the threat but also an assessment o f the vulnerability o f the potential
victim. This last category is beyond the scope o f this study.
Militant members o f the Christian Identity movement have frequently spoken
o f striking out against Jews. In reality, their activities have been limited primarily to
strikes against Jewish persons and property or against groups supportive o f activities
considered immoral by Identity members, such as adult theaters and organizations
allegedly promoting homosexual rights. Order members were indicted for
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firebombing the Embassy theater in Seattle, Washington; attempting to bum the
Congregation Ahavath Israel Synagogue in Boise, Idaho; and for machine-gunning
Jewish talk show host Alan Berg outside his home in Denver, Colorado. Similarly,
two Aryan Nations members were arrested in Seattle in May 1990 for conspiring to
bomb black bars in Tacoma, Korean businesses in south Tacoma, and a Jewish
synagogue in Seattle, Washington (FBI Says Two Men Planned Bomb Attack on
Homosexual Bar, 1990). CSA member Richard Wayne Snell was convicted o f the
1984 shooting death o f a black Arkansas state trooper and is now on death row for the
slaying o f a Jewish Texarkana, Arkansas pawnshop owner. Another CSA member,
William Thomas, was linked with the August 1983 firebombing o f the Jewish
Community Center in Bloomington, Indiana.
Although the violent acts o f right-wing extremists have been limited primarily
to racial and religious "enemies," there have been ominous and foreboding exceptions
that indicated the leaders o f the extreme Right intended to expand their terrorist
activities. James Ellison, CSA leader turned prosecution witness, testified at the 1988
national trial o f right-wing extremist leaders that Robert Miles, former KKK leader,
gave him a thirty-gallon barrel o f cyanide and declared: "The ones who would be
killed would not really matter. It would be a good cleansing."" Ellison claimed the
Washington, D.C., water system was suggested as a possible target. Although Miles
was acquitted o f the charges, more recent threats have been received that suggested
the release o f dangerous chemicals in densely populated areas. The evidence suggests
a move toward more indiscriminate violence by right-wing terrorists (Group Weighed
Cyanide Assault, 1988).
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Extremists o f the Left have been much more politically oriented in their
selection o f targets. Rather than churches, synagogues, homosexual bars, and non
governmental individuals, leftist terrorists have focused upon (1) representatives o f
government, civil and military personnel, buildings, and equipment; and (2) large
corporations —symbols o f capitalism. For example, the 1986 federal indictments o f
eight members o f the UFF listed the bombings o f two county courthouses in
Massachusetts; twelve bombings o f major corporations such as EBM, Honeywell,
Mobil Oil and Union Carbide; one bank; and four Army and Navy reserve centers or
recruiting offices. They financed their operations from 1976 to 1984 by robbing eight
banks in Maine, Connecticut, Vermont, New York, and Virginia. M19CO was
responsible for a series o f similar bombings from 1983-1985. During that period the
group bombed five federal and military installations, including the U.S. Capitol, and
three other targets: the South African Consulate, the Patrolmen's Benevolent
Association, and the Israeli Aircraft Industries Building. FALN bombings in Chicago
followed similar patterns. The 1983 indictment of four FALN leaders cited the
bombings o f four banks, thirteen corporate buildings, five military installations or
buildings, as well as the headquarters o f the Chicago Police Department, the Cook
County Building, and a U.S. Post Office building (U.S. House o f Representatives,
1987).
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CHAPTER HI

METHODOLOGY

According to Crowe, a fair amount is known about designing and redesigning
locations so that a setting's physical features—given certain social and cultural
conditions—help discourage criminal acts (Crowe, 1991). Yet what other strategies
contribute to mitigating the impact o f terrorist attack against the urban built
environment? What might be the unintended effects o f these strategies? Research to
date clearly counters the notion that physical environment features have stand-alone
effects on criminal acts and related problems. Their effectiveness depends on other
features o f the setting in question, especially local social, cultural, and organizational
dynamics. Too little is known to test specific hypotheses at this stage.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This research will use an exploratory approach to examine three major
questions regarding strategies to mitigate the impact o f terrorism on the urban built
environment. It will suggest policies and strategies to mitigate the impact o f terrorist
attacks. To do that, it will answer the following questions (potential data sources are
provided after the sub-questions on the following page):
1.

What strategies can be implemented to mitigate the impact o f terrorist

attacks on urban areas —attacks using either conventional and/or weapons o f mass
destruction?
2.

What might be the unintended effects o f these strategies?
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3.

Where are the gaps in existing terrorist/crime mitigation theories —

especially in light o f emerging threats from “weapons o f mass destruction” i.e.
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
To best answer these questions, several sub-questions will be answered
("attack” for the purposes of the research is generally synonymous with "attempted
attack."):
1.

What types o f terrorist attacks against the domestic urban built

environment have taken place already? (retrospective data —case study o f
entire population of cases over past twenty years that meet criteria for this
study).

2.

a.

Who were the terrorists?

b.

What did the terrorists attack?

c.

When did the terrorists attack?

d.

Where did the terrorists attack?

e.

Why did the terrorists attack?

f.

How did the terrorists attack?

What are the weaknesses/vulnerabilities in the preparedness for

attack against the build environment o f American urban areas? (retrospective
data —case studies, government reports, independent reports and analysis;
prospective data —expert interviews).
3.

What should be done differently? (retrospective data —

government reports, independent reports and analysis; prospective data —
expert interviews).
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4.

How can. the involved agencies play a more effective role in

ensuring the readiness o f the urban built environment for terrorist attack?
(retrospective data —government reports, independent reports and analysis;
prospective data —expert interviews).

STUDY DESIGN
This study investigated the theoretical and applied aspects o f implementing
strategies to mitigate the impact o f terrorist attacks against the urban built
environment using a descriptive research design. A qualitative method o f data
collection and analysis was used to more fully document mitigation strategies.

THE INVENTORY OF RECENT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST THE
URBAN BUILT ENVIRONMENT
As the first step in the study, it was necessary to take inventory o f who the
domestic terrorists were, what in the urban built environment they were attacking,
when they were attacking their targets, where they were attacking the urban target,
why they were conducting the attack, and how they were attacking. To do this, it was
necessary to carefully examine the population o f incidents o f domestic terrorist
attacks against the urban built environment.
The study began with a thorough examination o f terrorist attacks against the
U.S. urban built environment over the past twenty years. The twenty-year time period
was used because it was in the early 1980s that domestic terrorism first became a real
concern for U.S. policy makers (FBI, 1996). The 1980s saw a significant increase in
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the number o f terrorist incidents throughout the world beginning with the highly
visible release o f American hostages in Iran, and through the evolution o f “get tough”
Reagan initiatives toward terrorists, both domestic and international. The incidents
were selected to ensure that they were domestic incidents, that they were viewed as
acts o f terrorism based on F.B.I. guidelines, that they occurred in urban settings based
on the Census Bureau’s criteria for 'iirban,” and that the targets were some form o f
the urban built environment, as opposed to an assassination, airport, or a unique
political target such as an embassy or national monument.

SPECIFIC CASE SELECTION CRITERIA
All cases selected were post 1980. This is because, as a result o f the Iran
hostage crisis in 1979, the ability of terrorism to directly affect the American
populace was generally realized by most citizens, and certainly government
leadership. It was also the period when, beginning with airports, the federal
government took the first steps to mitigate the impact o f terrorism on our citizens,
both internationally and domestically. It was, in effect, the genesis of domestic
preparedness efforts.
A second o f the criteria was that the terrorist attack took place in an urban
area, and was primarily targeted against some part o f an urban built environment, i.e.
not a targeted assassination. This was important in order to eliminate “nongeneralizable” attacks - attacks on national monuments, embassies, consulates, the
UN —that could not easily be viewed as having broad, metropolitan applicability o f
mitigating strategies.
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As a result o f careful study o f these cases, a matrix was developed showing
the “who,” “what,” “when,” “where,” “why,” and “how” o f attacks. A condensed
version o f that matrix is provided in Appendix A. The overall purpose o f analyzing
the wide range o f terrorist attacks over the period 1980-2000 was to identify
commonalities o f attacks and provide a common framework for identifying
weaknesses.

THE INVENTORY OF CURRENT REPORTS ON TERRORIST ATTACKS
AGAINST THE URBAN BUILT ENVIRONMENT
After determining the “who,” “what,” “when,” “where,” “why,” and “how” of
the domestic terrorist attacks against the urban built environment over the past twenty
years, it was then necessary to carefully determine what had been done, and what
measures were in place, to mitigate future attacks. To do this, it was necessary to
review government and independent reports on domestic terrorism preparedness
policy initiatives from myriad agencies at the federal, state, regional and local level.
The purpose o f examining the reports was to further identify weaknesses in domestic
urban terrorism defenses, determine what has already been done, and identify
promising initiatives.

INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS
Based on information generated by both the inventory o f terrorist incidents in
the cases studies, and a review' o f current reports, an analysis o f policy direction
conducted through interviews was conducted with a purposeful sample o f subject
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matter experts. The interviews would provide an opportunity to clarify policy
alternatives, develop additional strategies, and prioritize those strategies to mitigate
domestic terrorist attacks.
According to Rubin and Rubin (Rubin & Rubin, 1995), the design o f a study
guides the researcher in what and whom to ask. They note that whom the researcher
chooses to interview should match the definition o f the subject o f the research. The
Rubins point out that the people interviewed should satisfy three requirements: they
should be knowledgeable about the cultural arena or the situation or experience being
studied; they should be willing to talk; and when people in the arena have different
perspectives, the interviewees should represent the range o f points o f view (Rubin &
Rubin, 1995).
The next step in the study involved semi-structured face-to-face interviews
with a purposeful sample o f twelve first-line disaster planners and responders.
Easterby-Smith notes that this type o f interview is particularly appropriate when “it is
necessary to understand the constructs that the interviewee uses as a basis for her
opinions and beliefs about a particular matter or situation.” (Easterby-Smith et al.,
1991). The participants for the interviews consisted of 12 key disaster planners from
federal, state and local agencies that have responsibilities for responding to terrorist
attacks against the urban built environment. The specific criteria for selection as an
interview participant was middle- to senior level administrative responsibility in one
o f the government agencies that Governor Gilmore of Virginia, at the direction of
President Clinton, tasked in 1998 with assessing domestic terrorism preparedness.
The participants are among the most knowledgeable in the field.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

62

An explanatory letter was mailed to the 12 interview participants to describe
the purpose and extent o f involvement in the interview, the method o f selection, and
secure their agreement to participate. In the event that the primary participant could
not participate, they were asked to name a key staff member who best represented the
agency position to participate in the interview. Telephone contact was made with the
prospective experts to confirm participation and to identify the key staff member
where applicable. No identified experts declined participation.

INTERVIEW FORMAT AND QUESTIONS GUIDE
The importance o f interviews is summarized by Burgess, who notes that “the
importance o f interviews is the opportunity for the researcher to probe deeply to
uncover new clues, open up new dimensions o f a problem and to secure vivid,
accurate, inclusive accounts that are based on personal experience” (Burgess, 1982).
In the structured interviews that this study will use, Lincoln and Guba point out the
importance o f defining the problem before the interview, formulating the questions,
and expecting that the respondent answers in terms o f the interviewer’s framework
and definition o f the problem (Lincoln, 1985).
One instrument was used in this study: an interview format and questions
guide. The interview format and questions guide (Appendix B) provided the structure
and framework for conducting the interviews with the selected experts from federal
and local agencies. The guide lists the introductory comments by the interviewer, a
review of agreement to participate and tape the interview, a list o f questions (from
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general to specific, with a conclusion back to the broad question), and the debrief
comments.
The purpose o f the interviews was to develop a deeper understanding of, and
to enhance the broad strategies suggested by the literature review and case analysis.
One to two broad questions were asked to prompt the initial response in the manager,
and seven more focused questions were used when the interviewee had not provided
depth in explanation in their initial responses. The questions included:
1. What do you consider the most likely urban target(s) for terrorist attack?
2. Why?
3. Why do you think it/they are they vulnerable?
4. Which terrorist group(s) do you consider the most likely to launch a
domestic attack? Right/left, foreign/domestic, specific?
5. What do you consider the most likely method(s) o f terrorist attack against
an urban target? (conventional/nuclear/biological/chemical)
6. Given the broad range o f weapons, including weapons o f mass destruction,
that may be employed by terrorists, what ways of protecting urban targets
do you consider most promising? Least promising?
7. What should we be doing differently to protect urban targets?
8. Who should be primarily responsible for ensuring our cities are prepared
for a terrorist attack?
9. How can involved agencies play a more effective role?
10. WTiat do you consider to be the downside or unintended impacts o f
enhancing the protection o f urban areas against terrorist attack?
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11. What might be some unintended outcomes that m ust be considered in
strengthening the preparation o f urban infrastructure for terrorist attacks?

The same researcher conducted all twelve interviews. The Interview Format
and Questions Guide is included as Appendix B.

DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES
This study will use in-depth interviews as part o f the strategy to collect data.
Kahn and Cannel (Patton, 1990) note that in-depth interviewing is a data collection
method relied on quite extensively by qualitative researchers. They describe it as “a
conversation with a purpose.”
According to Burgess, (Burgess, 1982) the primary purpose o f the interview is
to understand the meanings interviewees attach to issues and situations in contexts
that are not structured in advance by the researcher’s assumptions. He summarizes
the importance o f interviews by saying: “(the interview) is . . . the opportunity for the
researcher to probe deeply to uncover new clues, open up new dimensions o f a
problem and to secure vivid, accurate inclusive accounts that are based on personal
experience.” Most interviews are conducted on a one-to-one basis, between the
interviewer and the interviewee.
The label ‘qualitative interview’ has been used to describe a broad range o f
different types o f interview, from those that are supposedly totally ‘non-directive’ or
‘open’ to those where the interviewer takes to the interview a prepared list o f
questions which he or she is determined to ask. Notes Burgess, “. . . between these
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two extremes is an abyss o f practice and therefore theory about the purpose and nature
o f the qualitative interview” (Burgess, 1982). Burgess says the main reason for
conducting qualitative interviews is to understand ... “how individuals construct the
meaning and significance o f their situations . . . from . . . the complex personal
framework o f beliefs and values, which they have developed over their lives in order
to help explain and predict events in their world.” It is important, then, to be able to
conduct interviews so that the opportunity is present for these insights to be gained.
Failure to achieve this might well result in a superficial exchange o f information,
which might well have been better and more cost effectively achieved via a se m istructured questionnaire (Patton, 1990).
According to Burgess, semi-structured or unstructured interviews are
appropriate methods when:
•

It is necessary to understand the constructs that the interviewee uses

as a basis for opinions and beliefs about a particular matter or situation;
•

The aim o f the interview is to develop an understanding o f the

respondent’s ‘world’ so that the researcher might influence it, either independently or
collaboratively, as might be the case with action research.
Burgess adds that they are also useful when:
•

The step-by-step logic o f a situation is not clear;

•

The subject matter is highly confidential or commercially sensitive;

•

The interviewee may be reluctant to be truthful about this issue other

than confidentially in a one-to-one situation.
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Jones (Jones, 1998) highlights a num ber o f issues that must be considered in
order for interviews to be successful. The first is the problem o f how much structure
to put in the interview. She makes the point that:
. . . there is no such thing as presuppositionless
research. In preparing for interviews researchers will
have, and should have, some broad questions in mind,
and the more interviews they do and the more patterns
they see in the data, the more likely they are to use this
grounded understanding to want to explore in certain
directions rather than others.

According to Jones, researchers are free and encouraged to make choices as
they collect their data as to which line o f questioning they should explore further and
which lines o f inquiry to discard. They do need a framework from which to begin to
plot out the developing themes, but cautions that although researchers are to some
extent tied to their frameworks, they should not be ‘tied up by them ’. Jones goes on
to suggest that one way in which this can be achieved is to prepare a ‘topic guide’,
which can be used as a loose structure for the questions. Although there may be some
deviation from the sequence so as to follow interesting lines o f inquiry and to
facilitate an unbroken discussion, the interviewer should attempt to cover all the
issues mentioned (Jones, 1998).
On the subject o f structure, Jones warns against assuming that a “non
directive” interview, where the interviewee talks freely without interruption or
intervention, is the way to achieve a clear picture of the interviewee’s perspective.
She says that it is more likely to produce no clear picture in the m ind o f the
interviewee o f what questions or issues the interviewer is interested in, and in the
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mind o f the interviewer o f what questions the interviewee is answering. According to
Jones, too many assumptions o f this kind lead to poor data that is difficult to interpret.
She says that researchers are likely to be more successful i f they are clear at the outset
about the exact areas o f their interest.
McClelland says that understanding issues from an interviewee’s point o f
view can be extremely difficult, especially when the respondent may not have a
clearly articulated view o f the answers to the questions posed, or may not wish to
divulge sensitive information. He conducted studies about common sense notions
concerning motivations, claiming that people cannot be trusted to say exactly what
their motives are, as they often get ideas about their own motives from commonly
accepted half-truths. Often people simply are not aware o f their own motives.
Mangham (1996) met this problem in his studies o f managerial competence. He found
that although many managers complained that they needed subordinates who could
better motivate staff, when they were asked what exactly they meant by motivation
they gave ambiguous answers and became confused.
According to Mayo, the skills o f an interviewer center around the ability to
recognize what is relevant and remember it, or tape it, so that afterwards detailed
notes can be made. This requires the interviewer to be perceptive and sensitive to
events, so that lines o f inquiry can be changed and adapted during the interview.
Above all, interviewers need to be able to listen, and to refrain from projecting their
own opinions or feelings into the situation. This is more difficult than it sounds, since
one o f the ways o f obtaining trust is to empathize with the respondent. The
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interviewer needs to listen to what interviewees want to say, and what they do not
want to say, without helping them (Mayo, 1949).
The interviewer needs also to understand the importance placed on the social
interaction between interviewer and interviewee. Jones suggests people will attribute
meaning and significance to the particular research situations they are in. The
questions an interviewer may ask and the answers an interviewee gives will often
depend on the way in which their situations are defined (Jones, 1998).
According to Jones, preliminary telephone calls are best followed up by letter.
This fulfils three purposes. One is credibility, especially if the letter is on the
notepaper o f an independent body such as a university. Secondly, it may assist
cooperation in the future; and thirdly, it provides the opportunity to send further
details about the research. This, says Jones, is the opportunity to set out in detail what
is required. The location o f the interview and the setting in which it takes place can
also be important (Jones, 1998).
Tripp notes that there is also the question o f the effects o f using audio tape
recording in interviews. The decision on whether or not to use a tape recorder depends
much on an interviewee’s anxiety about confidentiality and the use to which any
information divulged could be put. The deciding factor should not be whether or not
to tape, or whether permission will or will not be given, but rather what effect its use
will have on the interview interaction in terms o f the relationship and the data created
(Tripp, 1983).
Patton points out that the relevance o f the research to interviewees is another
factor that will affect the quality o f the data provided. In addition, interest and
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commitment shown by the interviewer often produces far better results than clinical
detachment. This can be achieved in several practical ways. One way is by conducting
more than one interview, or by offering the interviewee the opportunity to comment
on the transcripts o f the tape or on completed field notes. Another is to offer
interviewees a summary o f the results or conclusions, and to make sure that one is
sent to them. These strategies are not ju st ‘ploys’ to obtain compliance with a
researcher’s wishes; they can, for example, form important ways o f validating data
and gaining new insights (Patton, 1990).
Twelve agencies throughout the United States that had responsibility for
domestic preparedness against terrorist attack were telephoned and requested to
provide assistance in the study. The interviews were briefly described as part o f a
larger study to determine strategies to mitigate the impact of terrorist attack against
the urban built environment. Agencies were asked for access to a key person on their
staff, usually by name based on earlier identification of someone with specific policy
making responsibility, who might be interviewed about their judgments on terrorist
mitigation strategies. Telephone contact was made with the representative to confirm
their willingness to participate and an interview time was arranged. All interviews
took place during the five month period between May 20th, 2000 and October 3 1st,
2000 .
The interview was conducted in either the participant’s office or another quiet,
private area within the agency. During the initial two to three minutes o f conversation
the researcher focused on gaining a professional rapport with the manager, and
answered any questions the manager had about the study, confidentiality, and taping
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o f the interview. All interviewees were assured that their comments would be kept
confidential and, if used as a verbatim comment in the written study, no identifying
information would be used.
In all interviews, the tape recorder was placed in an unobtrusive location
between the two persons. The tape ran throughout the entire interview and upon
completion o f the formal interview, the tape was turned o ff and the researcher asked if
the manager had further comments/questions, responded as necessary, and ended the
meeting. The taped interviews ranged from 20 to 40 minutes, and were transcribed
verbatim.
The broad question, "where do you think cities in general are most vulnerable
to terrorist attack?" was used to initiate the interview. Techniques to seek elaboration
on specific areas were used (Babbie, 1973), such as "how are they vulnerable to
biological (chemical, nuclear, conventional) weapons," "what makes water supplies
vulnerable targets," "what would you suggest as an effective strategy to meet this
vulnerability." The more focused questions listed on the interview format were used
as follow-up in areas that had not been mentioned or where the interviewee needed
more structured questioning to focus their thoughts. These interview data provided
information about the vulnerability o f infrastructure to terrorist attack and suggested
strategies to address these vulnerabilities.

DATA ANALYSIS PROCEDURES
The analysis was based on what Marshall & Rossman (Marshall, 1989) call
data “reduction” and “interpretation,” where a large amount o f information is reduced

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

71

to key patterns, categories and themes, and then interpreted. Tesch (Tesch, 1990)
calls this process “de-contextualization” and “re-contextualization;” a process
resulting in a “higher level” analysis. According to Tesch, “While much work in the
analysis process consists o f ‘taking apart,’ the final goal is the emergence o f a larger,
consolidated picture” (Tesch, 1990).

ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVIEWS
Data analysis o f the interview transcriptions included identification o f the
vulnerabilities o f the urban built environment to terrorist attacks. The coding
procedure used to reduce the information to categories is one recommended by Tesch;
“segmenting” the information and then generating categories (Tesch, 1990)
(Marshall, 1989) through a systematic process o f analyzing textual data. All phrases
or bullets o f data that indicated a vulnerability were lifted from the interview in
verbatim form. A master list o f phrases/sentences was then organized to reflect
categories o f like items. Judgments of which items were similar were made based on
the researcher's background knowledge o f both terrorism and the urban built
environment.

RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY
Validity and reliability related to the qualitative methodologies used in the
study are reviewed here, specifically validity o f the qualitative data collection
methods and the predictive validity o f these qualitative techniques. As Kirk and
Miller (Patton, 1990) point out, the language o f validity and reliability was originally
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developed for use in quantitative social science, and many procedures have been
devised for assessing different facets o f each.
According to Lincoln & Guba, there are several canons that can be phrased as
questions to which all research must respond (Lincoln, 1985). First, how credible are
the particular findings o f the study? By what criteria can we judge them? Second,
how transferable and applicable are these findings to another setting or group o f
people? Third, how can we be reasonably sure that the findings would be replicated if
the study were conducted with the same participants in the same context? And, fourth,
how can we be sure that the findings are reflective of the subjects and the inquiry
itself rather than a creation o f the researcher’s biases or prejudices?
Lincoln and Guba (Lincoln, 1985) refer to these questions as establishing the
‘Truth value” o f the study, its applicability, consistency, and neutrality. They point
out that every systematic inquiry into the human condition must address these issues.
Although Lincoln and Guba match these terms to the conventional positivist
paradigm - internal validity, external validity, reliability, and objectivity - they then
demonstrate how inappropriate these constructs are for naturalistic or qualitative
inquiry.
Lincoln and Guba propose four alternative constructs that more accurately
reflect the assumptions o f the qualitative paradigm. The first is credibility, in which
the goal is to demonstrate that the inquiry was conducted in such a manner as to
ensure that the subject was accurately identified and described. The inquiry then must
be “credible to the constructors o f the original multiple realities. According to
Lincoln & Guba, the strength of the qualitative study that aims to explore a problem
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or describe a setting, a process, a social group, or a pattern o f interaction will be its
validity. An in-depth description showing the complexities o f variables and
interactions will be so embedded with data derived from the setting that it cannot help
but be valid. Within the parameters o f that setting, population, and theoretical
framework, the research will be valid (Lincoln, 1985).
The second construct Lincoln and Guba propose is transferability, in which
the burden o f demonstrating the applicability o f one set o f findings to another context
rests more with the investigator who would make that transfer than with the original
investigator. Kennedy (Kennedy, 1979) refers to this as the second decision span in
g e n e ralizin g- That is, the first decision span allows the researcher to generalize the

findings about a particular sample to the population from which that sample was
drawn (assuming adequate population specification and random selection o f the
sample). The second decision span occurs when an investigator wants to apply the
findings about the population o f interest to a second population believed or presumed
sufficiently similar to the first to warrant that application. This second decision span
entails judgments about the relevancy o f the first study to the second setting.
According to Lincoln & Guba, a qualitative study’s transferability or
generalizability to other settings may be problematic. The generalization o f qualitative
findings to other populations, settings, and treatment arrangements - that is, its
external validity - is seen by traditional canons as a weakness in the approach. To
counter challenges, the researcher can refer back to the original theoretical framework
to show how data collection and analysis will be guided by concepts and models. By
doing so, the researcher states the theoretical parameters o f the research. Then those
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who make policy or design research studies within those same parameters can
determine whether or not the cases described can be generalized for new research
policy and transferred to other settings, while the reader or user o f specific research
can see how research ties into a body o f theory (Lincoln, 1985).
Lincoln & Guba note that one additional strategic choice can enhance a
study’s generalizability: triangulating multiple sources o f data. Triangulation is the act
o f bringing more than one source o f data to bear on a single point. Derived from
navigation science, the concept has been fruitfully applied to social science inquiry
(Denzin, 1978) (Jick, 1979) (Rossman, 1994) (Rossman, 1985). Data from different
sources can be used to corroborate, elaborate, or illuminate the research in question
(Rossman, 1985). Designing a study in which multiple cases, multiple informants, or
more than one data gathering method are used can greatly strengthen the study’s
usefulness for other settings.
The third construct discussed by Lincoln & Guba is dependability, in which
the researcher attempts to account for changing conditions in the phenomenon chosen
for study as well as changes in the design created by increasingly refined
understanding o f the setting. This represents a set o f assumptions very different from
those shaping the concept o f reliability. Positivist notions o f reliability assume an
unchanging universe where inquiry could, quite logically, be replicated. This
assumption o f an unchanging social world is in direct contrast to the
qualitative/interpretive assumption that the social world is always being constructed,
and the concept o f replication is itself problematic (Lincoln, 1985).
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The final construct, confirmability, captures the traditional concept of
objectivity. Lincoln and Guba stress the need to ask whether the findings o f the study
could be confirmed by another. By doing so, they remove evaluation from some
inherent characteristic o f the researcher (objectivity) and place it squarely on the data
themselves. Thus the qualitative criterion is: Do the data help confirm the general
findings and lead to the implications? This is the appropriate qualitative criterion
(Lincoln, 1985).
According to Marshall (Marshall, 1985a) qualitative research does not
pretend to be replicable. The researcher purposefully avoids controlling the research
conditions and concentrates on recording the complexity o f situational contexts and
interrelations as they occur. The researcher’s goal o f discovering this complexity by
altering research strategies within a flexible research design, moreover, cannot be
replicated by future researchers, nor should it be attempted.
Marshall says that qualitative researchers can respond to the traditional social
science concern for replicability by taking the following steps. First, they can assert
that qualitative studies by their nature (and, really, all research) cannot be replicated
because the real world changes. Second, by keeping thorough notes and a journal or
log that records each design decision and the rationale behind it, researchers allow
others to inspect their procedures, protocols, and decisions. Finally, by keeping all
collected data in well organized, retrievable form, researchers can make them
available easily if the findings are challenged or if another researcher wants to
reanalyze the data (Marshall, 1985b).
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation used multiple qualitative research methods to identify
patterns o f attack used by terrorists against urban targets in the United States. It
began by creating an inventory o f domestic terrorist attacks against the urban built
environment over the past twenty years. Through careful analysis o f each o f the
domestic terrorist attacks against the urban built environment, both successful and
unsuccessful, shared patterns o f attack were analyzed and vulnerabilities identified.
These shared patterns o f attack and vulnerabilities identified in the case
analysis formed the basis for the next part o f the study. Using the trends identified
through the cases, a review o f the current literature on domestic terrorism
preparedness was conducted. This review was very broad, and included not only the
specific thirty cases that were the subject o f this study, but a macro-level review o f
domestic preparedness given the constantly changing domestic and political
environment. This macro-review was also necessary to provide a basis for
understanding the threats posed by a domestic terrorist attack from those avenues not
evident in the cases: i.e. other terrorist groups that may now pose a threat but were not
represented in the thirty cases studies, or the very significant threat posed by Weapons
o f Mass Destruction —weapons greatly feared by those charged with preparing our
cities for domestic terrorist attack, but not used against urban targets to date.
The product o f the case studies and review o f the literature on domestic
terrorism preparedness was an understanding o f what had previously happened and
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what was currently being considered as means to mitigate domestic terrorist attacks
against the urban built environment. This provided a basis for developing the broad
questions for the interviews. Expert testimony was gathered through interviews with
experts in terrorism, design, and emergency management. An explanatory letter was
mailed to the participants to describe the purpose and extent o f involvement in the
interview process, the method o f selection, and to secure the participant's agreement
to participate. Follow-up telephone contact was made.
The interviews aided in identifying weaknesses in the current urban
environment, discussed cutting-edge plans to mitigate domestic terrorist attacks on
the urban built environment, provided a deeper understanding o f the problems faced
in preparing urban areas for terrorist attacks, and refined the initial suggestions for
reducing the severity o f terrorist attack developed previously through the case study o f
incidents and literature review.

FINDINGS
General Trends In American Terrorism
Law enforcement experts theorize that there are three types o f terrorist
organizations active in the United States; ethnic separatist and emigre groups, leftwing radical organizations, and right-wing racist, anti-authority survivalist-type
groups (Hoffman, 1986). The threat posed by these domestic terrorist groups is not
negligible.
Terrorist acts steadily increased in America during the early part o f the 1980s.
The increase in terrorism on American soil during the early 1980s was the primary
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catalyst for the escalation o f the FBI's counter-terrorism program to a Priority 1
program in late 1982. Whether or not these changes had a major impact on future
levels o f American terrorism is hard to assess. The deterrent effect o f most law en
forcement initiatives is extremely difficult to measure empirically. In this instance,
however, strong circumstantial evidence exists that the hardened governmental
attitude had a profound impact on the level o f American terrorism for the remainder
o f the decade.
The number of terrorist incidents dropped approximately forty percent in 1983
from that o f the previous year. Although the number of terrorist victims killed during
1983 reached an all-time high, decreases in subsequent years suggest that increased
FBI expenditures on counter-terrorism and the expansion of domestic security
investigations begun that year had a substantial adverse effect on terrorism in this
country. In a three-year period, the number o f acts o f terrorism fell from a record fiftyone in 1982 to only seven in 1985 (FBI Terrorist Research and Analytical Center,
1985).
Although leftist terrorists on the East Coast, right-wing affiliates o f the
Christian Identity Movement, and Puerto Rican extremists all suffered major blows
during 1984 and 1985, by 1986 several o f the organizations had regrouped and
embarked on a renewed campaign o f terror. Twenty-five acts o f terrorism were com
mitted during 1986, most o f which were carried out by Puerto Rican nationalists.
Neo-Nazis carried out five bombings in the Coeur d'Alene, Idaho area. The most
violent and successful of the terrorists during 1986 were Jewish extremists. Although
only committing two of the twenty-five incidents, they were responsible for seventeen
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o f the nineteen injuries that occurred that year from terrorist bombings and
assassination attempts (FBI Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, 1987).
By 1987, federal indictments began to have a major effect on the leadership
and organizational management o f domestic terrorist groups in America. The leaders
o f right-wing terrorist groups were either in prison or awaiting trial. The Aryan
Nations, the CSA, the White Patriot party, and the Order were all in states of disarray
because o f FBI operations and federal indictments. Similarly, members o f the major
leftist terrorist groups, the UFF and M19CO, were awaiting trials in Boston and in
Washington, DC. Even the previously immune leaders o f the Macheteros in Puerto
Rico found themselves under federal indictment in Hartford (FBI Terrorist Research
and Analytical Center, 1988).
With terrorist groups attempting to reorganize and recruit to replace lost
personnel, acts of terrorism waned during the late 1980s. The number o f incidents
dropped from twenty-five in 1986 to only nine in 1987 and eventually to a decade low
o f four in 1989. Had it not been for the emergence o f the environmental terrorists
during the closing years o f the decade, terrorism in America would have been
virtually non-existent during the late 1980s. The number o f persons killed or injured
because of terrorism also reflects this trend. The last three years o f the decade
witnessed no injuries or deaths due to terrorist bombs or assassins (FBI Terrorist
Research and Analytical Center, 1990). Although the number o f terrorist incidents
increased to seven in 1990, that was the fourth consecutive year in which America
experienced no deaths or injuries due to terrorism (FBI Terrorist Research and
Analytical Center, 1991).
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In the 1990s, domestic terrorist attacks claimed more American lives than they
did in any other decade. The Gulf W ar, continued forays into Iraq, right-wing
extremists, Muslim fundamentalists, and anti-abortion activists all contributed to
significant loss o f life and property. Weapons o f Mass Destruction were, for the first
time, a genuine concern as a possible terrorist tool. Legislation was introduced to
provide funding for domestic terrorism awareness and first-responder training, and
initial steps were and are being taken to prepare for domestic terrorist attacks. Table
2 on the following page presents a list o f the terrorist attacks against the urban built
environment chosen for this study. The attacks listed are consistent with the selection
criteria for domestic terrorist attacks against the urban built environment outlined in
Chapter III. A more detailed description o f each o f these attacks is provided in
Appendix A.
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TABLE 2.
INCIDENTS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST THE DOMESTIC
URBAN BUILT ENVIRONMENT DURING THE PAST TW ENTY YEARS
DATE

PLACE

INFRASTRUCTURE

METHOD

PERPETRATOR

Bomb

Anti-abortionists

Bombs

Muslim extremists

Park
Building

Pipe bomb
Car bomb

Unknown
Right-wing anarchists

5

June, 1993

Building, tunnels

Bomb

Muslim extremists

6

February,
1993
July, 1990
June. 1990
February,
1989
May. 1988
April, 1988
(a)
May, 1987

Asheville, North
Carolina
New York City,
New York
Atlanta. Georgia
Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma
New York City.
New York
New York City,
New York
Houston. Texas
Miami. Florida
Berkeley,
California
Miami. Florida
New York City,
New York
New York City,
New York
New York City,
New York
Coeur d ’ Arlene.
Idaho
Houston. Texas
East Meadow,
New York
Portland. Oregon
Abbeville &
Delcambre.
Louisiana
New York City.
New York

Building —W omen's clinic
that performed abortions
Subway

3
4

March,
1999
July, 1997
(a)
July. 1996
April, 1995

Building

Van bomb

Muslim extremists

Chemical storage tanks
Building
Building

Bombs
Bomb
Fire bomb

Muslim extremists
Cuban extremists
Muslim extremists

Building
New York City subway system

Pipe bomb
Bombs

Cuban extremists
Japanese Red Army

Building

Jewish Defense League

Building

Fire bomb, pipe
bomb, tear gas
Fire bomb

Buildings

Bombs

W hite supremacists

Building (mosque)
Building

Pipe bombs
Bombs

Anti-Muslim faction
United Freedom Front

Building
City water supply

Bomb
Poisoning by
cyanide

Anti-Rajneesh faction
Unknown

Buildings

Bombs

FALN —Puerto Rican
nationalists

Building

Bomb

Building

Bomb

Building

Bomb

Building

Pipe bomb

United Freedom
Fighters/United Freedom
Federation
United Freedom Fighters/
United Freedom Federation
FALN - Puerto Rican
nationalists
Croatian Freedom Fighters

Building

Pipe Bomb

Croatian Freedom Fighters

Buildings

Bombs

Buildings

Bombs

FALN - Puerto Rican
nationalists
FALN - Puerto Rican
nationalists

Building

Bomb

Building

Bomb

Building

Bomb

Building

Bombs

I
2

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
15
15
16
17
18

October,
1986
September,
1986
June. 1985
December,
1983
July, 1983
January,
1983 (t)

19

December,
1982

20

December,
1982

21

23

December.
1982
September,
1982
July, 1982

24

July, 1982

25

March,
1982
February,
1982

Westchester
County. New
York
Elmont, New
York
New York City,
New York
New York City,
New York
New York City,
New York
New York City,
New York
New York City,
New York

February,
1982
February,
1982
February,
1982
February,
1982

New York City,
New York
New York City,
New York
New York City,
New York
Rio Piedras,
Puerto Rico

22

26

27
28
29
30

Jewish Defense League

FALN - Puerto Rican
nationalists
FALN - Puerto Rican
nationalists
FALN - Puerto Rican
nationalists
Puerto Rican nationalists
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General Conclusions About Trends
According to the data developed for this study in the case analyses, four
distinct patterns o f American terrorism and counter-terrorism emerged during the
1980s and 1990s. First, the period began with terrorism at an all-time high, followed
by intense federal initiatives to combat the problem. Second, by the mid-1980s, as
successful federal prosecutions decimated terrorist organizations in the United States,
some groups tried to rebound from the devastation o f arrests and indictments by
staging retaliatory strikes. These efforts generally were short-lived and represented
short-term increases in the decade's statistics. Third, the decade closed on an ominous
note with the arrival o f environmental terrorism. Finally, during the 1990s right wing
and international terrorist groups made a spectacular resurgence, most visible in the
Kansas City and World Trade Center bombings.
Unlike many types o f crimes, terrorism occurs rather infrequently and is
committed by relatively few persons. Terrorist organizations typically are not as large
or as well entrenched in legitimate business activities as most organized crime groups.
Consequently, the effect o f intense federal intervention efforts is felt more critically
by terrorist groups than by traditional organized crime elements. Federal criminal
investigations into some organized crime groups occasionally net the leaders o f these
organizations incidental to law enforcement efforts. Unfortunately, many o f these
underworld organized crime groups are so large that their leaders are quickly replaced
by aspiring, younger proteges. The organizational structure o f the group remains
intact despite the loss o f its leadership, and the group's criminal enterprises continue
unabated. Terrorist groups generally are not so fortunate. The arrests and indictments
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o f the leaders o f relatively few terrorist organizations can have a dramatic impact on
terrorism statistics.
In Puerto Rico, the rather large infrastructure and support groups o f extreme
nationalist groups account for the ability o f Puerto Rican terrorist groups to continue
operations. On the other hand, levels o f terrorism in the western United States
remained high due to changes in the types o f groups that operated in that area.

Who Were The Terrorists?
The answer to this question has changed significantly over the 20-year period
that spans the cases used in this study. The research showed that there are
dramatically fewer international terrorist incidents than in the mid-eighties. Many o f
the groups that targeted America's interests, friends, and allies have disappeared. The
Soviet bloc, which once provided support to terrorist groups, no longer exists.
Countries that once excused terrorism now condemn it. This changed international
attitude has led to 12 United Nations conventions targeting terrorist activity and, more
importantly, growing, practical international cooperation.

Threats From Abroad
Although most o f the world's countries are firmer in opposing terrorism, some
still support terrorists or use terrorism as an element o f state policy. Iran is the clearest
case. The Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry o f Intelligence and Security
carry out terrorist activities and give direction and support to other terrorists. The
regimes o f Syria, Sudan, and Afghanistan provide funding, refuge, training bases, and
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weapons to terrorists. Libya continues to provide support to some Palestinian terrorist
groups and to harass expatriate dissidents, and North Korea may still provide weapons
to terrorists. Cuba provides safe haven to a number o f terrorists. Other states allow
terrorist groups to operate on their soil or provide support which, while failing short
o f state sponsorship, nonetheless gives terrorists important assistance.

Increased Lethality
The data showed that terrorist attacks have become more lethal during the
period included by the cases meeting the criteria for this study. The bombings o f the
World Trade Center and the Murrah Building in Oklahoma were the most visible.
One o f the respondents pointed out that:
Most terrorist organizations active in the 1970s and
1980s had clear political objectives. They tried to
calibrate their attacks to produce just enough bloodshed
to get attention for their cause, but not so much as to
alienate public support. Groups like the Irish
Republican Army and the Palestine Liberation
Organization often sought specific political
concessions, yet this has changed over the past ten
years.

The more recent cases studied for this dissertation showed that a growing
percentage o f terrorist attacks were designed to kill as many people as possible. In the
1990s a terrorist incident was almost 20 percent more likely to result in death or
injury than an incident two decades ago (calculated from casualty figures obtained
from case analysis data used in this study). The World Trade Center bombing in New
York killed six and wounded about 1,000, but the terrorists' goal was to topple the
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twin towers, killing tens o f thousands o f people (Mickolus, 1993). The thwarted
attacks against New York City's infrastructure in 1993—which included plans to
bomb the Lincoln and Holland tunnels—also were intended to cause mass casualties
(Mickolus, 1993).

Domestic Terrorist Groups
Analysis o f the cases used in this study showed that, unlike many international
terrorist groups, the groups operating from a domestic base in the United States
function more on emotional issues than on deeply entrenched political ideologies.
Said one o f the participants in this study,
Members o f radical international groups often were
bom and raised in a society that supports their view o f
the United States, or some other outside entity, as an
evil force. By contrast, members o f domestic radical
groups usually were loners whose beliefs gamer little
support from mainstream American society.
In these cases, such emotional variables as fear, anger, or hatred motivate
group membership and methods o f operation. The emotional responses of domestic
groups appear to be significantly less entrenched and thus more transient than the
ideological beliefs o f their overseas counterparts. Still, their destructive nature
remains strong.

National/Geographic Affiliation
Analysis o f the data used for this study showed that almost two-thirds o f the
terrorists implicated in domestic attacks against the urban built environment were
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native-born Americans. O f these, slightly less than one-third were Puerto Rican, and
two held dual citizenship and strong ties to Israel. The next largest group, those o f
Middle Eastern residency, accounted for one-sixth o f all domestic terrorist attacks.
Examination o f all attacks showed residency in only a handful o f countries/areas.
These were the United States (to include Puerto Rico), the Middle East/Africa
(Egypt/Sudan/Libya/Jordan/ Lebanon/Iraq/Iran/Pakistan), Cuba, Japan, and Croatia.
Figure 3, below, provides a depiction o f terrorist residence or regional affiliation.

Figure 3. National/Geographic Affiliation

Unidentified
5%
Native-born
A m erican
34%
Ja p a n

C uban
9%
P u e rto R ican
9%
C roation
2%
MiddleE astern
30%

No clear conclusions can be drawn about national/geographic affiliation and
the domestic urban terrorist for several reasons common to clandestine operations.
Investigations o f terrorist cells have shown a confusing pattern o f linkages to
countries. For instance, terrorists who are American residents may be recruited by an
Egyptian-based group, trained in Sudan, and funded by Afghans who are in turn
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funded by Saudis (this seems to have been the case with terrorists involved in attacks
and attempted attacks in New York City, and continues to be a common pattern,
particularly with Usama Bin Laden’s group). Another reason is the commonality o f
multiple passports and long periods o f residency in several countries. For instance,
several extremist Jewish groups’ members hold dual American/Israeli citizenship, and
frequently live for long periods in different countries.

Cause Identification o f the Domestic Terrorists
The cases analyzed for this study showed that there three major divisions in
the “causes” that domestic urban terrorists ascribed to. These are either political
causes, ethno-religious causes, or non-specific left-wing terrorism. Although there is
some degree o f overlap, for example, Puerto Rican terrorist actions may be considered
either political or ethnic —in this study they have been considered ethnic because
these Puerto Rican groups believe that their ethnicity is the root cause for their failure
to gain independence from the U.S., the division is generally clear. Political causes
involved either Cuban or Croatian liberation, or anarchistic causes. Ethno-religious
causes included Jewish militant responses to perceived anti-Semitism; Jewish actions
against Russian targets in the U.S.; Puerto Rican independence; attacking the
decadent W estern influence and culture; anti-Muslim reactions; killing those who
performed abortions; and Rajneesh and anti-Rajneesh reactions.
The third grouping, non-specific left wing terrorism, consists of terrorist acts
committed by groups espousing broad left wing ideologies such as “freedom for the
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workers” reminiscent o f the groups operating worldwide in the 1960s and 70s
(Japanese Red Army, United Freedom Front).
The Ideology o f Terrorists: Attacks from Throughout the Political Spectrum
Detailed analysis o f the thirty terrorist attacks against the domestic urban built
environment over the past twenty years showed that the terrorists had widely varying
political orientations. Some were right-wing religious zealots that included anti
abortionists or anarchists, four were by left-wing extremists, five attacks were by
Muslim extremists, two attacks were by persons unknown, two were by Cuban
extremist groups, two were by Jewish extremist groups, one was by white
supremacists, one was by an anti-Muslim group, one was by an anti-Rajneesh faction,
eight attacks were by Puerto Rican extremists and two were by Croatian extremists.
World events have overcome many o f the political issues that provided the
impetus for the domestic terrorist attacks. Yet new political issues present significant
probabilities for new attacks against American cities. For example, in at least one o f
the attacks by Jewish extremist groups, the target was a building that was holding a
reception for a Soviet dance troupe. In the case o f the terrorist attacks by the Puerto
Rican extremists, the incidents by this group ceased after all o f its members were
incarcerated (although all members were released last year by order o f then President
Clinton). A general conclusion that will be drawn here is that it is not very useful to
implement strategies for mitigating terrorist attacks against the domestic urban built
environment based on terrorist group identity or ideology, whose causes are often
brought about, made volatile, and extinguished in a relatively short period.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

89

Personal Characteristics O f Domestic Terrorists
Age: Older than in Previous Studies
Previous research provided an often inaccurate demography o f the terrorist
(see Chapter H, Theories About Terrorist Identity: Extremists Right and Left).
Virtually all studies o f the personal traits o f terrorists conclude (or assume) that the
average terrorist is young, usually between twenty to twenty-five years old. (Russell,
1977) (Rubenstein, 1987) (National Governor's Association). A National Governors
Association publication listed the average age o f domestic terrorists as twenty
(National Governor’s Association). A review o f the characteristics o f those persons
involved in the cases that were the subject o f this study reveals, however, that the
average age at indictment was considerably older —thirty-five. While some o f the
crimes for which these persons were indicted took place when the individuals were
much younger, the vast majority o f offenses occurred during the year or two before
indictment. The data used in this study showed the average age o f the American
terrorist would place him at no younger than thirty-two or thirty-three, again
considerably older than previous estimates o f all terrorists.
Prior studies included not only those involved in terrorism itself but also the
remaining members o f extremist groups. It may be that older, more experienced
members are more likely to be involved in the actual terrorist incidents committed by
a particular group. Another possible explanation, at least among leftist extremists in
America, is that many o f the leftist terrorists indicted in the last 20 years have been
involved in terrorism for many years. Indeed, the data shows that many o f the leftist
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extremists finally apprehended in the last 20 years had been involved with the
"revolution" for a decade or more.

Terrorists from the Political Right are Significantly Older
According to data analyzed for this study, the ages o f left- and right-wing
terrorists differed significantly. The average age o f right-wing terrorists involved in
the incidents under study was thirty-nine, higher than the average age either o f
domestic left-wing group members or o f international terrorists. Over one-third o f the
right-wing terrorists were over forty. In contrast, less than 20 percent o f the leftist
terrorists were over forty. Much o f this difference is found in the leadership o f the
Christian Identity Movement. Four o f those acquitted at the national trial o f white
supremacists in 1988 were over sixty years old. Aryan Nations leader Richard Butler,
Order member Artie McBrearty, fCKK leader Robert Miles, and CSA member
William Wade were over sixty years old, while the most active o f the white
supremacists, Richard Scutari, was only thirty-nine at the 1988 trial. Members o f the
UFF were all under forty at their indictment in 1986.
Terrorists from the Left were also older than portrayed in previous studies.
Levasseur, leader o f the UFF, was thirty-nine at his indictment in 1986; Marilyn Buck
of W eather Underground and M19CO fame was forty at her indictment in 1987. Even
examination o f the Puerto Rican separatist groups, the FALN and the Macheteros, as
well as members o f the El Rukns, the NAFF, and other leftists indicted for terrorist
activities reveals a membership averaging in their thirties. Fifty percent o f the leftist
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extremists indicted for terrorist-related activities during the last 20 years were
between thirty-one and forty years old.

Gender
While terrorism remains a predominantly male phenomenon, the proportion o f
females involved in the cases that were the subject of this study was far greater than in
traditional crime. Approximately 5 percent o f America's prison population are females
(Bureau o f Justice Statistics, 1998) while slightly over 12 percent o f the persons
indicted for terrorist-related activities for the cases under study were females
(calculated from case analysis data used in this study). If international terrorists are
excluded, the percentage is even greater. O f 131 persons indicted for domestic
terrorism, twenty (15 percent) were females (calculated from case analysis data used
in this study).
According to the data, substantial differences exist between leftist and rightist
groups regarding female involvement. It has been suggested that the role o f women
in terroristic violence in America is directly related to the ideological foundations of
the groups to which they belong (Georges-Abeyie, 1987) (Holland, 1989). O f fiftysix leftist extremists indicted, slightly over one-fourth (27 percent) were females.
Extremists of the Left have a long history of advocating egalitarianism. Some
groups like M19CO are predominantly female: Marilyn Jean Buck, Susan Lisa
Rosenberg, Laura Whitehom, Linda Sue Evans, and Elizabeth Duke all have played
major roles in the activities o f that group. Similarly, almost half o f the members o f the
UFF and the NAFF were females. Female participation within Puerto Rican separatist
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groups was substantially lower, just over 10 percent, but is still higher than levels o f
female participation within rightist groups.
Among the right-wing terrorist groups that were the subject o f this study,
females presented an interesting dilemma. Although many right-wing extremists
moved their wives and children to remote survivalist camps, it did not appear that
these women became involved in actual terrorist or criminal acts with nearly the same
frequency as those among leftist groups. Only five o f the seventy-five (7%) right-wing
extremists indicted for terrorist-related activities were females. In almost all o f these
cases, the women were married to active members of violent elements of the extreme
right (calculated from case analysis data used in this study). Only two played major
roles in terroristic violence: Margaret Jean Craig performed the surveillance on Allen
Berg prior to his assassination, and Deborah Dorr, along with her husband, was a
leader o f the Order 11.

Ethnicity: Color on the Left, White to the Right
According to one o f the participants, “members o f minority groups are more
likely than whites o f English heritage to believe that they have been exploited by
American expansionism and colonialism.” The case studies used in this research also
suggested that this belief permeates the violent left in America. Consequently, these
groups have been able to attract a large following of minority group members.
According to the data developed for this study from the case analyses, nearly threefourths (71 percent) o f the leftists indicted for terrorist-related activities were
minorities. The NAFF and the El Rukns are all-black groups; the Macheteros and
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FALN are overwhelmingly comprised o f white Hispanics; even the violent members
o f the M19CO, the UFF, and the Provisional Party o f Communists are racially mixed.
In contrast, the data showed that violent extremists o f the Right, with their re
ligiously based beliefs in the superiority o f the Aryan race, are virtually all white. O f
seventy-five members o f the extreme right indicted for terrorist-related activities, only
two claimed to be o f other than Aryan extraction. William Wade and his son, Ivan,
both affiliated with the CSA and the SPC, listed their ethnic background at their 1987
trial as American Indian. The Wades claimed to be descendants o f the Wade clan o f
tribal Indians who came into the Oklahoma territory in the 1800s. Consistent with the
beliefs o f SPC members, they maintained that the federal court at Fort Smith had no
jurisdiction over their activities. With an abiding hatred for blacks and Jews and a
disdain for federal policies allowing the immigration o f Mexicans, Vietnamese, and
other Asians, the extremists o f the far Right leave little room for minority
participation in their activities.

Education and Occupation: Not in Keeping with Previous Typographies o f the
‘Typical” Terrorist
Previous research, discussed in Chapter II, often painted an inaccurate picture
o f the terrorist. For instance, the National Governor’s Association study o f terrorism
concluded that terrorists are university educated, middle or upper class, and
professionally trained (National Governor's Association). It described the
characteristics o f the American terrorist as: “an average age o f 20; male and female;
single or separated; middle or upper class; urbanites; university graduates; Marxist
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and anarchist in ideology; recruited at universities; and (composed of) students,
lawyers, doctors, government employees, sociologists, and psychologists” (National
Governor's Association). Russell and Becker described terrorists as being generally
from middle or upper income families whose parents were predominantly
professional or white-collar workers (Russell, 1977)(Becker, 1977).
The data gathered for this study showed, however, that while leftist terrorists
in America closely resemble this description, violent extremists o f the Right are
significantly different. Although over h alf o f the leftists indicted during the 1980s for
terrorist activities were college or university graduates, only 12 percent o f the rightwing terrorists held college degrees. A third of the violent extremists o f the Right had
not graduated from high school.
These educational differences resulted in significant differences in the
occupations and incomes o f the leftist and rightist group members. Violent leftist
groups were more likely to have members who were physicians, attorneys, teachers,
and even government workers. For example, the eighteen members o f the Macheteros
indicted in 1986 for the 1983 robbery o f the Wells Fargo depot in West Hartford,
Connecticut included Jorge Farinacci Garcia, Roberto Maldonero Rivera, and Paul
Weinberg - all attorneys. Most o f the remaining indictees in this case have university
degrees in political science, sociology, and anthropology and are employed as
teachers, occupational therapists, and independent artisans.
The cases involving members o f M19CO and the NAFF reveal similar
educational and occupational backgrounds. M19CO member Alan Berkman is trained
as a physician, while his associate, Susan Lisa Rosenberg, is the daughter o f a
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prominent physician. NAFF leader Coltrane Chimurenga, previously known as
Randolph Simms, pursued his doctorate at Harvard University, while other members
o f the group, most of whom have college degrees, were employed in government
service.
By contrast, violent extremists associated with the Christian Identity
Movement are much less likely to be college educated. Although some o f the leaders
o f the various groups are well educated, many cadre members lack even minimal
educational and job skills. The better educated members o f these groups have
evolved, of course, as leaders o f the extreme right - Richard Butler, head of the Aryan
Nations, is an engineer as is Wilhelm Schmitt o f the SPC.
The generally lower educational and job skills o f the extreme right required
group members to rely more heavily on petty theft and robbery to finance their
operations. In fact, many o f the members o f these groups were drawn to these
organizations by the lure o f a place to stay and a modest monthly salary in exchange
for work at the compounds.

Summary o f Who the Terrorists Are
This study found that one major threat to American urban areas comes from
terrorists who may be from one o f a handful o f largely, but not exclusively, Middle
Eastern countries that provide state support to those organizations who espouse
terrorism. Yet, in contrast to previous theories about the demography o f terrorists, it
was found that terrorism in the United States during the last two decades was not
overwhelmingly leftist. While persons advocating Marxist revolution have done their
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share o f terrorism in America, a substantial number o f those involved in terroristic
violence in this country during the past decade have been members o f or associated
with right-wing groups.
However, the terrorist groups that were active in the United States during the
past tw o decades closely fit the descriptions provided in the theoretical groupings o f
Flemming, Stohl and Wilkerson previously described in Chapter II (Flemming,
1988>(Wilkinson, 1987). The data used in this study showed that left- and right-wing
extremists involved in terrorism in America, for example, differ significantly in
certain characteristics and traits. Yet the similarities within the categories are
sufficient to allow generalizations to be made about groups falling within one or the
other categories. Unlike the concerns raised by Flemming and Stohl, these categories
are unlikely to result in different observers assigning groups to inappropriate
categories; in other words, they are generally reliable. The characteristics used to
distinguish various terrorist groups are mutually exclusive and o f functional utility for
predicting terrorist activities. The contrasting ideological traits o f left- and right-wing
groups in America produce interesting demographic distinctions between the two
categories.
According to the data used in this study, with the exception of the single-issue
terrorist (e.g., animal rights activists), Americans indicted for terrorism or terrorist
related activities fall readily into one o f these two categories. The right-wing groups
are easiest to label since most are tied together by the Christian identity Movement.
The A ryan Nations; Arizona Patriots; CS A; various factions of the Ku Klux Klan; the
O rder and Order II; SPC; and the White Patriot Party fit this category. However,
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F le m m in g notes that simply labeling the remaining groups as leftist presents some

problems. The El Rukns, Macheteros, FALN, M19CO, UFF, New African Freedom
Front (also known as the New African Freedom Fighters or NAFF), and the
Provisional Party o f Communists are different from each other in many ways. For
example, one might think that the El Rukns street gang w ould have little in common
with Puerto Rican independence groups like the FALN and the Macheteros. Yet on a
number o f major identifying characteristics all o f these groups bear striking
resemblances. In particular, the data used in this study show left-wing terrorists in
America are bound together by at least five major similarities: 1) their ideology and
beliefs about human nature; 2) their views on economics and the distribution o f
wealth; 3) their bases o f operations; 4) their tactical approach; and 5) the targets they
select.
The data gathered in this study shows terrorists that threaten America tend to
be older than previously thought by scholars, with those from the right being
somewhat older than terrorists from left wing organizations. Women play an
important role in terrorist organizations that threaten the urban built environment.
Recent terrorist attacks have shown that domestic attacks are much more
lethal than those in the past, often with terrorists trying to kill as many Americans as
possible. There is no one, clear political ideology o f terrorists who pose a threat to
American urban infrastructure. Table 3, below, compares domestic terrorists who
have attacked urban infrastructure by ideology. All data is obtained from the
population fitting the criteria for this study.
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TABLE 3.
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDY POPULATION OF
TERRORISTS BY POLITICAL ORIENTATION/IDEOLOGY
1980-2000
Religiously-oriented Right-wing Terrorist
Left-wing Terrorist
Variable
Terrorist Groups
Groups
Groups
A verage: 3 4
A verage: 3 9
Age
A verage: 33
93% m ale
73% m ale
92% m ale
Gender
27% fem ale

Ethnicity

71% n on-w hite
29% w hite

Sponsorship

0% direct foreign
governm ent
20% indirect foreign
(Japanese Red Army,
R ed B rigade, Croatian
Liberation)

8% fe m a le
(fem ale p resen ce in
anti-abortionists and
anti-R ajneesh on ly)
60% n o n w h ite/M id d le Eastern
40% w h ite
(w h ite p resen ce in
anti-abortionists, antiR ajneesh and Jew ish
groups o n ly )
15% d irect foreign
governm en t (L ib ya,
Y em en , Sud an , PLO )
65% indirect foreign
(U sam a bin Laden,
H am as, H ezb ollah )
20% unknow n

Education

20% non-foreign
(B lack , Puerto Rican)
60% university

7% fem ale

100% w h ite

0% direct foreign
governm ent
0% indirect foreign

10% unknown
90% non-foreign
(K K K , Aryan N a tio n ,
etc.)

50% u n iversity

12% university
B lue collar, non
p rofessional trades
(electrician, plum ber,
farmer, etc) or
unskilled.
90% native-born
A m erican
10% Cuban

Occupation

P rofession al (law yers,
doctors, governm ent
em p lo y ees, so ciologists,
p sych ologists)

W hite c o lla r
(govern m en t w orkers,
clergy, etc.)

National/
Geographic
affiliation

50% Puerto Rican
5% Croatian
5% Japanese
40% native-born
A m erican (B lack
extrem ists)

60% M iddle-E astern
20% native-born
A m erican (an ti
ab ortion ists, antiR ajn eesh)
20% A m erican , but
w ith " o th e r ’ origin
(Jew ish extrem ist)
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What Did The Terrorists Attack?
According to the data, the targets in the urban built environment chosen by
terrorists for attack generally were buildings. Out o f the thirty incidents that fit the
criteria for this study, twenty-five targets were buildings. Other targets were subways
(two incidents), a public park, a chemical plant, and a municipal water supply (Chart
2, below). Although one would conclude that buildings are the m ost likely target, it is
important to consider the displacement effects o f target hardening discussed in
Chapter II of this study.
Chart 2. D om estic Targets
Other
17%

Bldgs.
83%

Targets generally followed broad categories based on the motives o f the group
or on the individual planning the attack. Domestic groups, including right-wing,
issue-oriented, radical organizations and separatists, often chose targets for a specific
purpose. Targets fell into two broad categories, some that overlap, depending on the
motives o f those planning the attack.
Symbolic or public message targets represent the first, the most common, and
by far the largest, category. These were prominent landmarks, electrical utilities,
pipelines, state and local government buildings, universities, certain federal
government buildings, and businesses and industries involved in such areas as
chemical production, animal research, forest or wood products, and refineries. One
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expert interviewed for this study described these types o f structures as “signature”
structures.
The second category included government-owned or -operated facilities.
These consisted o f tunnels, computer facilities, bridges and overpasses, maritime
facilities (e.g., locks and harbors), and law enforcement buildings and support
structures. These findings are consistent with Bowman’s theories about what targets
terrorists may choose to attack, discussed in Chapter H in the section “Theories About
What the Terrorists M ay Attack: Targets.”

The Potential o f Defensible Space and Crime Prevention Through Environmental
Design (CPTED)
The theories o f Oscar Newman discussed in Chapter II suggest that designing
for street crime and crimes o f opportunity is going to reduce the opportunity for acts
o f terrorism. Newm an’s ideas were supported by both the experts interviewed for this
study, as well as the current terrorism literature. CPTED must be part o f the redesign
process o f courthouses, office buildings, and corporate America. CPTED represents a
planning process that reduces the architectural vulnerability.
One o f the participants interviewed for this study stressed
security standards are needed for a minimum standard
o f care, ju st as fire disasters have created a uniform
standard for fire protection. Protecting people,
information, and property m ust be a high priority for all
buildings. The goals fo r designing to protect against
terrorism are different than designing to resist crime
but the process is the same... (italics mine)
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After the World Trade Center was bombed in 1993, the principles o f
defensible space design were put into place there. In addition to concrete planters
parking is no longer open to everyone. Tenant parking is tightly controlled and
includes a hydraulic barrier - a latter-day drawbridge - lowered by a guard only after
proper credentials are shown, and capable o f stopping a truck at 50 miles an hour.
Even before the bombing o f the World Trade Center, commercial parking in
the country was being reviewed to prevent the 1,400 violent crimes that occur daily.
The new garages favor fewer columns, larger spans, and high ceilings. They have flat
floors, instead o f sloping, blind ones and glass elevators to observe occupants and
high lighting brightened further by painted ceilings.
Much o f the movement toward safeguarding public spaces centers around
rethinking them with a CPTED paradigm. Compare the Washington Metro, wide
open for surveillance, to the N ew York City subway, closed-in and dim. The premise
is that design can help reduce terrorism. Unlike high-tech security systems,
successful design minimizes the opportunity for predatory crimes like burglary,
robbery, rape, and murder, as well as terrorism, through more natural methods of
surveillance and controlled access and design that fosters a sense o f ownership in a
given area.
According to the experts interviewed for this study, in high-risk security
situations more sophisticated tools are needed. Ronald J. Massa, an engineer who is
president o f Lorron Corporation in Burlington, Mass., has developed BombCad, a
software program designed to help architects and engineers determine whether a
building will collapse from a bomb. The program takes analytical three-dimensional
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drawings o f a building and simulates a bomb's effect, providing detailed estimates o f
injury and accidents. One interviewed expert advocates 10- to 20-foot "stand-off
areas," or buffer zones around buildings and well-policed traffic "choke points," like
the barricaded checkpoints in London's financial district.
One participant in this study with responsibility for assessing the
vulnerabilities of buildings to terrorist attack pointed out that “the number-one source
o f property damage and injury in a bombing is falling and flying glass from the
immediate building as well as from those nearby.” A CPTED approach would
suggest that a good tool for mitigating the effects o f glass injury would be to increase
in the use o f laminated windows, in which soft plastic is bonded to a two-piece
sandwich o f glass to prevent shattering.

Liability Litigation Threatens the Creation o f More Defensible Space
One of the participants interviewed for this study pointed out that
The creation o f basic minimum security standards (for
buildings) is needed. The federal government has just
recently established a minimum standard o f care for
federal buildings, but not even minimum standards
apply to other buildings. Unfortunately, in the private
sector,
the threat o f premises liability litigation has driven the
major organizations for hotels and motels, shopping
centers, retail association, and builder associations to
try and block all efforts of minimum standards—
A legal and physical benchmark would put all o f corporate America on notice
to make their buildings safe against terrorism, not ju st the remote occurrence o f fire.
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Insurance companies are strongly supporting standards that they could measure a
business against and reduce their losses.

W hen and Where Did The Terrorists Attack Their Urban Targets?
Most terrorist attacks against the domestic urban built environment took place
in mid-morning or mid-evening, although there were incidents across the whole
spectrum o f the clock. General predictions o f the most likely time for a domestic
terrorist attack cannot be made.
The most common area o f the country for domestic terrorist attacks against the
urban built environment is New York City. Although attacks against the urban built
environment took place throughout a wide range o f places around the country, almost
two-thirds o f the attacks were on targets in New York City or its immediate
surroundings. Several factors could contribute to New York’s high incident count.
One may be its status as a “World City,” with the plethora o f media channels that can
immediately broadcast associated terrorist platforms to the world. Another factor may
also be related to New York’s “World City” status —the constant filtering in and out
o f policymakers and international events on the world stage —all making an attractive
venue for terrorist actions.
The selection of major, urban centers is consistent with current theory and
leftist doctrine, particularly as described by Marighella in his classic work, Mini
manual o f the Urban Guerilla. Here, Marighella describes the city as the ideal
location for terrorist operations, and advocates an urban location for two reasons.
Theoretically, it provided the opportunity to strike at the very seat o f capitalism;
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tactically, it offered the anonymity o f the crowd as a safe haven for its revolutionary
members.

Why Did The Terrorists Attack?
The trend toward higher casualties, discussed earlier in this chapter, reflects,
in part, the changing motivation o f today's terrorists. Analysis o f the cases used in
this study showed that religiously motivated terrorist groups, such as Usama bin
Ladin's group, al-Qaida, which is believed to have bombed the U.S. Embassies in
Africa, represent a growing trend toward hatred o f the United States. Other terrorist
groups are driven by visions o f a post-apocalyptic future or by ethnic hatred. Such
groups may lack a concrete political goal other than to punish their enemies by killing
as many of them as possible, seemingly without concern about alienating
sympathizers. Increasingly, attacks are less likely to be followed by claims of
responsibility or lists o f political demands.
The data suggests that the shift in terrorist motives has contributed to a change
in the way some terrorist groups are structured. Because groups based on ideological
or religious motives may lack a specific political or nationalistic agenda, they have
less need for a hierarchical structure. Instead, they can rely on loose affiliations with
like-minded groups from a variety o f countries to support their common cause against
the United States.
Al-Qaida, a terrorist organization involved in several o f the cases used in this
study, is the best-known transnational terrorist organization. In addition to pursuing
its own terrorist campaign, it calls on numerous militant groups that share some of its
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ideological beliefs to support its violent campaign against the United States. But
neither al-Qaida's extremist politico-religious beliefs nor its leader. Usama bin Ladin,
is unique. As one o f the interviewed participants pointed out,
. ..if al-Qaida and Usama bin Ladin were to disappear
tomorrow, the United States would still face potential
terrorist threats from a growing number o f groups
opposed to perceived American world dom ination...
Moreover, new terrorist threats can suddenly emerge from isolated conspiracies or
obscure cults with no previous history of violence.
Intelligence will continue to be an important first line o f defense against the
domestic terrorist. Coupled with the close ties to the local pulse fostered by a
community policing approach to law enforcement, the evidence suggests the potential
utility o f monitoring trends and indicators. One o f the interviewed experts pointed
out that,
the more loosely affiliated, transnational terrorist
networks are difficult to predict, track, and penetrate.
They rely on a variety of sources for funding and
logistical support, including self-financing criminal
activities such as kidnapping,
narcotics, and
petty crimes. Their networks o f support include both
front organizations and legitimate business and
nongovernment organizations. They use the Internet as
an effective communications channel.

How Did The Terrorists Attack Their Urban Targets?
Of the thirty domestic terrorist attacks against urban infrastructure that met the
criteria for this study, twenty six used conventional explosives, three used fire bombs,
and one was an attempt to poison an urban water supply. It was evident from the
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cases that guns and conventional explosives have so far remained the weapons o f
choice for most terrorists. Such weapons cause many casualties and are relatively easy
to acquire and use. Yet the potential for the use o f chemical, biological, or nuclear
(Weapons o f Mass Destruction) materials remains an ominous possibility that must be
considered in plans to mitigate the effects o f an attack on American cities. Several of
the experts interviewed for this study noted that, while it is extremely difficult to
predict the likelihood o f a Weapons o f Mass Destruction attack, today’s terrorists “are
seeking the ability to use such agents in order to cause mass casualties.” This is
consistent with Finding One, which noted that terrorist attacks are becoming more
deadly.
Weapons of Mass Destruction give a non-state sponsored terrorist group
significant technical challenges. Participants in the interviews noted that, while lethal
chemicals are easy to come by, getting large quantities and weaponizing them for
mass casualties is difficult, and only nation states have succeeded in doing so.
Biological agents can be acquired in nature or from medical supply houses, but
important aspects of handling and dispersion are daunting. To date, only nation states
have demonstrated the capability to build radiological and nuclear weapons.
The 1995 release o f a chemical agent in the Tokyo subway by the apocalyptic
Aum Shinrikyo group demonstrated the difficulties that terrorists face in attempting to
use Weapons o f Mass Destruction to produce mass casualties. The group used scores
o f highly skilled technicians and spent tens o f millions of dollars developing a
chemical attack that killed fewer people than conventional explosives could have. The
same group failed totally in a separate attempt to launch an anthrax attack in Tokyo.
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A small Weapons o f Mass Destruction attack could be successful if the
terrorists' goal is to challenge significantly Americans’ sense o f safety and confidence.
Terrorists could acquire more deadly Weapons o f Mass Destruction capabilities from
another country. Five o f the seven nations the United States identifies as state
sponsors o f terrorism have programs to develop Weapons o f Mass Destruction.

The Gaps —The Analysis O f Policy Initiatives Related To Domestic Terrorist Attacks
Against The Urban Built Environment

Federal
According to both the current literature on domestic preparedness, as well as
the comments o f several experts interviewed for this study, the primary deterrent and
investigative unit for matters associated with terrorist attacks has been federal law
enforcement. A recurring comment from the interviews relating to law enforcement
approaches was that "criminal acts of terrorism occur locally, but are generally
investigated federally.” Because o f this trend, most contemporary local law
enforcement officers confronted with a terrorist act would probably be unable to
differentiate it from a traditional crime without assistance.
As one interviewed participant pointed out,
there is a risk that, in preventing or responding to a
catastrophic terrorist attack, federal officials may
hesitate or act improperly because they do not fully
understand their legal authority or because there are
gaps in that authority....
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This comment is supported by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) in
its report on Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and
Efficiency, which noted that federal agencies' individual efforts to enhance
consequence management o f possible incidents involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction terrorism are not guided by an overarching strategy for achieving a
defined end state (General Accounting Office, 1998).
The GAO noted that local officials in m ost o f the cities visited for their study
raised the issue that the many Weapons o f Mass Destruction training, equipment, and
consequence management programs are evidence o f a fragmented and possibly
wasteful federal approach toward combating terrorism. This sentiment was echoed by
several o f the experts interviewed. The GAO noted that cities pointed to similar
federal agency training and equipment programs, such as those offered by the
Department o f Justice and FEMA and the new initiative to give
the National Guard a WMD response role, as examples o f the unfocused federal
approach to combating terrorism (General Accounting Office, 1998).

State and Local
Although the FBI assumes the lead federal role in the investigation and
prevention o f domestic terrorism, every act o f terrorism occurring within the United
States remains local in nature. Such acts, and the threat thereof, fall within the
purview o f state and local law enforcement and present significant challenges, far
removed from the daily concerns, priorities, and operational considerations o f most
police administrators.
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Both the interviewed experts and the Government Accounting Office
emphasized that FBI activities cannot succeed without cooperation and assistance
from local law enforcement agencies (General Accounting Office, 1998). Particularly
in light o f the proven effectiveness of a Community Policing approach, local police
officers and deputy sheriffs, along with troopers and state investigators, have the
ability to sense the discontent among terrorist movements, monitor the advocacy o f
extreme causes, respond to hate crimes, and serve as the foundation for an effective
assessment of threatening activities within their communities. As one o f the
interviewed participants pointed out,
...in all probability, state or local law enforcement
officers will respond first to a terrorist threat or
incident
however, state and local administrators
should remember that the FBI's unique role in the
nation's counter terrorism efforts makes it a critical
component in any terrorism-related investigation....
Several o f the interviewed experts noted that activity by right-wing extremist
groups has remained difficult to assess from the data available because o f the celltype structure and other clandestine tactics many groups have adopted. Problems
have appeared to increase since the Oklahoma City bombing. Klanwatch—a project o f
the nonprofit Southern Poverty Law Center that attempts to curb Klan and racist
violence through litigation, education, and monitoring-reported that "[tjhere were
858 groups operating in the United States in 1996, a 6 percent increase over the 809
groups noted in 1994 and 1995'’ (Southern Poverty Law Center, 1997). Although the
interviewed experts acknowledged the difficulty when determining the level o f threat,
a concern for future activity remains. Said one o f the participants,
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The potential for increased violence, including the
possibility of biological and chemical attacks, really
worries me. We need to prepare and plan for the
possibility of an incident occurring in any jurisdiction,
regardless o f location or size.

State and Local Intelligence
According to the data, complicated and legally challenging intelligence issues
surround the deterrence o f domestic terrorism. Many terrorist groups rely on the
constitutionally protected rights o f advocacy and assembly. Therefore, determining
the curiosity seekers, followers, and those who may advocate violence requires an
intelligence assessment o f known and observed activities. A Community Policing
approach to law enforcement may maximize the potential for timely, accurate
intelligence concerning terrorism in a domestic, urban environment.
One interviewed expert said “critical ingredients to success include
coordinated planning, intelligence sharing, and a unified, informed response to
terrorist threats among federal, state and local agencies.7’ The prevention and
response to terrorist acts require unified efforts.
All levels o f law enforcement must implement effective antiterrorism efforts
in combating this threat to ensure the safety o f all American citizens and their
communities. Yet the data suggests that state and local law enforcement agencies are
not sharing a great deal o f useful intelligence gathered at the federal level.
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A Need To Review And Modify Current Statutes That Target Terrorism
There are, for the states, conceptual problems in reaching a legally acceptable
definition o f terrorism, as none o f the statutes have enacted into law statutes that
actually deal explicitly with terrorism. Most statutes are modeled after the American
Law Institute's exemplar called "terroristic threatening." Enacted into legislation with
the promise of "doing something about terrorism," these statutes do little more than
cr im in a liz e verbal threats (Smith, 1988). If severity o f sanction can be used as a rough

gauge o f deterrent value, these statutes have had little preventive effect. Relegated to
misdemeanor or m in o r felony status, these statutes have been used only once or twice
during the past decade to prosecute crimes that might be labeled "terroristic” (Smith,
1988). If anything, they open the door for governmental overreaction, enabling local
officials to label selected offenders as terrorists.
The problem in criminalizing terrorism, according to several interviewed
experts, lies in translating academic definitions into legally permissible definitions of
terrorism. To adequately study the phenomenon of terrorism, most academicians add
a number o f qualifying characteristics to their definitions. For example, Jordan Paust
argues that any definition o f terrorism must consider the outcome, violence used,
motivation, and goals o f the terrorist to define adequately the concept (Paust, 1977).
Likewise, Grant Wardlaw notes, "for a definition o f terrorism to be universally
accepted it must transcend behavioral description to include individual motivation,
social milieu, and political purpose" (Wardlaw, 1982). Unfortunately, these salient
features conflict with efforts to create legal definitions o f terrorism.
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According to Paust, efforts to transform academic definitions of terror into
legal definitions are doomed under constitutional scrutiny. He says that the law must
go beyond the goals o f empirical study, and decisions must be made regarding the
social acceptability o f an act, subsequently rendering empirical definitions
unworkable. Consequently, motive or political purpose no longer become useful
variables in legislating statutes in a system o f justice where motive is not normally an
essential element of an offense. Finding a universally accepted definition o f terrorism
has not met with much success in United States courts (Paust, 1977).
The conceptual difficulties are magnified when one attempts to write
legislation that makes an act criminal because it was intended to invoke political
change or influence an audience beyond the immediate victims, two widely accepted
aspects o f an academic definition o f terrorism. One o f the interviewed participants
noted, “the issue is really one o f requiring proof of motive as an element required in
criminal liability.”
Typically, proof that the act occurred (actus reus) and that the particular act
was accompanied by the required intent (mens rea) is sufficient for criminal liability
(Wardlaw, 1982). Normally, motive relates only to why a person might commit a
given act to achieve a desired result. For example, A murders B to obtain money from
B's wallet. A's intent was to kill, and it must be established in court to convict on a
murder charge. Ars motive was to steal, but it does not have be established in court as
an essential element o f the offense except for use as circumstantial evidence in
establishing intent. Most academic definitions of terrorism, however, include as an
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element o f the crime the motive o f the perpetrator, i.e., to invoke political or social
change.
The review o f the current literature on terrorism preparedness showed that
only one state, California, has attempted to criminalize terrorism explicitly.
Subsequently challenged because o f its attempt to criminalize motive, a California
Supreme Court decision, People v. Mirmirani, held that the phrase "to achieve social
or political goals" was unconstitutionally vague (People v. Mirmirani).
California's attempt to make terrorism a criminal act represents the only effort
to retain a definition o f terrorism similar to that used in academe and generally
believed by the American public to constitute terrorism. Although it may be doomed
by its purist approach, the statute reflects the enormous conceptual difficulty faced in
specifically criminalizing acts o f terrorism.

Lack O f Effective Coordination And Communication
As with any form of disaster planning, planning for a terrorist attack against
the urban built environment presents a complex balancing act between the risk o f the
incident, the potential for casualties and the tremendous costs involved in attempting
to mitigate such an incident. As a result o f both the expert interviews and the review
o f the terrorism-related literature, it became evident that there is a wide range o f
“potential expense” vs. “likelihood o f terrorist attacks by various methods” available
to the terrorist. That balance can best be illustrated by Figure 2 below:
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Figure 2. Risk Analysis o f Types o f Terrorist Attacks Against the Urban Built
Environment
Attack with
Conventional
Munitions

LikHhood of
Occurrence

Chemical or
Nuclear Attack

Biological
Attack

Cost of Mitigation Effort
Potential
Casualties

Both the knowledgeable persons interviewed and several government-initiated
reports confirmed that policy-makers are now realizing that a proper response to
terrorism requires effective coordination and open communication. Unfortunately, it
may still be lacking in some instances. "The working relationships among key
agencies at all levels o f government are limited," said one o f the interviewed
participants. "In many places they're nonexistent." A study sponsored by the National
Institute o f Justice (NIJ) confirmed that state and local law enforcement agencies view
the threat o f terrorism as real, but their response to the threat varies widely according
to the size and resources o f the department and the nature o f the threat in any given
community.
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Several knowledgeable persons interviewed pointed out that, in the past, major
cities developed preventive and preparation programs, often in cooperation with the
FBI and its joint terrorism task forces, whereas smaller cities and counties usually
operated on their own. This was corroborated by the NIJ report, which noted that
antiterrorism resources varied according to the existing threat potential. Some smaller
jurisdictions developed regional alliances to address specific extremist groups and
organizations operating within locales. However, the majority o f jurisdictions only
recently realized the threat presented by extremist individuals and groups and now
assess the threat that such groups may pose to their respective communities and to
related operational planning and readiness issues.

Improvement in Intergovernmental Coordination and Relations is Needed
As one of the participants noted, “the federal government cannot prepare for
Weapons of Mass Destruction incidents on its own.” The experts generally agreed
that improvements are needed in intergovernmental relations between federal, state
and local governments. For example, federal agencies developed some o f their
assistance programs without coordinating them with existing state and local
emergency management structures. In addition, the multitude o f federal assistance
programs has led to confusion on the part o f state and local officials. One promising
step to improve coordination and reduce confusion has been the creation o f the
National Domestic Preparedness Office within the Department o f Justice to provide
"one stop shopping" to state and local officials in need o f assistance. This office has
recently prepared a draft plan on how it will provide assistance, but the experts
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interviewed for this study stressed that m uch work has yet to be done to promote true
intergovernmental cooperation.
One participant stressed that an important intergovernmental issue requiring
immediate resolution is “the matter o f command and control at the site o f a terrorist
incident.” Roles o f the federal government versus the state and local governments
need to be further clarified to prevent confusion.

The Urban Built Environment is Vulnerable to Conventional Attack
According to The Sentinel (Vol 1, No. 3, Third Quarter 1993) a publication o f
the Industrial Risk Insurers, explosion has the highest average dollar loss o f all
hazardous events. Therefore, another cost factor entering today's construction and
building operation economy is blast mitigation costs. Military installations for years
have been designed to resist conventional weapons or blast attacks, with the single
focus toward sustaining the structure for the purpose o f maintaining the mission.
Noted one participant,
for buildings in American cities, the single most
important design consideration is to construct buildings
to save lives in the event o f a terrorist attack. There
should be absolutely no concern for saving the structure
other than to save the people.
One o f the unintended consequences o f designing for defensible space to
mitigate terrorism may be that people do not want to work in fortress-like structures.
Designing commercial buildings as military installations is very impractical, as
ordinary people do not want to work in bunker-like buildings. Commercial buildings
serve a very different purpose and therefore must be designed to a different standard.
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Accepting that fact, the experts noted that commercial buildings should be designed
to sustain a certain amount o f attack, meaning they are designed to allow for limited
localized damage-not total failure-to permit rescue teams to evacuate the victims.
The goals of building designers should be 1) to design safer buildings that will not fail
when attacked and 2) to help rescue professionals gain entrance to a damaged
building to tend to the survivors.
Planning collaboration, well before construction begins, is essential. As noted
by one interviewed expert, “when considering protection for a building, the building
owners and architects must work with structural engineers and blast consultants to
determine which threats they are trying to protect against.” For bombings, the
terrorist threats range from the large truck bomb to the mid-size car bomb to the small
package or letter bomb. For these assaults, the source can originate either external or
internal to the structure. No m atter what size the bomb, there will always be some
localized damage and some unavoidable deaths. However, by limiting the localized
failure, catastrophic structural failure can be prevented. Optimally, noted the
interview participant, “blast mitigation provisions for a new building should be
addressed in the early stages o f the design. However, existing buildings can be
upgraded to behave better when attacked.”
As was pointed out in the case study of the World Trade Center bombing, one
bomb disabled the primary utility feeds and their backup systems. However,
accidental or terroristic, these events not only disrupted the operations o f the facility
but also impaired the rescue operations.
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Rescue Operations Are Affected By Urban Design
“Protection for a building, which comes in active and passive forms, will
impact the damage sustained by the building and the rescue efforts o f the emergency
workers,” said one study participant. Several methods that enhance the building's
structural performance will directly benefit the emergency response team. As the
building cannot be designed to be bombproof, the key is to limit the acceptable
damage to a confined area.
Acceptable damage is a relative term, with the spectrum of damage ranging
from a few broken windows to regional slab failure to confined structural frame
failure. In any case, the ultimate goal is to prevent widespread structural failure or
progressive collapse. The damage at the World Trade Center was extensive but
somewhat localized, relative to the massive twin structures. Unfortunately, the
damage to the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, which was very
extensive, could have been limited had the design included provisions to mitigate
progressive collapse.

The Urban Built Environment Is Most Vulnerable To Biological Attack
One o f the bio-terrorism experts interviewed for this study pointed out that,
“in the past, an attack with a biological agent was considered very unlikely; however,
now it seems entirely possible.” The experts believe that it is no longer a matter o f
“i f ’ but “when” such an attack will occur. They pointed to the accessibility of
information on how to prepare biologic weapons and to activities by groups such as
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Aum Shinrykyo, which, in addition to releasing nerve gas in Tokyo's subway,
experimented with botulism and anthrax.
Massive Impact on an Unprepared Metropolitan Health System
An attack with an agent such as smallpox poses a threat
to large populations because o f the potential for personto-person transmission, enabling spread to other cities
and states. Such a disease would quickly culminate in a
nationwide emergency. International involvement
would be sure to follow. Control of such an epidemic
would require the coordinated effort of the entire public
health community. —study participant
Several o f the participants noted that the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
has significant experience in responding to explosion and chemical related terrorism
events and emergencies. Chemicals are plentiful and many o f the world’s worst
disasters have involved the release o f industrial compounds. However, the experts
noted, special risks are attendant with biological terrorism. For example, when people
are exposed to a pathogen like plague or smallpox, they may not know that they have
been exposed, and they may not feel sick for some time. This delay between exposure
and onset o f illness, or the incubation period, is characteristic of infectious diseases.
The incubation period may range from several hours to a few weeks, depending on
the exposure and pathogen. During this period, patients may continue to travel, visit
family and friends, or attend public meetings at a time when they may be highly
contagious. Consequently, a disease may be well established in the population before
the first cases appear ill and require medical attention.
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Numbers o f Casualties Would Overwhelm M etropolitan Public Health Systems
American cities must be prepared for a potential
spectrum o f domestic bio-terrorism that ranges from
hoaxes and use o f nonmass casualty devices and agents
by individuals and small groups to state-sponsored
terrorism that employs classic biological warfare agents
and can produce mass casualties. —Interviewed expert

The agents o f anthrax, plague, brucellosis, smallpox, viral encephalidites, and
viral hemorrhagic fevers were cited by the participants as those o f particular concern:
they are relatively easy and inexpensive to produce, cause death or disabling disease,
and can be aerosolized and distributed over large geographic areas. If released under
ideal environmental circumstances, these agents can infect hundreds o f thousands o f
persons and cause many deaths. Such scenarios would present serious challenges for
patient management and for prophylaxis o f exposed persons; environmental
contamination could provide a continuing threat to the population (especially those
exposed at the beginning o f the crisis) and generate panic in the community.
The interviewed experts stressed that bioterrorist attacks could be covert or
announced and could be caused by virtually any pathogenic microorganism. In one o f
the cases examined for this dissertation, the Rajneeshee religious cult in Oregon
provided an appropriate example. The cult planned to infect residents with
Salmonella on election day to influence the results o f county elections. To practice for
the attack, they contaminated salad bars at 10 restaurants with S. Typhimurium on
several occasions before the election. A community wide outbreak of salmonellosis
resulted; at least 751 cases were documented in a county that typically reports fewer
than five cases per year.
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In the Rajneeshee case, although bioterrorism, was considered a possibility
when the outbreak was being investigated by public health officials, it was considered
unlikely. The source of the outbreak became known only when the FBI investigated
the cult for other criminal violations. A vial o f S. Typhimurium identical to the
outbreak strain was found in a clinical laboratory on the cult's compound, and
members o f the cult subsequently admitted to contaminating the salad bars and
putting Salmonella into a city water supply tank. This incident, among other recent
events, underscores the importance o f improving preparedness at all levels.

Biological Agents are Extremely Difficult to Detect
A bioterrorist attack may be difficult to distinguish from
a naturally occurring infectious disease outbreak.
Investigators must first examine the epidemiology o f an
outbreak to identify its source, mode o f transmission,
and persons at risk —Interviewed bio-terrorism expert
Certain clues may indicate whether an outbreak is the result o f purposeful
release o f microorganisms. Naturally occurring diseases are endemic to certain areas
and involve traditional cycles o f transmission; some diseases occur seasonally, and
sentinel cases are not uncommon. In contrast, a disease outbreak due to bioterrorism
could occur in a nonendemic-disease area, at any time of year, without warning, and
depending on the agent and mode o f transmission, thousands of cases might occur
abruptly.
Biological weapons have an unmatched destructive potential, noted the
interviewed experts. Pound for pound, biological agents are the world's most lethal
substances. The lethality of biological agents makes it unnecessary for terrorists to
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maintain large stockpiles. Some biological agents are self-replicating, which sets them
apart from chemical and nuclear weapons. Increasingly sophisticated genetic
engineering techniques also raise the haunting possibility o f terrorists exploiting
antibiotic and vaccine-resistant bacteria, as well as biological agents altered to
facilitate aerosol dissemination.
One interviewed expert noted that the technology for dispersing biological
agents is becoming more sophisticated. Analysts often have downplayed the potential
for bioterrorist strikes to inflict mass casualties, considering the difficulties associated
with disseminating biological agents. Although aerosol dissemination presents
technical challenges, they are not insuperable. Biological agents could be
disseminated as an aerosol cloud and infect a large area with potentially lethal
infective doses.
According to the Department o f Defense's 1997 report on proliferation (Office
o f the Secretary o f Defense, 1997), in 1990 Iraq attempted to modify spray tanks
capable o f delivering 2,000 liters of anthrax via remotely piloted aircraft. In Japan,
the Shinrikyo cult bought a Russian helicopter and two remotely piloted vehicles
capable o f disseminating biological agents. Spurred by market pressures, technology
for dispersing biological agents, such as that used by farmers to spray insecticide, is
certain to improve. One interviewed expert stressed, “It would be a serious mistake to
think terrorist groups would not seek to exploit such enhancements.”
According to the experts interviewed, the lag time between infection and the
appearance o f symptoms generally is longer for biological agents than with chemical
exposures. The incubation period will vary, depending on the biological agent. For the
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plague, the incubation period is two to three days; for anthrax, one to five days.
Terrorists seeking to cover their tracks will find this lag time appealing; so might
states seeking plausible denial or attempting so-called false flag operations, in which
one power wrongly implicates another. Clearly, the gap between infection and the
appearance o f symptoms will complicate efforts to pursue bioterrorists. Law
enforcement officials, in fact, took more than a year to ascertain that the 1984
salmonella outbreak in Oregon resulted from intentional contamination.

Bioterrorist Weapons Are Easy and Cheap to Produce
The interviewed experts stressed that lethal biological agents can be produced
easily and cheaply. Analysis o f one o f the cases used in this study showed that many
biological agents suitable for terrorist strikes can be cultivated easily. For example,
the Patriot's Council, the Minnesota-based militia group that schemed in 1992 to
assassinate a deputy U.S. marshal and a sheriff, reportedly manufactured enough ricin
toxin from a book recipe to kill 125 people. Detailed techniques for extracting ricin
from castor beans are available in numerous publications. The cost o f procuring lethal
biological agents is also relatively low. One o f the interviewed participants estimated
that “a significant biological arsenal could be cultivated in a 15-foot square room with
$10,000 worth o f equipment.’’
As many as ten countries possess offensive biological weapons programs,
including the People's Republic of China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Russia, and
Syria. The existence o f these programs greatly increases the danger o f bioterrorism.
Countries seeking to sponsor bio-terrorist acts always have the option o f sharing their
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expertise with extremist groups. For their part, terrorists groups interested in bio
terrorism may attempt to lure disgruntled scientists to support their causes.
The interviewed experts emphasized that biological agents are easier to
produce clandestinely than are either chemical or nuclear weapons. Said one
knowledgeable person,
Biological research can be used for peaceful or
malevolent purposes. The equipment required for the
production o f biological agents for either purpose is
generally the same, which raises the so-called dual-use
problem. The dual-use problem also makes it easy for
countries to conceal their biological weapons programs.
Even small terrorist groups could develop lethal
biological agents, or genetically altered agents,
clandestinely.

Urban Areas Are Ideal Terrorist Targets
The global transportation links usually found in close proximity to urban areas
facilitate the potential for biological terrorist strikes to inflict mass casualties. In 1918
and 1919, a globe-girdling strain o f influenza killed 22 million people, including
500,000 Americans. The advent o f rapid transportation links has made the world even
more vulnerable to the rapid spread o f contagious diseases. Thanks to the reach and
rapidity o f modem je t travel, a person carrying the Ebola virus, for example, could
infect hundreds or thousands o f people across several continents in a matter o f hours.
To be sure, the contagion potential o f biological agents would not appeal to terrorists
intent on narrowly focused attacks. But for a nihilistic or apocalyptic group aiming to
cause mass casualties, this potential would be very attractive.
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Urbanization provides terrorists with a wide array o f lucrative targets. In
densely populated areas, even a partially successful biological attack would have a
devastating impact. The potential to generate mass panic is greatest in city
environments. The emergence o f global, real-time media coverage increases the
likelihood that a major biological incident will induce panic. One o f the experts
interviewed for this study noted that a major biological attack on U.S. soil would
unleash an avalanche o f media attention. Grossly inaccurate or sensational media
coverage of even a limited bioterrorist incident, including a well-planned hoax, could
induce widespread panic and confusion. In a world already awash with low-level
violence, bio-terrorists seeking to gain attention for their cause may find this potential
for pandemonium particularly appealing.

Anthrax And Smallpox Pose The Most Serious Civilian Threat To Urban Areas
The most serious threats from a bio-terrorist attack
come from those agents that have the greatest
availability, ease o f production, that are lethal or
incapacitating, have stability in storage, have high
infectivity/toxicity, and are stable/deliverable in aerosol.
—Interviewed bioterrorist expert
Terrorist criteria for a biological agent are that the agent is pathogenic for
humans, plants or animals; causes the onset o f severe disease or disability; is effective
at low dose rates; has a high rate o f disease following infection; is highly infectious
but not contagious and can be weaponized in a variety o f munitions or aerosol
generation equipment. The intent of the terrorists are to kill large numbers,
overwhelm resources, and cause massive societal disruption.
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The interviewed experts stressed that the highest threat is posed from those
biological agents that are dispersed in aerosol, are highly lethal, that lack treatment or
vaccine, and that are communicable- According to the interviewed experts, two
candidates emerge from the long threat list: anthrax and smallpox. Both have well
demonstrated historical devastation potential, both are highly lethal agents, both have
devastating psychological impact, are easy to produce, and can be aerosolized.

Organizational Issues And Lines O f Communication Are Unclear
Should an attack against an American city take place, consequence
management responsibility would be that o f the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA). FEMA is responsible for ensuring that the Federal Response Plan
is adequate to respond to the consequences o f terrorism directed against large
populations in the United States, including terrorism involving Weapons o f Mass
Destruction.
The Federal Response Plan is a generic template designed to coordinate the
delivery o f federal assistance—personnel, technical expertise, and equipment—in the
event o f natural disaster or federal emergency. Although the general lines o f
responsibility appear reasonably clear, the federal government’s plan to cope with the
threat o f bio terrorism suffers from several weaknesses. Noted one interviewed expert,
The reactive nature o f the federal government’s
approach has helped spawn an "alphabet soup" o f
counter-terrorism programs. The sheer number o f
actors involved has created immense coordination
problems in the unwieldy counter terrorism
architecture, which includes more than 40 different
federal agencies, bureaus, and offices.
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In theory, the U.S. National Security Council is supposed to coordinate
disparate elements o f the counter terrorism effort by managing various working
groups. The reality, according to the data, is very different. A government bioterrorist
simulation conducted in March 1998 revealed serious interagency coordination
problems. According to former CIA director James Woolsey, who recently served as
the co-chair o f a classified study on terrorism and Weapons o f Mass Destruction,
"The system is not well organized at all.”
According to the experts interviewed for this study, the federal government
has failed to develop a public education program to explain the dangers posed by
bioterrorism. This shortcoming is alarming, noted the experts, especially because the
specter o f bio-terrorism has attracted considerable attention. It has become a frequent
topic o f newspaper stories and magazine articles, many of which express serious
doubts about the government's ability to deter bioterrorist attacks, let alone manage
the horrific consequences. The absence o f a modulated public education campaign
increases the likelihood of mass panic in the aftermath o f such a strike.

Too Much Reliance On The Military
According to the interviewed experts, the military's ability to assist state and
local officials in coping with bioterrorism on U.S. soil has lagged. To help remedy
these shortcomings, Congress passed the 1996 Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA), Richard Lugar (R-EN),
and Pete Domenici (R-NM). This act directed the Department o f Defense, in
conjunction with other federal agencies, to manage a training and equipment program
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in 120 cities over a five-year period. The law was designed to nurture, at the local

level, the expertise to cope with the consequences o f major terrorist strikes involving
Weapons o f Mass Destruction. As o f April 1998, the program had reached roughly
25 percent o f the designated cities. The interviewed experts noted that the program
has experienced "growing pains," particularly with respect to allocation and funding
o f equipment.
In March 1998, the Department of Defense announced plans to give the
National Guard a greater domestic role in responding to terrorist strikes involving
Weapons o f Mass Destruction. The Pentagon's fiscal year 1999 budget request
included money to field ten 22-member Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection
(RAID) teams to respond to chemical or biological attacks.
The interviewed experts were in agreement that, although the creation o f
RAID teams is important, they should not be considered the "cornerstone" o f U.S.
policy. Instead, it was constantly stressed by several experts that the cornerstones
should be 1) the training and equipping o f the "first responders," the local police and
fire officials who will arrive at the scene hours, perhaps even days, before federal or
state assets can be deployed in force, and 2) the strengthening participation o f public
health providers (no priority should be inferred for these two items). The first few
hours are critical in responding to chemical and biological attacks; this time
represents a narrow window in which local officials can manage the casualties from
the attack and reduce the risk o f mass panic.
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The Public Health System Should Have More Resources And Play A Larger Role
In addition to the Department o f Defense, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention has a vital role in the consequence management o f biological attacks.
Unfortunately, the U.S. public health system lacks the resources to handle such a
contingency. Indeed, the system has problems even with the resurgence o f infectious
diseases such as tuberculosis. A recent White House-backed interagency working
group on infectious diseases found that at least "29 previously unknown diseases have
appeared since 1973, and 20 well-known ones have reemerged, often in new drugresistant or deadlier forms.”
These findings raise serious questions about the ability o f the U.S. public
health system to cope with major biological terrorist attacks. Dr. Donald Henderson,
dean emeritus of the Johns Hopkins School o f Public Health, argued that “the United
States is ill-prepared to confront a terrorist attack using biological weapons, and
health officials need more money to prepare against such attacks.” In 1972, for
example, the United States ceased giving routine smallpox vaccinations. Dr.
Henderson, who led the global effort to eradicate smallpox, believes the United States
should increase its store o f smallpox vaccine by 20 million doses.
According to the interviewed experts, other public health system issues
germane to bioterrorism require urgent attention beyond the vaccine deficiencies. As
late as 1995, U.S. laws and regulations provided few barriers to prevent an individual
from legally procuring biological agents. The 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act made it a crime to threaten the use of biological weapons and
established tighter regulations concerning the transfer of biological agents. As Senator
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Jon Kyi (R-AZ) emphasized in recent hearings before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, although the CDC published the regulations required by the act, it "failed
to provide the funds needed to implement and enforce safeguards designed to prevent
the diversion o f lethal agents into the hands o f terrorists."
It was stressed by several interviewed experts that the overall structure o f the
public health system is incapable o f managing the consequences o f a major
bioterrorist strike. An interviewed participant with public health responsibilities
stressed that,
...the U.S. emergency system overall is geared to
respond to small numbers o f people injured primarily
due to trauma, including transportation accidents,
medical emergencies such as heart attacks, and
localized cases o f violence. The responses to these
types o f emergencies are not as relevant to injury
caused by chemical and biological attack.
According to the interviewed experts, public health agencies at the municipal,
county, state and federal levels will be central participants in efforts to recognize and
respond to bioterrorist attacks. Public health response activities will be especially
essential to shaping the scope and outcome of a bioterrorist attack. Containment o f
transmissible disease outbreaks is a formidable undertaking. The mobility of urban
populations, the global availability o f high-speed transportation networks, and
limitations on public health's legal authorities, are factors that impact on epidemic
management.
The experts that were interviewed for this study noted that, while it is possible
that electronically based surveillance systems will be helpful in detecting an attack; it
is certain that such systems will be essential tools in managing an epidemic. Thus, the
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ability o f local and state health departments to analyze and monitor the
epidemiological situation is a key component o f any national response system.
Epidemiologic analysis o f initial victims may be critical in determining where the
attack occurred, who is at risk, and who requires prophylactic treatment.
A key component o f efforts to limit the number who become ill will include
the identification o f contacts requiring vaccination, antibiotics or quarantine.
Epidemiologic tracking o f the epidemic will be necessary to determine if response
efforts are succeeding, where resources should be invested, and whether additional
attacks have occurred. Governments' ability to describe accurately the course of
disease outbreaks has a great impact on public credibility and on citizens' willingness
to follow the recommendations o f public health authorities.
Several interviewed experts stated that, unfortunately, the public health
infrastructure in the U.S. has been neglected for decades. This was corroborated by
Institute of Medicine, that wrote, in 1988, "public health in the United States has been
taken for granted" and that "our current capabilities for effective public health actions
are inadequate" (Institute o f Medicine, The Future o f Public Health, National
Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1988). The experts interviewed for this study felt
that the situation has only gotten worse. City and state health agencies remain
seriously under-funded and understaffed, a situation that presents a real danger in our
nation's potential to manage effectively an epidemic among the civilian population.
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Hospitals In American Cites Are Not Prepared To Respond To A Terrorist Attack
Should a terrorist attack on US civilians occur, hospitals would be frontline
institutions for dealing with the response, regardless o f the type or scale o f the attack.
As a knowledgeable person emphasized,
the current hospital system is not well prepared to deal
with a mass disaster. Economic pressures have reduced
staff and the number o f available hospital beds.
Intensive care and isolation beds are particularly scarce.
Drugs and equipment are purchased on an "as needed"
basis, which has resulted in reduced stockpiles available
for immediate use.
Another knowledgeable person noted that hospitals have been largely missing
from bioterrorism response planning to date. Efforts to include hospitals in exercises
sponsored by the Domestic Preparedness programs have not been successful in
engaging hospital leaders, who are preoccupied with the changing and financially
competitive terrain o f modem health care. Most hospitals are not in a position to
accept unfunded mandates, and are unlikely to respond to bioterrorism response plans
unless the nation establishes a thoughtful menu o f incentives and programs that
motivate and enable them to do so.

Summary
While the United States has the greatest intelligence system in the world, the
country does not have a national antiterrorist emergency unit, organizational chain of
command, or the capability to respond directly to a domestic terrorist attack. With
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regard to terrorist countermeasures, we do not have a capability for the equivalent o f a
911 call in response to a domestic terrorist incident.
A national response team capability does exist through the Bureau o f Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), but both these agencies respond to incidents after the fact, when the damage
has already been done. The ATF has developed a program to help federal, state, and
local investigators meet the challenges they face at explosives crime scenes. This
program involves specialized teams that can respond within twenty-four hours to any
scene o f a major explosion or fire. This specialized response capability is the only one
o f its kind offered by a federal law enforcement agency.
FEMA has the responsibility o f dealing with the consequences o f domestic
terrorism. However, FEMA is ill-equipped and is not experienced in rapid and
effective response to infrastructure attacks, including responding to the destruction o f
the urban built environment to include key portions o f the power grid, water supplies,
and other logistical networks.
Another problem is the lack o f national security standards in this field. The
Department o f Transportation has not developed detailed guidance explaining how
transit and port authorities could best meet security requirements, for example.
Neither do industry volunteer guidelines exist. Without detailed guidance and
standards, an effective response to attacks cannot be assured.
Explosives detection capabilities are a concern as well. Current explosives
detection methods are ineffective to cope with the terrorist threat o f today, as they
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lack the range, throughput, and technical specificity to perform in the real-time
operational environment necessary for transportation and infrastructure operations.
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CHAPTER V.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study was designed for the prime purpose o f determining strategies that
could mitigate the impact o f terrorist attacks on urban areas -- attacks using either
conventional and/or weapons o f mass destruction. While exploring these strategies,
careful attention has been directed to possible unintended effects o f these strategies.
In addition, a thorough examination o f the gaps in existing terrorist/crime mitigation
strategies was conducted - especially in light o f emerging threats from ‘"weapons o f
mass destruction” i.e. biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
Specific areas o f inquiry included a focus on what types o f terrorist attacks
had taken place already, who the terrorists were, what they attacked, when they
attacked, where they attacked, why they attacked, and how they attacked. Based on
this initial step, an assessment of the weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the
preparedness o f the urban built environment o f American cities was made. The
outcome o f this initial assessment is a series o f suggestions as to what should be done
differently, and how involved agencies at federal, state, regional and local levels can
play more effective roles in ensuring readiness against terrorist attacks. Based on the
information developed in Chapter IV, several conclusions and recommendations are
presented in this chapter.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Overall Planning Process Does Not Sufficiently Involve Agencies at the State and
Local Level
According to both the GAO (United States General Accounting Office, 1997)
and the experts interviewed for this study, adequate planning is generally coordinated
across federal agencies, but state and local agencies are often left out o f the process or
have minimal involvement. This is particularly true for smaller metropolitan areas.
One solution to this problem would be th e creation o f a domestic terrorism
planning process at the state and local level. B y creating a domestic terrorism
planning process at the state and local level, administrators can respond better to a
terrorist incident and also help to identify and prevent an incident from occurring.
First, law enforcement officers must recognize a domestic terrorism threat. Next, as
with other important law enforcement challenges, agencies should develop a state o f
readiness to prevent, deter, and interdict terrorist attacks. Planning, an essential step,
should include identifying potential threats andl those areas that may be vulnerable to
attack, maintaining an inventory o f relevant agency resources, and creating
interagency agreements. Such agreements should include information exchange,
planning oversight, a survey of available resources, and formal involvement in an
incident command structure. Agencies also sho»uld engage in contingency planning to
prepare for “what i f ’ scenarios by exploring th e various alternatives for attack in a
particular jurisdiction. An effective planning effort also includes an enhanced ability
for multi-agency response.
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The Public Health System is N ot Prepared to Meet the Threat O f Domestic Terrorism,
Particularly Bioterrorism
Unlike an explosion or a tornado, in a biological event, it is unlikely that a
single localized place or cluster o f people will be identified for traditional first
responder activity. In every one o f the cases used in this study that resulted in an
actual attack, local personnel were the first on scene. These people were either local
law enforcement, firefighters or paramedics. The next group involved were other
health professionals such as hospital personnel. In the only actual biological attack
used in this study, the Rajneesh case, the victims of the biological attack started
showing up at the local hospital within days after the attack. This strongly suggests
that in future attacks, the initial responders to such disasters, especially a biological
attack, will most likely include county and city health officers, hospital staff,
members o f the outpatient medical community, and a wide range o f response
personnel in the public health system.
An increased investment in the Public Health system would be an important
step toward meeting the threat o f domestic terrorism, and bioterrorism in particular.
Protection against terrorism requires investment in the public health system. This
point was stressed repeatedly by the interviewed experts, and is underscored in a
report commissioned by the Department o f Health and Human Services Office of
Emergency Preparedness (OEP) and recently released by the Institute o f Medicine and
the National Research Council, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Research and
Development to Improve Civilian Medical Response, which stresses the need for
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long-term public health improvements in surveillance and epidemiology
infrastructure.
Increased vigilance and preparedness for unexplained illnesses are an essential
part o f the public health effort to protect the American people against bioterrorism.
Toward this end, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), working in collaboration
with State and local health departments, many other public health agencies, and other
Federal agencies, should begin an effort to upgrade public health capabilities locally
and nationally to respond to biological and chemical terrorism. Specifically, the
CDC, in partnership with state and local governments, should focus upon detection o f
unusual events —i.e. public health surveillance. Because the initial detection of
bioterrorism will most likely occur at the local level after a period when patients have
incubated the disease, it is essential to educate and train members o f the medical
community —both public and private —who may be the first to examine and treat the
victims. State and Federal epidemiologists must be trained to consider unusual or rare
threat agents when a suspicious outbreak occurs and must be prepared to address
questions related to their transmission, treatment, and prevention. It is also necessary
to upgrade the surveillance systems o f State and local health departments, which will
be relied upon to identify unusual patterns o f disease occurrence and to locate any
additional cases o f illness as the disease spreads throughout the community and
beyond.
The CDC should also promote the development o f new disease surveillance
networks which will better link critical health care facilities and components o f the
emergency medical system to public health agencies. CDC should also pilot and
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evaluate new surveillance systems to improve the nation’s ability to detect low
incidences o f unexplained illnesses or track critical health resource utilization.
In the response to an outbreak caused by an act o f bioterrorism, the most likely
scenario will be that CDC —as well as DOD and security agencies —will be alerted to
the event only after State or local health officers, medical practitioners, or other
workers in the health sector have identified and validated a cluster o f cases that are
highly unusual and potentially unexplained. For this reason, it is imperative that State
and local health departments have sufficient resources to conduct disease outbreak
investigations. CDC should provide State and large metropolitan health departments
with tools, training, and financial resources for local outbreak investigations, and help
develop rapid public health response capacity at the State and local levels.
Additionally, in the event o f a suspected or an actual attack, CDC should be prepared
to assist in identifying threat agents and their modes o f transmission, in instituting
control measures, and in providing consultation on medical management.
Strengthening communication among clinicians, emergency rooms, infection
control practitioners, hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, and public health
personnel is o f paramount importance. In the event o f an intentional release o f a
chemical or biological agent, rapid and secure communications will be especially
crucial to ensure a prompt and coordinated public health and medical response.
Further, in the event o f such an attack, the CDC will need to ensure that the public is
provided with accurate and timely information. An act o f terrorism is likely to cause
widespread panic, and on-going communication o f accurate and up-to-date
information will help calm public fears and limit collateral effects o f the attack.
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CDC should work to ensure that all levels o f the public health community —
Federal, State, and local —are prepared to work in coordination with the medical and
emergency response communities to address the public health consequences o f
biological and chemical terrorism. The CDC must work to assure that first responders
are better prepared against biological and chemical exposures. CDC has significant
experience in the areas o f detector technology, personal protective equipment,
including protective clothing and respirators, and the necessary training to work in
hazardous environments. The challenge is to expand these capacities to better protect
first responders from the perils o f biological and chemical terrorism.
Strategies to create protocols for immunizing at-risk populations, isolate large
numbers o f exposed individuals; assess methods o f safeguarding food and water from
deliberate contamination; and explore ways to improve linkages between animal and
human disease surveillance networks should be developed since threat agents that
affect both humans and animals may first be detected in animals.
Collaboration between public health departments and the medical community
is also critical to bioterrorism response. The gulf between medicine and public health
is well documented and significant. Communication between hospitals and state
health agencies is extremely limited, according to both the literature and the
interviewed experts. For example, few state health agencies have the ability to
determine how many intensive care unit beds in the state are occupied at any given
time, and few physicians know how to contact government health agencies were they
to suspect a case o f smallpox or anthrax. Re-establishing the linkages between
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medical practitioners and hospitals and public health agencies will be extremely
important (and is likely to yield dividends beyond bioterrorism response).
It is likely that many physicians will be reluctant to devote time or resources in
preparing to treat diseases with low probabilities o f occurrence. Physicians must be
educated about the potentially calamitous consequences o f bio terrorism, and the
critical role that astute clinicians could play in recognizing such attacks. It is essential
that at least a core o f practitioners in selected medical specialties - such as emergency
medicine, infectious disease, internal medicine, hospital epidemiology, etc.- are aware
o f the basic clinical manifestations and management of diseases caused by biological
weapons.
Effective response to a bioterrorist attack that results in hundreds or thousands
o f patients will require extensive coordination and cooperation among dozens of
hospitals and Health Maintenance Organizations in a city or region. The protocols and
infrastructure for implementing such collaboration should be examined, especially in
view o f the autonomous and financially competitive nature o f health care
organizations.

First Responders Lack Sufficient Training
Maintaining effective disease surveillance is an essential first step in
preparedness and is important in helping law enforcement officials to react swiftly.
Preparations must include plans for rapid identification and characterization o f agents
involved and for emergency distribution of large quantities o f medical supplies,
especially antibiotics and vaccines. Coordination and communication links also need
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to be strengthened to minimize response time, especially at first when exposed but
asymptomatic persons may still be treated prophylactically. Also, when response time
is shortened, the possibility of apprehending perpetrators increases. Education and
training in bioterrorism and its potential consequences must become national
priorities.
Increased emphasis on training and equipping "first responders" according to
the specific needs o f individual locales would be one solution to this problem. No
matter how well-trained or quickly mobilized they are, federal response teams never
will match the responsiveness of local officials because o f time and distance.
Therefore, Congressional efforts to train and equip first responders must remain a top
priority. This assistance must be tailored specifically to address local circumstances,
because clearly, the requirements for New York City are not the same as for Wichita,
Kansas. Cities each have a very broad range o f varying infrastructure that may serve
as potential terrorist targets. For instance, subways, bridges, skyscrapers, tunnels,
water supplies, power plants, and signature sites such as the St. Louis Arch, the
Seattle Space Needle, Lincoln Center, each present city-unique problems for firstresponders. Federal and state officials will be successful to the extent they sustain
working partnerships with local officials.

American Cities Need an Early Warning System
Several knowledgeable persons stressed the importance o f having an early
warning system established to inform citizens o f terrorist attacks. Said one
knowledgeable person,
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if I can identify the symptoms o f anthrax in a timely
manner, say within twelve hours, I can give you a shot
and you will live. If it’s been over twelve hours since
you’ve contracted the disease, you’re dead. And, we
can’t bury you... .your body must be burned.
It is therefore important that a system which could provide early warning o f terrorist
attacks be developed and implemented. Reliance solely on the intelligence capability
o f law enforcement may not provide sufficient warning.

Unlike a chemical agent

attack, which would cause an almost immediate reaction, a biological attack would
not cause a reaction until after an incubation period. Noted one o f the interviewed
experts, "Generally it takes 24, 36, 48 hours before (victims) would start showing
what oftentimes are nondescript, flu-like symptoms which then progress to whatever
symptoms the specific agent would normally cause."
According to several knowledgeable people, the best defense comes from
using a combination of immunization and physical protective measures. They pointed
to the anthrax vaccine as a key countermeasure against a biological warfare attack.
When vaccines are not available as a biological countermeasure, the answer according
to one interviewed expert, is "rapid detection, warning, and reporting."
Technology currently exists to deploy sensors capable o f providing early
warning o f biological attacks in major U.S. cities. The Defense Department is
developing and fielding smaller, lighter, and simpler biological detectors. One o f
these is the Biological Integrated Detection System, or BIDS. After detecting what
appears to be an unnatural agent, the systems first provide a warning, then determine
specifically what the biological agent is. In summer 1998, the Department o f Defense
deployed a system of biological agent detectors (called the "Portal Shield") at select
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U.S.

m ilitary

bases in South Korea and the Middle East.

This system, originally

deployed in the Persian G u lf region, is about two-thirds the size o f a typical office
desk. It's fully modular, self-contained and can detect eight different agents.
"The beauty o f this device is that it's a network sensor," noted one
respondent. “Depending on the geography, as many as 18 sensors may be arrayed
around a port or an airfield.” The sensors talk to one another, he said, so you're not
relying on just one o f them sounding an alarm. Using sensor arrays, the false positive
rate very quickly gets down to zero. In Bahrain, U.S. forces have run more than 3,000
tests during round-the-clock monitoring by the Portal Shield deployed there. The false
positive rate was less than one half o f 1 percent.

U.S. citizens living in major

metropolitan areas should be afforded a comparable measure o f warning.

Current Criminal Laws Are Not Adequate fo r Addressing Terrorism
Any response to a threat o f domestic terrorism should include assessing and
separating lawful, constitutionally protected rhetoric from criminal threats. To
accomplish this difficult and sensitive task, state and local agencies should initiate a
formal process o f threat assessment. The vast majority o f individuals who hold
extremist beliefs pose no real threat to law enforcement or society. Most remain
content with espousing inflammatory rhetoric and attending meetings, rallies, and
exhibitions to reinforce their beliefs. Distinguishing between the individuals and
groups who advocate extreme views and those who advocate harm becomes the
challenge that law enforcement agencies must address effectively.
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A Citizen Watch Approach Should be Implemented
To strengthen the ability of law enforcement to monitor those who may
engage in bioterrorism, the equivalent o f Megan's Law for individuals convicted o f
violating state and federal laws regarding the possession o f biological agents should
be implemented. Megan's Law was developed to alert local communities o f the
presence o f convicted child molesters. Because national security concerns sometimes
outweigh an individual's right to privacy, the same principle should be applied to
individuals who violate laws and traffic in biological agents. Such a law would
require local law enforcement officials to be notified o f the presence of persons
convicted o f such federal and state related crimes.

Developing a Community Focus Remains Appropriate fo r Deterring Terrorism
One o f the most promising tools for assisting law enforcement with detecting
the presence o f potential terrorist activity is the Community Policing philosophy.
This approach includes the presence o f law enforcement personnel at the
neighborhood level. The police officer's primary duty is, or course, to control crime.
However, the most important thing an officer needs to carry out that mandate is
information. The rapport engendered by having the same officer in the same
geographic area every day facilitates a two-way information flow, where the officer
receives input on community priorities in exchange for which the residents provide
vital information. The officer becomes a "member" o f the community. The officer
can be the catalyst in the formation of block clubs and associations so that people can
be the "eyes and ears" o f their neighborhoods.
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Law enforcement personnel can attend public meetings to monitor a n d assess
the threat potential or seriousness o f the proposed actions. Still, administratEors should
exercise caution to avoid opening investigations based on beliefs alone. If, However,
those beliefs encourage or elicit others to commit violence to accomplish extrem ist
objectives, then a legitimate law enforcement interest exists. Oversight sh o u ld focus
on criminal actions, not mere advocacy or impassioned pieas for legitimate action to
correct perceived wrongs. An unintended consequence may be some perceived
diminishment o f First Amendment rights to free speech with regard to the sseparation
o f constitutionally protected speech and terroristic speech. It will be imporrtant to
carefully distinguish between passionate, inflammatory speech and crimina_l speech.

The Public Should be Made More Aware o f the Threat Posed by Domestic .Terrorism
At a press conference in November 1997, Secretary Cohen held alotft a fivepound bag of sugar to dramatize how little anthrax would be needed to in flict mass
casualties in a city like Washington, D.C. The Secretary’s actions may serwe to
dramatize national security threats, but should not be confused with a sustained
campaign to heighten awareness about the danger o f terrorism. Such a camjpaign
would explain, in a sustained and carefully modulated fashion, U.S. c o u n te r terrorism
policy as well as the nature o f the terrorist threat. This could be achieved thorough a
variety o f different media, including public service announcements on television and
radio. Although some analysts might find this approach alarmist, a carefulLy
modulated educational campaign could serve, in fact, as an important confiadencebuilding measure and reduce the possibility o f mass panic. To address p u b lic

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

147

education issues related to the threat o f terrorism, a sustained campaign to educate the
public on the threat o f terrorism should be conducted. However, an unintended
consequence o f a sustained campaign to educate the public on the threat of terrorism
may be the potential to cause some degree o f panic if not carefully implemented.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Remains Applicable, and Design
Training is Essential fo r Protection Against Terrorism

Structural Approaches
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) emphasizes
problem seeking before moving into problem solving. The theory is consistent - the
process o f assessment is the same for assessing threats from terrorism as for more
traditional crime. CPTED starts with the threat and vulnerability analysis to
determine the weakness and potential for terrorist attack against some part o f the
urban built environment. The process and challenges o f a CPTED approach to
mitigation o f terrorism are the same for designing to deter terrorism as for other
crimes —only the level o f the threat is changed. CPTED and Defensible Space
planning are a planning process, as compared to fortressing or target hardening. When
designing against crime or terrorism, the security consultant must resist the rush for
quick answers.
What the CPTED process does is ask the questions about 1) access control; 2)
natural surveillance; 3) territorial reinforcement; 4) maintenance ; and 5) management
strategies. The CPTED process provides the direction to solve the challenges of
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terrorism with organizational (people), mechanical (technology and hardware), and
natural design (architecture and circulation flow) methods.
In response to the increased threat o f domestic terrorism against the urban
built environment, military engineers and architects should work with civilian
building professionals to adapt to commercial use some o f the technologies and
designs developed to protect military buildings from bomb blasts. One military
approach that is applicable to civilian buildings is increasing the strength o f a
structure's lower levels to make it more bomb resistant —an approach that also would
improve its ability to withstand natural forces such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and
earthquakes. Commercial building designers should have access to selected technical
manuals, computer programs, and other materials developed by the military for use in
evaluating the risk o f terrorist attack and the effects o f bomb blasts, and for mitigating
blast damage and deterring future bomb threats. In many cases, however, research will
be needed to adapt these resources for civilian use. For example, the military uses
special computer programs for predicting the force o f a bomb blast and how a
building's structure will respond to that blast. But it is not clear how readily these
programs can be used to model blast effects on civilian buildings, which typically are
lighter in construction but more complex than military structures.
Several modes of protection were suggested by the data for commercial use.
These include buffer zones or controlled-access areas around buildings, thus avoiding
situations like that in Oklahoma City, where the building sat next to a public road.
A "keep-out zone" ensures a minimum guaranteed distance between the explosion and
the target structure. This keep-out zone is achieved by placing at the site perimeter
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planters, fountains, and other barriers that cannot be compromised by ramming with a
vehicle. While this is the most effective measure to lessen the effect o f a terrorist
attack, it also can work against rescue teams since the barriers could deter access to
the rescue and firefighting vehicles. In most urban settings, the typical setback
distance from the street to the building facade is 10 to 25 feet, which does not pose
any access problems for emergency vehicles. However, when designing prestigious
buildings, including landmark office towers, hospitals, and museums, the setback is
often increased to create a grand public space. These setbacks could create keepout
distances o f more than 100 feet with barriers to guarantee protection but which also
could limit emergency vehicle access. Details that may provide operational barriers or
fences should be included in the design to allow emergency access. If plaza or
monumental stairs were used, some secondary access must be incorporated to
similarly allow entry.

Engineering Approaches
Building professionals also should look at ways to increase the blast resistance
o f a building's subsystems —lighting, plumbing, communications, and ventilation.
These non-structural elements have been largely overlooked in blast mitigation
designs, but they can be crucial to the survival of a building's occupants. Such
analysis also should be done for some existing buildings, such as those determined to
be at particular risk from terrorist attack and those already scheduled for renovation.
For a planned new building, incorporating reasonable blast hardening would add
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around 5 percent to construction costs, but both the costs and benefits o f such
measures should be considered on a case-by-case basis.
A research program that examines critical structural and non-structural
components o f civilian buildings is needed. The program would include testing and
developing more blast-resistant interior partitions, such as metal stud and drywall
partitions that could be bonded together to reduce fragmentation from an explosion.
Research also is needed on the blast resistance o f common materials and equipment
used in lighting, plumbing, communications, and ventilation systems.
In addition to making buildings safer, efforts should be made to improve
preparations for rescue and recovery operations in case o f an attack. This emergency
planning should include ensuring rapid availability o f building plans and structural
drawings to rescuers, as well ensuring their ready access to computer-based modeling
and other methods for assessing the extent o f blast damage to the building.
Buildings’ operational control areas and utility feeds should be protected from
direct attack to lessen the negative effects o f a blast. Therefore, it is important to
design operational redundancies to survive all kinds o f attack. Simple structural
modifications include designing redundancies into the structure to carry additional
loads imposed after a bomb attack. These provisions include properly designing
beams, girders, and columns to carry damaged slabs or columns. In the Oklahoma
City Bombing, the beam floor system used did not have any redundancy or backup
support system for slab or beam failure. By properly designing and detailing the
building's structural elements, the slab may fail locally, but the entire floor will not
collapse. Similarly, columns should be designed to carry additional loads such that if
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one column is severely damaged to the point where it cannot properly function, the
load will be distributed to the neighboring columns.
These changes all attempt to enhance the structure's response to the severe
dynamic loading by adding strength to resist the blast, ability to absorb the energy,
and redundancy to reduce the chance o f progressive collapse. Many of these steps
incorporate some o f the recommendations made for the Department of State-Office o f
Foreign Buildings Operations after the attacks on American embassies. It remains
today the only design guideline approved for government design or construction.
The last major structural consideration includes the construction o f the
exterior facade. Second only to the impact the standoff distance has on the effects o f
the blast, the facade remains the occupant's last form o f true protection. Not only does
the building's skin protect the occupants from the weather, but it also limits the
amount o f blast that can actually enter the workspace. The facade is built o f two
elements-the structural skin or wall section and the window or glazing. By
constructing the exterior wall o f a more durable material such as reinforced cast-inplace concrete instead o f block walls or curtain walls, at least for the lower floors, the
building will be able to resist or curtail certain blast loads, resulting in significantly
less bodily injury and building damage. In addition, a properly designed concrete wall
will aid in preventing progressive collapse, as the wall will assist in carrying the load
o f a damaged column.
While most blast engineers would like to eliminate windows, they rem ain an
essential element in building design. Windows, unfortunately, are the weak link in the
facade design, as they typically will fail before any other element. The two keys to
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protecting the workspace are attempting to prevent the windows from failing and then
ensuring that the windows fail properly if overloaded.
Standard annealed glass used in window sections for both homes and office
buildings behaves quite poorly in blast loading and failure. Not only is the peak
allowable pressure less than two psi, but this type of glaring breaks into sharp shards.
It is these "knives and daggers" that cause most o f the injuries so vividly seen in the
news clips.
Several other types o f glazing are available for building design, including
thermally tempered glazing (TTG) and polycarbonate glazing, also known as bulletresistant glass. TTG is commonly used in special areas where glass breakage and
bodily injury are likely to occur; the most common examples are the side and rear
window's o f automobiles. This glazing, which can be designed for loads up to 30 and
40 psi, breaks into rocksalt pieces and would cause significantly fewer injuries to
people occupying the building under attack. The polycarbonate glazing also performs
quite well under blast loading but does not experience the same failure mode as the
TTG. Instead o f breaking into small pieces, it remains a single unit as it dislodges
from its support frame.
The most common use o f polycarbonate glazing is the front windshield o f an
automobile. When damaged, it develops spider web cracks but does not break into
small shards. The downside o f this mode o f failure is that the glass unit can become a
large flying object, causing additional injury and damage. Other window treatments
include adding a Mylar film to the glass, which will reduce the shards but can discolor
and be easily vandalized, reducing its effectiveness. Furthermore, the failure
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mechanism is similar to the bulletproof glass, which creates large flying obstacles.
Blast curtains, which collect the glass fragments, also can be used but reduce the light
and view that the windows are trying to provide in the first place.
While these glazing window solutions appear to function quite well, some
drawbacks in these high-performance glazing systems include cost and high
maintenance. Not only are the windows themselves very costly, but to fail properly,
their support and attachment systems must be properly designed, which further
increases the cost. Even though a great number o f human injuries are related to flying
glass shards, it is not the only significant source o f injury, though usually a more
visible one. The other visible cause o f injury is falling debris.
One o f the less visible causes o f human injuries is blast pressure, which can
rupture the ear drum, collapse the lung, or even crush the skull as a result o f the blast
wave's getting into the workspace. These injuries, which begin at pressures near 15
pounds per square inch (psi), can be reduced if the level o f blast pressures entering the
space is curtailed. The amount of blast that enters the space is directly proportional to
the amount o f openings on the facade o f a structure.
With the cost for installing these windows reaching several million dollars, the
protective design money would be better spent keeping the structure standing rather
than keeping the windows in place. This is because the anticipated blast pressures
from a car or truck bomb far exceed the allowable pressures any window system can
resist. As a point o f reference, the blast pressures felt on the facade in the Oklahoma
City Bombing were on the order o f 4,000 psi-100 times higher than the design
pressures described above.
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The biggest structural engineering lesson learned from the Oklahoma City
Bombing was that the building's response to the dynamic loading o f a terrorist bomb
must be improved. The single most important improvement would be to mitigate
catastrophic failure or progressive collapse by incorporating some structural
redundancy. This measure alone, regardless o f glazing or facade improvements or
maximizing the standoff distance will significantly reduce the number o f fatalities.
When more than 80 percent o f the deaths are caused by the structure's falling on top
o f occupants who otherwise would have survived the blast, construction money would
be most prudently spent to properly design, reinforce, and detail the building to
improve its response to explosions. While the localized damaged zone will not be in
pristine condition, it will remain safe enough to facilitate the rescue o f potential
victims.
Additional benefits for strengthening buildings, especially key signature
structures, would be a resistance to destruction caused by a wide variety o f naturally
occurring phenomenon. These include hurricane, tornado and earthquake events. On
the other hand, a potential unintended consequence might be a reduction in personal
freedom due to the limits imposed by access control, metal detectors and other
restrictions.
Yet another unintended consequence created by the use o f “keep-out” barriers
may be to impede access o f emergency vehicles to crisis sites. This consequence may
be overcome, however, by carefully considering limited access areas throughout the
protected site.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

155

There is a Need fo r More and Improved Consequence Management Training,
Coordination, and Clarification o f Responsibilities
“Consequence management” describes ways and means to alleviate the shortand long-term physical, socio-economic, and psychological effects o f a terrorist
attack. It describes the coordination o f international, national, regional, and local
assets to deal with the effects o f such an attack. The term includes preparatory work in
response to a WMD threat—against the Super Bowl, for example—that would include
site surveys; assessment o f the ability o f local hospitals to treat or decontaminate
victims, and the size, condition, and locations o f local stocks o f various antidotes.
Preparation could include determining the locations, size, and availability o f other
national antidote stocks as well as international stocks available to support planning
for surge capacity.
More and improved consequence management training, better coordination,
and clarification of responsibilities is needed. This should become the foundation on
which to develop a certification process for all levels o f response. Such a process will
enable the nation to begin standardizing its response to the consequences o f Weapons
o f Mass Destruction. Without a certification process, disparate approaches will
inevitably inhibit communication and coordination. Therefore, consequence
management and training should receive additional emphasis.
Seminars and conferences should be conducted with far more frequency than
at the present time. If only to define the scope o f the problem and to establish an
awareness o f just how many types o f organizations and people are involved,
conferences may offer a significant national return for a relatively small investment.
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All national assets are generally not going to be able to respond to an incident
within 6 to 12 hours. In that case, local responders will have to carry the burden o f the
immediate response. And while there is a good plan for federal agencies to educate
and train metropolitan police, fire, health, and other emergency providers, the
operational role o f the "feds" interacting with the affected state remains largely illdefined. Participants in any aspect o f consequence management must be selected
with great care. With so many organizations and agencies involved in consequence
management, unity o f command is probably impossible.

Responsibility A nd Authority is Fragmented
In terms o f agency responsibility for mitigating the effects o f terrorist attacks
against the domestic urban built environment, authority is fragmented. Agencies and
levels o f government protect their own facilities and guard their own prerogatives.
Physical obstructions, security guards, and other security measures are largely
controlled by individual agencies. Local governments assume responsibility for local
security, except when there is a compelling reason for state or national assistance or
intervention as in the cases o f the Los Angeles Olympics, the New Orleans World’s
Fair, and nuclear power facilities. In the latter case, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission is the responsible agency for on-site security and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency Is responsible for off-site concerns such as responding to
nuclear accidents (terrorist or otherwise) that create danger for the surrounding
populace. Therefore, lines o f authority and responsibility must be clarified and
carefully delineated.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY
This dissertation began by examining several passive approaches to mitigating
criminal acts as suggested in the theories o f defensible space originally proposed by
Jane Jacobs. Oscar Newman, Lewis Mumford and Harold LasswelL Posing
somewhat different strategies, they all agree that physical forms o f urban space affect
security.

The Passive Mitigation Theories o f “Natural ” Police Powers
These early theorists contended that “natural” police power is significantly
superior to the more artificial, state-imposed police power. Their theories were
largely based on the view of a social community which "looks out for its own," and of
a physical structure which encourages such community and allows for widespread
community surveillance. Yet even Oscar Newman noted that the effectiveness of
natural police power was limited, and that there was room for alternative approaches
to ensure safety and security. He argued that, in contemporary urban America, a
situation cannot be envisioned in which state police presence is not required
(Newman, 1972). He points out that the effectiveness of this community-based
surrogate for actual police power depends greatly on how well-equipped the
communities are to prevent crime.
The present study has moved well beyond an examination o f the traditional
defense o f urban space, and has expanded the concept o f urban defense to include
emergency preparedness operations involving a very broad range o f law enforcement,
emergency disaster response, public health response and the intergovernmental
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matrix. The evidence suggests that with their emphasis on such concepts as
neighborhood cohesion and sense of community, Jane Jacobs and Oscar Newman
provide a sound basis for defending against terrorism. While these theories were
proposed at a time well before recent acts o f domestic terrorism, their contention, that
one can design defensible space to maximize safety, would appear to have utility for
planning mitigation strategies. The potential to structure the environment so as to
ensure safety, serves as a useful reservoir of ideas to defend against terrorist attacks.

Active Mitigation Theories on “Designing-in ” Safety and Security
More recent theorists, such as Jeffery (CPTED), Clarke (Opportunity
Blocking and Situational Crime Prevention) and Crowe (Target Hardening), build on
the work o f earlier defensible space pioneers by suggesting that proactive changes
could be made to urban spaces that would “design-in” safety. They suggest that once
a community has defined and analyzed its vulnerabilities, it is time to begin planning
for change. This approach continues to serve as the basis for mitigating terrorist
attacks.

Selecting the strategies and tactics to be implemented at a likely target site

involves the same careful analysis needed to understand any crime problem. Some o f
the specific strategies suggested by CPTED included target hardening, which were
improvements that make unauthorized access more difficult. Installing strong doors,
locks, and window screens, reinforced glass, and alarms were several other
approaches suggested by CPTED to reduce the chance that terrorists will gain access
to the structure.
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Still other strategies suggested by CPTED include access control, which can
be achieved by keeping doors and gates locked and interior common spaces fenced off
from public access. Establishing visitor check-in booths and guard houses, reducing
the number o f entrances and exits, and issuing pass cards can help management
maintain control o f a site. Emergency stairwells can be restored to their intended
purpose by equipping them with alarm-connected panic bars and removing exterior
door handles.
The findings in this study suggests that a CPTED approach is one o f the
most effective approachs for mitigating the consequences o f terrorist attacks against
the urban built environment. The theory CPTED can be successfully applied to
making a difference in preventing acts o f terrorism. CPTED emphasizes problem
seeking before rushing into problem solving through a careful threat and vulnerability
analysis to determine the weakness and potential for attack. Attack from criminal
behavior or attack from terrorist activity only reflect a change in the level and types o f
threats.
CPTED and Defensible Space planning provide a very useful planning process
for mitigating the consequences o f terrorist attacks. What the CPTED process does is
direct attention to such considerations as 1) access control; 2) natural surveillance; 3)
territorial reinforcement; 4) maintenance ; and 5) management strategies that can a)
increase the effort to commit crime or terrorism; b) increase the risks associated with
crime or terrorism; c) reduce the rewards associated with crime or terrorism; and d)
remove the excuses why people do not comply with the rules and conduct
inappropriate behavior. The CPTED process provides the direction to solve the
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challenges o f crime and terrorism with organizational (people), mechanical
(technology and hardware), and natural design (architecture and circulation flow)
methods.

A More Systematic Approach to CPTED is Necessary
While CPTED is one o f the most promising approaches for mitigating the
consequences o f terrorist attacks, the literature shows that CPTED has generally been
practiced without the benefit o f a systematic process or assessment as dictated in the
scientific method. Most practitioners are in law enforcement and have gained their
CPTED expertise by attending one or several trainings. The police officer CPTED
practitioner is seldom given the time, resources, or expertise to conduct pre and post
evaluations o f crime hot spots requiring improvements. The solution has been to
conduct a "quick and dirty" study o f a vulnerable area. Thus, the practitioner
develops recommendations without the benefit of gathering all o f the relevant
information, without the benefit o f power or authority to implement
recommendations, without the power to make design or management decisions that
perpetuate the problems, nor without the ability or resources to evaluate or measure
the success or failure o f the recommendations. Each new site calls for reinventing the
process again without a standard code or protocol.
The CPTED practitioner m ust address divergent facets o f architecture,
operational/ management practices, governmental bureaucracy, and vested interests
together in a collaborative process. Each new situation requires creative problem
solving. However, there are no minimum standards o f what the process should be or
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the criteria for evaluation. With the exception o f several cities with CPTED
codes/ordinances/resolutions, there are virtually no common guidelines for the
practitioners to follow other than their own experience or resources. CPTED can
make a difference in preventing acts of terrorism. CPTED emphasizes problem
seeking before rushing into problem solving. Security standards are needed for both
minimum and uniform standards o f evaluation for CPTED, just as fire disasters have
created a uniform standard for fire protection. Protecting people, information, and
property must be a high priority for the urban built environment. Government
buildings, signature infrastructure, bridges, tunnels, stadiums, transportation hubs,
water facilities and other building types such as schools, public housing, convenience
stores, residential housing, and retail and commercial buildings must be included in
CPTED planning. Even family planning clinics are subject to the terrorist activity of
pro-life groups. The goals for designing to protect against terrorism are different than
designing to resist crime, but the process is the same: CPTED.

Situational Crime Prevention Provides an Approach to Mitigation
Situational Crime Prevention theory, based on the assumption that if one
knows the type o f place and the type o f vulnerability, one should be able to
recommend a specific tactic that can prevent crimes o f this type and this place. Such
an approach is advocated by both situational crime prevention theory (Clarke, 1992)
and problem-oriented policing theory (Goldstein, 1990). At minimum, these
complementary strategies are also a promising approach to mitigating the
consequences o f a terrorist attack. Rather than looking for a generic solution to a
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specific vulnerability at a particular place, one could undertake a thorough
examination o f the situation and then craft a unique set o f interventions to address this
problem.

Rational Choice Theory
Rational-choice theory in criminology, has developed out o f the utilitarian
concept that one chooses that which will provide the most reward and will result in
the least pain (Clarke and Cornish, 1986). Ancillary approaches to defending space
continued to build on earlier theoretical foundations through the convergence of three
elements. These generally include (1) a motivated offender, (2) a target, and (3) some
degree o f vulnerability. Along this vein, this study expanded upon Rational Offender
theory, applying it to terrorist attacks, and suggesting studying the ways or “routines”
o f potential terrorists and how they intersect with the “routines” o f targets.

Routine Activity Theory
Concentration o f crime at places is predicted by routine activity theory (Cohen
and Felson 1979; Felson 1994) and offender search theory (Brantingham and
Brantingham 1981). Some o f the original evidence for clustering o f crime at places
was found in Boston (Pierce, Spaar and Briggs 1986) and Minneapolis (Sherman,
Gartin and Buerger 1989). Additional evidence for crime concentration at places has
been found for specific types o f crime. Routine Activity Theory can help identify
areas vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
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More Research is Needed on the Effects o f Displacement Theory
Crime Displacement Theory contends that an intervention (e.g. a change in
street lighting) does not deter the criminal or offender but merely displaces the crime
to the daytime, a nearby area, a different target, or type o f crime. This theory suggests
some degree o f rationality on the part o f the terrorist, and so is integrally tied to the
terrorist’s making o f a rational choice. Yet theoretical explorations based on the
rational choice perspective discussed above (Cornish and Clark 1986) find no basis
for believing offenders always completely displace if they cannot attack their ideal
targets (Cornish and Clark 1987; Barr and Pease 1990; Eck 1993; Barnes 1995;
Bouloukos and Farrell 1997). Reviews o f empirical studies examining place-focused
prevention, police enforcement, and other preventive tactics in the United States,
Canada, Great Britain, continental Europe, and Australia, find that there is often no
displacement, but when displacement occurs it does not overwhelm other gains from
blocking crime opportunities (Cornish and Clark 1987; Barr and Pease 1990; Eck
1993; Hesseling 1995). In these studies, there is no evidence to suggest that these
interventions increase opportunities for crime by displacing it. Researchers who have
looked for empirical evidence o f displacement have found little evidence o f that
displacement. Concern about displacement appears to be based more on pessimism
than empirical fact. Therefore, theories on displacement effects seem to hold very
little promise for mitigating the impact o f terrorist attacks at this time, absent more
thorough research into its effects.
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The Theory o f a “Garrison State ” M ay Provide an Accurate Picture o f Future Trends
Harold Lasswell’s concept o f the “garrison state,” which were developed in
the 1930s, may provide an accurate description o f the future o f urban areas. Lasswell
initially offered the garrison state construct in 1937 in response to the Sino-Japanese
War. He reasoned that technological changes within the military would alter the
relationship between the military institutions and the civilian societies o f which they
were a part. This conjecture was consistent with his general perspective that
technological change is always accompanied by social dislocations and that these
dislocations were responsible for psychological tensions that threaten the rationality
o f political processes (Lasswell, 1941).
The crucial technological development that prompted LasswelTs reflections
and resulted in the garrison state construct was the introduction o f air power to
military efforts. He perceived that military air power would make civilians vulnerable
to attack in addition to military installations and personnel. In essence, he argued that
the development o f military air power generated a democratization o f risk. The
garrison state construct became a widely embraced theory o f civil-military
relationships. Many intellectuals subscribed to it, as did representatives o f the mass
media.
The evolvement o f LasswelTs garrison state remains a possible consequence
o f the wide use o f terrorism. This is consistent with his general perspective that
technological change is always accompanied by social dislocations, and that these
dislocations were responsible for psychological tensions that threaten the political
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process. Lasswell specifically addressed the idea o f increased risk for civilians ,
noting the development and ascent o f “specialists on violence” to positions of
political power. In essence, then, Lasswell conceived o f the garrison state as the
eventual result o f the increase centrality in society o f the specialists on violence.
The thesis offered by Lasswell almost seventy years ago provides insight into
the current state o f terrorist activities. Today, the lethal technology that Lasswell
identified to frame his argument, namely airpower, has been replaced by tools o f
terrorism as an extension o f politico/military power. As noted earlier, terrorism is
officially sanctioned by several countries that are recognized by the United States as
state sponsors of terrorism. Terrorist methods continue to generate the
democratization o f risk identified by Lasswell. The potential for terrorist attacks
supports Lasswell’s construct o f the garrison state by calling for broadly applied
exclusionary physical barriers among society or segments o f society (Lasswell, 1941).
The myriad surveillance, detection, intelligence and physical strategies currently used
or planned for implementation show that public spaces in American cities will indeed
be closer to fortresses than at any previous time. Those strategies that make terrorist
acts more difficult, more costly and/or less rewarding for terrorists appear to present
the most likely probability for successfully mitigation.
Based on reviews o f government documents and interviews with
knowledgable informants, this study builds upon the already existing theories of
defending against traditional crime to include a very broad approach to mitigate the
impact o f terrorist attack on the urban built environment. These strategies include not
only specific target hardening to meet the special demands posed by terrorist
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bombings, but also includes strategies to plan for defending aigainst terrorist acts
involving Weapons of Mass Destruction.
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APPENDIX A.
INVENTORY OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS MEETING THE
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS STUDY, PREVIOUS 20
YEARS
O
>
H
tfl

Z

n
o
ra
Z
H

H

zn
H
70
C

sc
o
a

n
h
c

H3
cn
pa
"O
tn
pa
H
O
pa

TO
ra

A bomb planted outside an abortion clinic in
Asheville, N.C. exploded causing no injuries
and little damage because it detonated only
vO
partially.
The clinic received no advance
vO
vO
warning o f the bomb. Police initially said two
bombs had been planted at the Femcare clinic,
but the FBI determined that a second device
found in the vicinity was actually a piece o f the
exploded bomb. The bomb was placed outside
the Femcare clinic, next to a wall near where
the waiting room is located. It went o ff at about
a half-hour before the clinic wras to open at 8
a.m. Homes and businesses near the building
were evacuated and police cordoned off the
road around the Orange Street clinic in a
neighborhood several blocks from downtown
Asheville. FBI and Asheville bomb teams
disarmed what was left o f the bomb.
Investigators would not elaborate on the bomb's
makeup. Femcare was one o f several clinics
nationwide that received packages said to
contain the potentially deadly bacterium
anthrax. Nothing was found inside the packages
sent to the clinics.
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Two Palestinians and a Pakistani are arrested on
a tipoff to New York City police and are found
vO to have suicide bombs and a note indicating
vO they intend a terrorist attack in the city's
subways. Ghazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer, a
Palestinian, entered the United States (in
Washington state) illegally from Canada three
times and was apprehended and returned to
Canada. He entered Canada as a student, but
requested and received political asylum. After
his last U.S. entry the Canadians would not take
him back because he had committed crimes in
Canada. He applied for asylum, and a judge
ordered a hearing for 1998 and released him.
Abu Mezer said that he had been accused by the
Israeli government o f belonging to Hamas, a
terrorist organization a claim denied by his
family in Israel. On June 23, at a hearing on his
asylum application, he withdrew it, and the
judge gave him 60 days to depart the country.
Lafi Khalil, the second terrorism suspect
entered the country on a tourist visa and stayed
on illegally.________________________________
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During the Summer Olympic Games, less than
two weeks after the TWA Flight 800 disaster, a
S
O
pipe
bomb exploded at Centennial Olympic
so
OS
Park in Atlanta, Georgia, killing two people and
injuring more than one hundred others. The FBI
said that the pipe bomb looked "homemade"
with "nails and screws attached." They
suspected domestic terrorists, and members o f
local militia groups were questioned without
any results. The Olympic flag flew at half-mast
and Olympic athletes and spectators became
tense and worried. Lines to attend Olympic
events became even longer than before;
spectators were submitted to more thorough
scrutiny as they passed through metal detectors
and had their bags inspected. During the
Games, Atlanta had been under surveillance by
more than 30,000 law enforcement officials,
and the Olympic Committee and the city had
spent over $300 million on security efforts. Yet
even these measures were not able to prevent
the bombing in Centennial Olympic Park. The
Committee had been proud o f the organization
and location o f the Games. They had spent
years planning for the Games and there were no
major problems up to that point. The attack
dampened their spirits. But it was a temporary
setback and the Games continued to a
successful conclusion. The FBI named a
suspect: Richard Jewell, a security guard who
had spotted the bomb. His name was leaked to
the press as the primary suspect and the story
appeared in newspapers around the world.
Much to the embarrassment o f the FBI,
however, they were unable to come up with any
proof or physical evidence linking Jewell to the
bombing. The investigations o f the FBI and
local authorities have not produced any other
suspects. Recently, a $500,000 reward was
offered for information leading to the arrest and
conviction o f those responsible. While the
response has been encouraging, there has been
no breakthrough to date. This terrorist attack
remains unsolved.
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Right-wing anarchists

April, 1995

A bomb in a 1993 Ford truck exploded at 9:02
a.m. at the nine-story Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building at Fifth and Hudson Streets in
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, killing
169—including 19 children—and injuring over
500. Among the dead were 15 children who
were in the America's Kids day which was
destroyed when the second story o f the building
collapsed. Two people were found dead in a
neighboring building that had been damaged.
People heard the blast from 50 miles away. At
least 75 buildings were condemned and at least
312 damaged. Ten buildings collapsed. Damage
estimates ranged from $750 million to $1
billion. Approximately 250 children lost one or
both o f their parents in the blast. The bomb
likely contained at least 4800 pounds o f
explosives including fuel oil and ammonium
nitrate, a fertilizer ingredient. Federal
employees in the building worked for the Social
Security Administration; the Departments of
Health and Human Services, Labor,
Agriculture, Veterans Affairs, Defense,
Housing and Urban Development; the Secret
Service; the Drug Enforcement Agency; the
General Services Administration; the United
States Customs Service; the Bureau o f Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms; and the General
Accounting Office. Federal facilities around
the country were evacuated when several hoax
bomb threats were received. April 21 the United
States Department o f Justice reported the arrest
James McVeigh, 27, a member o f the
right-wing Michigan Militia, which views the
United States government as the enemy o f the
common man. McVeigh was angry with the
federal raid on the Branch Davidian compound
in as, two years earlier, in which scores died.
Eight minutes after the bomb went off,
McVeigh was picked up in a 1977 Mercury
Marquis 20 miles from the bombing site on a
traffic offense; federal authorities did not know
until later that he was in custody. Police found
residues o f ammonium nitrate and high
explosives inside the car.
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A bomb exploded in the World Trade Center in
New York City. The World Trade Center is the
second tallest building in the world, where more
than 100,000 people work and visit every day.
The bomb exploded in the parking structure
underneath the building, damaging the
infrastructure and subway tunnels. Smoke
reached the top o f the 110-story building in
minutes. Six people were killed; more than
1,000 were injured. The FBI joined the Joint
Terrorist Task Force in the investigation, which
eventually brought 22 Islamic fundamentalist
conspirators to trial. The trial revealed extensive
plans to use terrorism to wreak havoc in the
United States, including targeting government
facilities.
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An explosion ripped through the Arco chemical
factory near Houston, Texas, killing 17 people.
On July 13, the previously unknown Islamic
Liberation Front phoned Agence France-Presse
in Amman and claimed it had exploded a
factory in Texas that supplies chemical weapons
to the American Army. The caller did not
specify the date or location o f the attack, but
threatened that the groups would ‘'strike at any
target in the United States,’’saying that his
group was capable of choosing the “venue and
the date.”
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Muslim extremists
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Eight militant Muslim fundamentalists are
arrested in New York for plotting to blow up
the United Nations headquarters, tunnels under
the Hudson River and a federal office building.
The arrestees were from Sudan, Egypt, the
Israeli West Bank and Gaza, Jordan and
Pakistan.
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Cuban extremists

Fire bomb

M uslim
extremists

February, 1989

1
0

Building

June, 1990

9

A bomb went o ff outside the Cuban Museum o f
Art and Culture in Miami's "Little Havana"
section at lam , causing $20,000 to two
paintings and a sculpture included among the
works o f 15 M arielista artists. The blast also left
a hole in the sidewalk. No injuries were
reported. The museum was exhibiting a
celebration o f the 10th anniversary of the Mariel
boatlift. The same museum was bombed in May
1988. The FBI called the bombing an act o f
terrorism tied to political differences within the
Cuban exile community. The FBI was
investigating 16 other homemade bombs which
had exploded or were discovered in Dade
County since May 1987. No arrests had been
made in any o f the cases
Two Berkeley, California, bookstores that had
sold all o f their copies o f Salman Rushdie’s The
Satanic Verses were firebombed. Codv’s
Books and a Waldenbooks were damaged when
bottles filled with flammable liquid were
thrown through their windows.
A pipe-bomb damaged the Cuban Museum of
2
Art and Culture in M iami’s Little Havana
—
district. The museum has been the focus o f
v ©
O
O tension among Cuban exiles regarding whether
oo
to initiate dialogue with the Castro retime.
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Hackensack police arrested Yu Kikumura, 35, a
•n suspected Japanese Red Army member, at 7
a.m. at the Vince Lombardi rest station in
VO
O Ridgefield off the New Jersey Turnpike with 3
O
oo
'o' powerful homemade bombs. State police officer
Robert Cieplensky noticed empty gunpowder
boxes on the back seat o f Kikumura's 1980
Mazda when the officer signaled him to pull
over. Police found three sophisticated and
powerful 18-inch antipersonnel bombs in fire
extinguisher canisters, a complete detonating
system and additional materials and
bomb-making tools (including rifle powder, six
gunpowder containers, a plastic funnel, wire
cutters, pliers, tubes o f glue, and a hacksaw).
An FBI bomb expert said the bombs could have
"destroyed the car and a substantial part o f a
normal dwelling."
Magistrate Ronald J. Hedges had him held
without bail for possession o f the bombs and
entering the US at Kennedy International
Airport on March 8 with a fraudulent 3-month
visa obtained in Paris on February 23 by using a
stolen Japanese passport. He faced charges that
carry penalties o f up to 90 years in prison and
$260,000 in fines. He was remanded to federal
custody at the Metropolitan Correctional Center
in Manhattan. Public defender Thomas Higgins
was assigned to defend him. At the time o f his
arrest, Kikumura was carrying a card for a
Swiss bank account and an account statement
from a West German bank, written in German.
He also had $3600 in $100 bills, $49 in lower
denominations, an Air France airline ticket,
international airline schedules, and maps o f
Florida, Massachusetts, Tennessee, New York
City and the New York subway system. The
New York City map contained pinholes o f
several locations that may have been targets for
the bombs.
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The Federal Bureau o f Investigation arrested
ca
t 3
S3
e c
-t CT
Victor Vancier (Chiam Ben Yosef), 30, leader
OQ cr
sa o
o f the Jewish Defense League; Jay Cohen, 23;
3
OQ
OO
—J and Sharon Katz, 44, all o f N ew York City, for
a series o f fire bombings, a pipe bombing, and a
■cCtT
tear gas attack at a Soviet dance troupe’s
opening in Lincoln Center in which 20 people
o
3
were injured. No one was hurt in the other
incidents.
A
fire bomb exploded outside Lincoln Center’s
CO
O
o
c
Avery
Fisher
concert
hall
in
New
York
City
o
CT where the Moscow state Orchestra was to
O
3
tJQ
3
perform in its first appearance in New York
VO
OO
CTv since 1979. The bomb caused minor damage
but no injuries. Three plastic canisters
containing a flammable liquid were found at the
hall entrance. A caller to a news agency said,
“There will be no Soviet Nazi performance until
three million Soviet Jews are freed. Never
again,” which may indicate that the bombing
was a work o f the Jewish Defense League. On
Aug. 13, 1987, Victor Vancier, 30, Murray
Young, 59, and Jay Cohen, 24, pleaded guilty to
charges o f racketeering and bombings aimed at
Soviet citizens including the Lincoln center
bombing._________________________________
C/3
Three bombs exploded at 9 a.m. at the federal
CO
DO
T
o
c
■C
CT
building,
a
Jax
restaurant,
and
a
luggage
store
in
3
CT
cn
Coeur d’Arlene, Idaho. A fourth bomb was
3
OQ
CT diffused atop the Armed Forces recruiting
cn
center. On October 3rd Aryan Nations church
vO
OO
members
David Dorr and Edward and Olive
Os
Hawley were arrested for counterfeiting and
_________________
conspiracy.___________
In Houston, Texas, two homemade pipe bombs q' 03
3
■C
CT
T
3
i s.
CT exploded at the Daar Us Salaam Mosque
£
S:
3 3
O
VO causing $50,000 damage. Authorities viewed
C
T OQ
oo
3
cyi the attack as a protest against the holding of
cn
U.S. hostages on Trans World Airlines flight
847 in Lebanon.
S3
v;

V©

C/3

is

CT*

CT*

1
3

CT*

1
4

aCT

3>
3
C/3

CT

tr
CT
03

OQ

C
CT

CT

t.
cn

CT*

aCT

CT*

CT*

CT*

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

3

CT*

CT*

1
5

CT

3*

S’
3

cn

CT

n

C
T
S3
OQ

cCT

CT
cn

C
*CT

CT
S3

o

S
O31 >
3
i
o*
3 £
c

183

5*
OQ

United Freedom Front

1
9

CO
£

Bombs

1
8

Building

1
7

In a phone call, the United Freedom Front
warned a Navy recruitment office in East
Meadow, New York, o f bombs hidden in
attache cases. After clearing the building,
police covered the two attache cases, which had
been affixed to the east and west staircases,
with blast-absorbing blankets. Minutes later the
bombs exploded, causing heavy damage to the
stairwells. The terrorist group’s communique
criticized United States intervention in South
and Central America.
Three explosions at Hotel Rajneesh in
c
downtown Portland, Oregon, injured two,
including the suspected terrorist. Stephen P.
OO Paster, who was charged with first-degree
arson, was seriously injured with bums to his
hands, arms, face, and torso. A policeman
suffered minor injuries from smoke inhalation.
The incident was related to growing hostility
against guru Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh and his
followers who had purchased large
landholdings in Oregon.
C
—
I
Officials in Abbeville and Delcambre,
£3
3
Louisiana flushed the public water systems after
£
£
receiving threats that cyanide had been dumped
—
into the water. More than 13,000 homes were
'O
oo
without water. Water had been cut off in the
southern Louisiana town o f St. Gabriel the
previous week for similar reasons. Chlorine
was added to the water to neutralize any
cyanide.
The Fuerzas Armadas Liberation Nacional
o
fD
o
(FALN) set o ff four bombs in Manhattan that
C
D
3
injured three people, including one whose leg
O’*
CD
was amputated. One blast at 9:25 pm damaged
the Brooklyn Federal courthouse; the other
sO
OO blasts occurred in lower Manhattan. A fifth
to
bomb, made o f four sticks o f dynamite, a
blasting cap, a nine-volt battery, and a pocket
watch, was deactivated in lower Manhattan.

December, 1983
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Bom b

United Freedom Fighters/United
Freedom Federation

Bomb

United Freedom
Fighters/ United
Freedom
Federation

2
J•*>

Building

2
2

Building

1

December, 1982

2

A powerful bomb exploded at 7:40 pm at a
Westchester County, New York, International
Business Machines office in Harrison, causing
no injuries. The bomb went o ff four hours after
a bomb had exploded at a South African
transport office on Long Island (see next case).
International Business Machines has extensive
operations in South Africa. The IBM office,
one o f 27 facilities in the country, was a sales
and service branch where 500 persons usually
work. Only about 30 —all o f whom were
evacuated —were in the building when a
telephoned warning was received a few minutes
before the blast from the United Freedom
Fighters/United Freedom Federation.
A bomb exploded at 3:00 pm after one hundred
people were evacuated from an Elmont, New
York, building that housed the South African
Railways Procurement office. No injuries were
reported. An anonymous phone caller had sent
a warning from the United Freedom
Fighters/United Freedom Federation.
The
Federal Bureau o f Investigation reported
C
o/5
T3 that 12:40 am. an improvised explosive device
tV
3cr exploded at Bankers Trust, 280 Park Avenue,
o
New York City. The explosion caused
extensive damage to Bankers Trust and some
glass damage to the building across the street
oo
tsJ
triggered at 300 Park Avenue. No injuries were
reported. The FALN claimed responsibility.
c—l At 5:45 p.m. a pipe bomb exploded at a travel
c
office in New York. The offices and for nearby
cars were damaged. The Federal Bureau o f
sO
OO
to Investigation believed the Croatian Freedom
Fighters were responsible. The Bureau said the
Croatian Freedom Fighters are a generic name
used by the Croatian National Resistance, an
international anti-Yugoslav organization
committed to the establishment o f Croatia. The
name is used claim responsibility for terrorist
attacks.
December, 1982
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Croatian Freedom
Fighters

2

CD

Pipe Bomb

5

Building
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At 8:30 a.m. the bomb squad o f the New York
police department discovered a pipe bomb
scheduled to detonate at 9:20 a.m. in front o f
the Yugoslav Airlines office in New York City.
Police diffused the bomb, believed by the
Federal Bureau o f Investigation to have been
placed by the Croatian Freedom Fighters.
Puerto Armed Forces o f National Liberation
2
S
3
—
1 (FALN) bombed the New York and American
=r Stock Exchanges, the N ew York headquarters
vO of Merrill Lynch, and Chase Manhattan Bank at
oo
to midnight, causing extensive damage but no
injuries. The blasts came on the 28th
anniversary o f the Puerto Rican nationalist
attack on the House o f Representatives in which
five congressmen were wounded by gunfire.
Since 1974, the FALN has claimed credit for
one hundred twenty bombings in New York
City, Washington, D.C., and Chicago.
■n The Federal Bureau o f Investigation reported
vU
CT*
that a bomb exploded at the New York Stock
d
p
Exchange, 18 Broad Street, New York City. An
improvised explosive device was placed next to
soo a glass door on the north side o f the building
to causing extensive damage to a metal security
door, glass doors and windows, and two
windows in adjacent buildings. Parts o f a
timing device were recovered. The Associated
Press in New York City received a call from a
male with a Spanish accent who stated that a
communique from the Puerto Rican Armed
Forces o f National Liberation (FALN) had been
left in a telephone booth at 91st and Riverside
Drive claiming FALN responsibility for these
incidents. No injuries were reported.

July, 1982
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FALN - Puerto Rican
nationalists

££3

Bomb

V.W

cr

The Federal Bureau o f Investigation reported
that a bomb exploded at the Chase Manhattan
Bank, 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York
City. The device was placed between a pillar
and a window on Nassau Street, causing
extensive glass damage to the Plaza entrance
level at the mezzanine level. A witness
observed gray smoke and the strong order o f
cordite but did not see the perpetrator. No
injuries were reported. The Puerto Rican
Armed Forces o f National Liberation (FALN)
was believed responsible.
The Federal Bureau o f Investigation reported
that a bomb exploded at the Merrill Lynch
Office, 1 Liberty Plaza, New York City. An
improvised device had been placed at the
Cortland Street entrance. Extensive damage
was caused to glass in the building. No
physical evidence was recovered. No injuries
were reported. The Puerto Rican Armed Forces
of National Liberation (FALN) was believed
responsible.
The Federal Bureau o f Investigation reported a
bomb exploded at the American Stock
Exchange at 86 Trinity Place, New York City.
An improvised explosive device was placed on
a window sill causing damage to windows on
the street level. No witnesses were reported and
no evidence was recovered. There were no
injuries. The FBI believed to the Puerto Rican
Armed Forces o f National Liberation (FALN)
was responsible.
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According to Federal Bureau o f Investigation, at
approximately 10:45 p.m., two sophisticated
bombs exploded at the administration building,
o f the University o f Puerto Rico. Rio Piedras,
Puerto Rico. The two devices consisted o f a
propane tank, a 5 by 2 inch pipe bomb, external
packages o f high explosives, a clock timing
mechanism, and an electric blasting. The
communique claiming credit for this incident
reportedly urged students to form semiclandestine groups to fight against American
imperialism. No injuries were reported. The
FBI believed the Antonia Martinez student
commandos responsible. The FBI indicated
that the group is composed o f anti-United States
university students and is named for Antonia
Martinez, a student at the University o f Puerto
Rico who was killed during a you UPR riot on
March 4th, 1970, while standing on the porch of
a boarding house near the campus. Martinez,
19, was struck in the head by a bullet. Among
radical students she is considered to be a
martyr.
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(a) —attempt
(t) —credible threat
Summary:
Targets: 25 buildings, 2 subway, 1 park, 1 chemical plant, 1 water supply
Method: 26 conventional explosives, 3 fire bombs, 1 poison
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APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW FORMAT AND QUESTIONS GUIDE
Explain Purpose
'This interview is part o f a larger study to identify and prioritize strategies to mitigate
the impact o f terrorist attacks against urban infrastructure."
Obtain Consent
"As we discussed, the interview will be taped to help me to tabulate the highlights of
the many conversations in the most accurate way. Is that still agreeable to you?"

Introduction
"There are several broad questions that I'd like to ask o f you. As someone who has
responsibility for dealing with the possibility o f terrorist attacks, there are several
important questions I’d like to ask you."
Questions (based on literature review and review o f attacks against urban
infrastructure meeting criteria for this study over the past twenty years)
1. What do you consider the most likely urban target(s) for terrorist attack?
2. Why?
3. Why do you think it/they are they vulnerable?
4. Which terrorist group(s) do you consider the most likely to launch a
domestic attack? Right/left, foreign/domestic, specific?
5. What do you consider the most likely method(s) o f terrorist attack against
an urban target? (conventional/nuclear/biological/chemical)
6. Given the broad range o f weapons, including weapons o f mass destruction,
that may be employed by terrorists, what ways o f protecting urban targets
do you consider most promising? Least promising?
7. What should we be doing differently to protect urban targets?
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8. Who should be primarily responsible for ensuring our cities are prepared
for a terrorist attack?
9. How can involved agencies play a more effective role?
10. What do you consider to be the downside or unintended impacts o f
enhancing the protection o f urban areas against terrorist attack?
11. What might be some unintended outcomes that must be considered in
strengthening the preparation o f urban infrastructure for terrorist attacks?

Debrief
'"Thank you so much for both your time and expertise. You have provided valuable
information that should be o f great assistance in this study. Your efforts in this
interview are part o f the larger study and, as discussed earlier, a final report will be
available in the Summer o f 2001. I'd be happy to send you a summary."
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